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"To propose an analogy, or simply to understand one, requires taking a kind of mental 
leap. Like a spark that jumps across a gap, an idea from the source analog is carried 
over to the target. The two analogs may initially seem unrelated, but the act of 
making an analogy creates new connections between them. Nothing ever guarantees 
that the target will actually behave the way the source suggests it should ... Some of 
the mental leaps accomplished by analogy have ended in creative triumphs; others 
have ended in dismal failures. Analogy must be recognized as a source of plausible 
conjectures, not irrefutable conclusions. The success of an analogy must finally be 
judged by whether the conj ectures it suggests about the target analog prove accurate 
and useful." 
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, p.7) 
"Often, progress in science begins with finding the right analogy. Recently, cognitive 
and developmental psychologists have invoked the analogy of science itself" 
(Gopnik, 1996b, p.485) 
xii 
Introduction 
How can we best characterize the development of knowledge in childhood? Do 
young children know different things from adults about the world, or is their 
knowledge essentially the same as ours? Are they immature thinkers, br do the forms 
of reasoning seen in childhood tell against any strong demarcation line between early 
and later cognition? What about the origins of knowledge? What representations 
and/or cognitive structures do we begin with and what particular forms do they take; 
for example, is it informative to characterize these structures as modules, constraints, 
biases, or 'starting state' theories? Further, does the current picture we have of the 
developmental process suggest an orderly sequence of incremental shifts, or are there 
major reorganizations of knowledge occurring? Finally, what role does the child's 
everyday experience play in this progression? Does it simply act as a catalyst for 
maturing modules or more actively function as evidence for or against children's 
developing representations of the world? Or is the responsibility for development 
even more equally weighted between a structured environment and predispositions in 
the individual, with cognitive and linguistic abilities somehow emerging as the 'end 
products' of a dynamic interactive process? 
The above questions highlight issues at the heart of cognitive developmental research. 
The content of children's knowledge, their reasoning processes, an accurate 
characterization of the initial state, the nature of conceptual change, and the role of 
experience, are all central to understanding cognitive development because they 
contribute to the task of describing and explaining the changes that occur in the 
developing mind. However, these questions are also seen to be relevant because they 
are informed by an increasingly dominant perspective on cognitive development that 
draws insights from the development of knowledge in science. 
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During the past decade, an extensive body of cognitive developmental research has 
emerged that subscribes either implicitly or explicitly to the analogy of the child as an 
intuitive scientist. This analogy captures the idea that children resemble scientists in 
their attempts to explain and predict phenomena, and thereby directs research 
attention to the development of knowledge in science as a potential source model for 
understanding cognitive development. The "theory theory",l as this perspective has 
become known, receives its most detailed treatment in a recent book by Alison 
Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff (1997). 
In Words, Thoughts, and Theories (1997), Gopnik and Meltzoff claim that a single 
model of development applies across science and childhood. They argue that 
children's and scientists' conceptions of the world constitute theories, that conceptual 
development in both domains amounts to an ongoing process of theory construction 
and revision, and that semantic development is intimately tied to this theory building 
process. According to this version of the theory theory, we begin life with a number 
of "starting state theories" which are open to revision, and the subsequent learning 
process is largely one of theory change based on experience. Crucial to 
differentiating this view of cognitive development from alternatives that posit innate 
modules or the maturation of information processing capacities, is the claim that the 
nature of the relations between evidential input and theories is similar in both 
childhood and in science. Hence the task of capturing the developmental process in 
both domains, according to Gopnik and Meltzoff, involves specifying the causal 
relations that exist between initial theories, evidential input, and new theories that 
result from a conceptual restructuring process. 
In this thesis, I critically examine the utility of the theory theory as presented by 
Gopnik and Meltzoff and propose an alternative formulation of the analogy in which 
the construction of meaningful relations between children and scientists is achieved 
1 This phrase was originally introduced by Adam Morton (Morton, 1980) to refer to the claim that our 
commonsense psychological understanding or folk psychology has the structure of a genuine empirical 
theory, a claim that he argued to be false. Advocates of the theory formation view, however, adopted 
the phrase and a developmental version of the theory theory has come to dominate the literature 
examining the emergence of an understanding of mind in childhood. More recently, researchers such 
as Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have been employing the phrase far more widely to advocate a 
general 'theory formation and change' perspective on cognitive development. It is in the current 
broader sense that the phrase is used in the current work. 
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by developing a methodological perspective on the debate. I will argue that such a 
reinterpretation of the child-as-scientist analogy avoids the problems encountered by 
current attempts to construct mappings between children and scientists, and affords 
researchers a better platform from which to investigate the development of knowledge 
in childhood. With this aim in mind, it is useful to begin by situating the current 
presentation of the theory theory within a recent historical context that surveys a 
range of positions taken by researchers on the question of child-scientist parallels. 
Children's knowledge and framework theories 
An influential application of the scientific analogy to the content and structure of 
children's commonsense knowledge is found in the work of Henry Wellman 
(Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). In a seminal book investigating the 
young child's developing understanding of the mind (Wellman, 1990), Wellman puts 
forward an extended argument for the theoretical status of such knowledge. He 
argues that like scientific theories, children's early understanding of the mind can be 
characterized as coherent, as incorporating fundamental ontological distinctions or 
commitments, and as providing a causal-explanatory scheme for understanding 
phenomena in its domain. More particularly, Wellman proposes that the child's 
theory of mind takes the form of a framework theory and suggests that it is at this 
level of analysis, rather than at the level of specific theories, that the analogy with 
scientific knowledge structures is most informative. 
Drawing on the work of philosophers who have attempted to capture the role of 
theoretical frameworks in science (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Laudan, 1977), 
Wellman argues that a number of features of framework theories make them a useful 
source model for attempts to characterize the nature of our everyday conceptual 
knowledge. Firstly, framework theories serve to define what exists in a domain and 
can be seen to act as framing devices that constrain and support more specific 
attempts to theorize about phenomena. Secondly, these framework theories are 
relatively protected from empirical test and come under scrutiny only when a viable 
alternative causal-explanatory framework is made available that offers a replacement 
for the existing framework. Thirdly, framework theories are particularly relevant to 
issues of how knowledge develops since they constrain alterations to specific 
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knowledge structures within their scope and offer a way of thinking about large-scale 
change within a particular domain (Wellman, 1990). According to Wellman, the idea 
that our everyday knowledge inheres in such framework-theoretical structures allows 
us to make sense of the content-dependent, domain-specific nature of human 
cognition, and offers the beginnings of a research programme for investigating the 
development of these knowledge frameworks in childhood. 
Knowledge systems and strong restructuring 
While the intent of Wellman's work has been to achieve a more precise notion of 
everyday theories by drawing on philosophical accounts of framework theories in 
science, Susan Carey (1985, 1992) has looked to apply the analogy to the issue of 
how knowledge is reorganized during development. More specifically, she has 
investigated the possibility of substantive structural correspondences between 
knowledge systems in childhood and science and in particular, whether changes 
observed in children's conceptual systems involve strong restructuring of the sort seen 
during periods of revolutionary theory change in science (e.g., Kuhn, 1970). 
In her 1985 case study of the emergence of biological knowledge (Carey, 1985), 
Carey attempts to answer these questions by undertaking a close examination of 
children's knowledge of animals and living things, and tracking the changes that 
occur in their understanding between the ages of 4 and 10 years. Based on her 
findings, she endorses the view of intuitive knowledge as organized within domain-
specific theoretical systems and suggests that the reorganization of such knowledge 
over the course of development is best understood in terms of belief revision and 
conceptual change. More particularly, by highlighting evidence of a shift from a folk 
psychological framework and its attendant explanatory mechanisms to a genuinely 
biological framework, together with changes at the level of individual concepts, Carey 
argues that the extent of reorganization involved exhibits parallels with conceptual 
revolutions in science. 
For Carey, then, the analogy with science demonstrates utility because it facilitates the 
construction of a more accurate description of knowledge acquisition in childhood. 
Specifically, it draws attention to the organization of children's knowledge within 
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conceptual systems, and reclassifies children's early knowledge as alternative models 
of the world rather than incorrect or impoverished versions of adult theories. In 
addition, the analogy promotes a concern with changes to the structure of these 
knowledge systems over the course of development and provides deve10pmentalists 
with some much needed tools, such as Kuhn's doctrine of incommensurability (e.g., 
Kuhn, 1982), for tackling the problem of conceptual change. 
The child as spontaneous theoretician 
A somewhat different line of developmental research that makes use of child-scientist 
comparisons has been undertaken by Annette Karmi10ff-Smith (e.g., Karmi10ff-Smith 
& Inhe1der, 1974; Karmi10ff-Smith, 1988). In an article entitled The child is a 
theoretician not an inductivist (1988), Karmi10ff-Smith focuses on the cognitive 
processes involved in discovery and describes a range of problem solving tasks 
designed to uncover the strategies young children use in their investigations of the 
physical world. From a micro genetic analysis of children's performance on these 
tasks, Karmi10ff-Smith identifies a robust pattern of recurrent interconnected phases, 
indicating that children are engaged in spontaneous theory construction. 
During the initial phase of discovery, children are "data driven" and their problem 
solving success rests primarily on the utilization of information in the external 
environment. Having succeeded on the task, children become ''theory driven", 
suspending their interest in achieving behavioural success in favour of generating a 
rudimentary explanatory theory of the phenomena involved. Following this 
"internally driven phase", data and theory are realigned and the children once more 
achieve success on the task, but this time via the application of a consolidated and 
generalized theoretical framework. Based on her findings, Karmi10ff-Smith 
concludes that children cannot be accurately characterized as inductivists; rather, like 
scientists, theory building constitutes a pervasive feature of their everyday problem 
solving. 
From this brief summary of Karmi10ff-Smith's research, it is obvious that the 
scientific analogy functions in a very different capacity compared to its role in 
Carey's investigations. Instead of considering structural parallels between conceptual 
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change in children and theory change in science, Karmiloff-Smith endorses the 
analogy primarily as a way of teasing apart children's action sequences from the 
internal mental representations underlying these sequences. By granting children 
"theories-in-action", and by focusing on the dynamic interplay between theory 
building, heuristics and data in children's problem solving, Karmiloff-Smith is able to 
explain a number of important cognitive changes that occur across development, in 
particular the V-shaped patterns of behavioural success on many tasks. More 
generally, her synchronic approach to the question of how knowledge develops, 
indicates that the processes of scientific knowledge construction are not qualitatively 
distinct from those found to be operating in everyday problem solving, and that theory 
construction plays a pivotal role in learning about the world in both contexts. 
Misrepresenting children and science 
In addition to those who endorse the analogy, a number of researchers have argued 
that comparisons between children and scientists promote misleading assumptions 
about both the nature of cognitive development and the nature of science. These 
arguments can be characterized as taking one of three forms: empirically based 
arguments concerning the reasoning processes employed by children, lay adults, and 
scientists (Kuhn, 1989); arguments from the general standpoint of developmental 
theory (Russell, 1992); and arguments based on social-constructionist analyses of the 
history of science (Gellatly, 1997). I briefly consider each in tum. 
Based on empirical investigations of scientific reasoning skills in children and lay 
adults, Deanna Kuhn (Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel & O'Loughlin, 1988) argues that the 
child-as-scientist analogy promotes an inaccurate view of commons~nse reasoning. 
In support of this claim, Kuhn begins by defining a view of scientific thinking that is 
centrally concerned with the co-ordination of theories and evidence. More 
specifically, she proposes that the abilities required to explicitly state one's theory, to 
know what sorts of evidence would support it and what sorts of evidence would 
undermine it, and to justify its acceptance over competing theories on the basis of this 
theory-evidence co-ordination process, comprise the core skills involved in scientific 
reasoning. Following this definition of scientific inquiry, Kuhn reviews a range of 
research findings to suggest that these scientific skills undergo "strong restructuring" 
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over the course of development. She concludes that "the ability to reason 
scientifically" is not an accurate description of the knowledge seeking endeavours of 
young children. Rather, scientific thinking processes are best understood within a 
developmental framework in which the progressive differentiation and co-ordination 
of theories and evidence is seen to develop in tandem with the emergence of 
metacognitive capacities. 
Another criticism of child-scientist parallels questions its utility as an explanatory 
framework for developmental inquiry. James Russell (Russell, 1992) argues that 
theory theorists' accounts of the child's emerging understanding of mind dangle at a 
hopelessly elevated level of description and, as a result, actively inhibit any useful 
discussion of the developmental process. In his view, focusing on theories and theory 
change is unhelpful for the following reasons. Firstly, such a focus neglects the 
cognitive abilities and competencies necessary for acquiring an integrated body of 
knowledge such as a concept of mind. Secondly, it offers no insights about the 
acquisition process itself, merely describing development as a succession of theories. 
Thirdly, a concern with theory formation and change fails to demonstrate any 
connective threads with the lower level of information processing and (particularly 
critical for Russell) executive control. Russell takes these limitations as motivation 
for dispensing with discussions of theories and theory change altogether, rejecting the 
analogy with science based on its failure to demonstrate any explanatory force. 
Russell's absence-of-mechanism argument is reinforced and further elaborated by 
Angus Gellatly (Gellatly, 1997). In an extended critique of the analogy, Gellatly 
works backward from the history of science to highlight problems of equivalence that 
arise when institutional change is adopted as a model for individual theory 
construction. He argues that comparing conceptual change in the young child with 
theoretical developments in the history of science promotes a fundamental "category 
error". That is, it conflates the cognitive development of an individual with the social 
processes identified by philosophers (e.g., Kuhn, 1962) to be responsible for scientific 
theory change. Failing to respect this distinction between "the personal and the 
social" has, according to Gellatly, two unwelcome consequences. Firstly, it 
encourages a misrepresentation of scientific practice that masks its inherently social 
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nature. Secondly, it leads developmental researchers astray in their search for 
plausible mechanisms of change that are responsible for cognitive development. 
In the preceding pages, I have sketched a recent historical context for the theory 
theory by highlighting the ways in which researchers have variously constructed 
mappings between children and scientists and pointed to some of the criticisms that 
have been levelled at these attempts to reason by analogy. In the chapters that follow, 
I intend to propose and develop an alternative model of the child-as-scientist analogy 
that situates the question of parallels between children and scientists at the 
methodological level. First, however, I suggest that attempts to achieve a clearer 
model of child-scientist parallels will benefit from a prior understanding of 1) the 
relations involved in analogical reasoning itself; and 2) the ways in which an effective 
analogy can advance scientific knowledge in a particular domain. Given that the 
overall aim of this thesis is to exploit the analogy between children and scientists in 
order to develop a more informative model of cognitive change, I therefore begin this 
model development process by examining the nature of analogy and its role in 
scientific inquiry. 
What constitutes a productive scientific analogy? 
A review of the literature on models and the use of analogy in science reveals that, 
traditionally, philosophers have been reluctant to credit modelling practices with a 
legitimate methodological role. 2 For example, Pierre Duhem, commenting on the 
mechanical models employed by 19th century English physicists suggests that, at best, 
such devices are dispensable aids to theory generation and, at worst, a distraction to 
logical ordered thought (Duhem, 1954). In a similar vein, analogical reasoning has 
commonly been presented as a variant of enumerative induction (e.g., Mill, 1872) that 
is incapable of supporting logically valid inferences and, therefore, is properly 
restricted to the context of discovery. Such views clearly indicate a marginalized role 
for models and analogical thinking in scientific inquiry. That is, by stressing the 
temporary nature of a model's influence on the inquiry process and by consigning 
analogical reasoning to the realm of psychological discovery techniques, these views 
2 A notable exception is Campbell (1920). 
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endorse the assumption that modelling practices are extraneous to the business of 
science proper. 
Subsequent detailed analyses of scientific models and analogy, however, have 
overturned this assumption. In its place, philosophers such as Mary Hesse (1966) and 
Rom Harre (1976, 1978) have argued persuasively for the validity of analogical 
argument and for the centrality of modelling to scientific inquiry. More recently, this 
picture has been complemented and extended by a significant body of work in 
cognitive science (e.g., Forbus, Gentner & Law, 1994; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; 
Magnani, Nersessian & Thagard, 1999). The richer representations of models and 
analogical reasoning afforded by these current cognitive accounts reinforce the 
importance that Hesse and Harre place on modelling practices for science. Moreover, 
by attempting to codify the cognitive processes involved in constructing analogies, 
investigating the ways in which such analogies advance our knowledge of poorly 
understood scientific phenomena, and developing ideas about how we can evaluate 
the effectiveness of our analogies, this research goes some way to uncovering the 
features that .mark a productive scientific analogy. A brief summary of the basic 
principles of analogical thinking highlighted by these accounts can be given as 
follows. 
Basic principles 
Both philosophical and cognitive accounts of analogical reasoning begin by making a 
fundamental distinction between two components of an analogy: the source and its 
subject or target (Dunbar, 1999; Harre, 1976; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). The source 
is an entity, process, or system, sometimes drawn from another domain, which is 
already well known and understood. The target is the unfamiliar phenomenon that the 
scientist is trying to understand. The importance of clearly distinguishing these two 
components of an analogy lies in the structured relationship that is established 
between them during the analogical reasoning process. 3 
3 For example, Harre (1976) has argued that this distinction is necessary for the role models play in 
creative theory construction. 
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The process of reasoning by analogy involves establishing a correspondence or 
relation between' the source and the target that enables the transfer of information 
from one to the other. In practice, this is regularly achieved by constructing a model 
that draws on certain features of a known source to develop a plausible analogue of 
the primitively understood target By mapping information about the nature of the 
source onto the target, that is, by viewing the target in terms of the source (Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995), an attempt is made to learn something new about its nature, Viewed 
in this way, reasoning by analogy is essentially a method for developing knowledge 
about unfamiliar or novel phenomena by extension from what is already known 
(Hesse, 1966; Nersessian, 1999; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), 
Concerning the issue of what is mapped from source to target, accounts of analogy 
argue for a selective emphasis on particular features or properties rather than the 
wholesale mapping of a source in its entirety, For example, Hesse (1966) proposes 
that in any particular case the source is unlikely to correspond to the target in all 
respects. She therefore makes a distinction between what she terms "the negative 
analogy" (properties that belong to the source but not the target), "the positive 
analogy" (properties that are shared by source and target), and "the neutral analogy" 
(properties which need to be investigated to determine whether they form part of the 
positive or negative analogy). According to Hesse, the process of model building 
involves discarding the negative analogy and focusing on the positive and neutral 
analogies; the former providing an initial basis for comparison, and the latter offering 
the potential for new predictions (Hesse, 1966), 
Similarly, cognitive accounts of analogy (e.g., Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) stress the 
selective mapping of properties that occurs in analogical reasoning. They further 
highlight the processes underlying this ability to extract features that are common to 
two or more situations while disregarding features that are different, as a significant 
cognitive advance that enables the transfer of information between two entities in the 
absence of global similarity (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). 
The capacity for selective mapping also underscores the ability to construct mappings 
between the source and the target at a number of different levels. Accounts of 
analogy typically distinguish between attribute mappings that focus on the basic 
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attributes or features of the source and target, and relational mappings that focus on 
the underlying patterns of relations between elements (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Hesse, 
1966; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). The most satisfying analogies are those that go 
beyond superficial perceptual similarities to uncover deep correspondences between 
the source and the target. For example, both Hesse (1966) and Harre (1976) stress the 
importance of mapping causal relations when reasoning by analogy in science. 
Similarly, Nersessian's (1999) discussion of analogical modelling focuses on the 
process of generic abstraction seen in classical mechanics, in which there is a move 
from specific examples of motion with all their attendant features, to the construction 
of models at increasing levels of abstraction that recognize cornmon systems of 
underlying relations. 
In addition to highlighting the components of analogy, the process of establishing 
correspondences between source and target, the issue of global versus selective 
mapping, and the levels at which mappings can occur, philosophers and cognitive 
scientists have been concerned to specify the constraints operating on analogical 
thinking. At a general level, researchers have argued that effective model 
construction in science is simultaneously constrained by both the source and the 
target. For example, Harre (1976) proposes that the model needs to maintain a 
relation with the source on which it is based. Yet at the same time it must also be 
adequate to the demands placed on it by the target, namely to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the real object, process, or system under investigation. 
More detailed analyses of the cognitive constraints that guide analogy use have 
identified direct similarity between source and target as a powerful constraint on 
establishing an initial correspondence between them and suggesting the possibility of 
more fundamental parallels (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). The importance of 
structural parallels such as a one-to-one relation between elements of the source and 
elements of the target during the mapping process has also been emphasized (Holyoak 
& Thagard, 1995). 
Finally, accounts of the use of analogy in science suggest that the fundamental 
purpose of analogical reasoning and model construction is to enable scientists to move 
beyond perceptual experience. For example, both Hesse and Harre argue that 
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modelling provides a important additional source of information to observation. 
Specifically, Harre claims that modelling is crucial to scientific endeavour precisely 
because it provides a means of reasoning about the existence and behaviour of a 
target's underlying causal mechanisms that cannot be investigated by other more 
direct methods (Harre, 1976, 1978). 
At a more general level, both philosophical and cognitive analyses emphasize the 
ability of analogical thinking to effect creative changes to existing knowledge, and 
therefore stress the important role played by analogy in conceptual and theoretical 
innovation (Hesse, 1966; Harre, 1978; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Nersessian, 1999). 
However, at the same time these accounts recognize that analogy is a 'weak' method 
that does not guarantee a solution in any particular case. Accordingly, 
recommendations for the effective use of analogy in scientific inquiry stipulate that 
the output of analogical reasoning be rigorously evaluated against the real patterns 
and processes of nature (Harre, 1976). 
The multi constraint theory of analogy 
The above sketch highlights some basic principles of analogical reasonmg and 
provides an initial sense of how analogies can be employed to extend knowledge of 
unfamiliar phenomena A far more detailed account that builds on these basic 
principles is the multiconstraint theory of analogy developed by Keith Holyoak and 
Paul Thagard (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). This general cognitive theory, together 
with the associated computer programs it has inspired, provide an integrated treatment 
of analogical thinking that explains how people use analogy in everyday and scientific 
contexts in terms of the operation of three classes of constraints. 
The first constraint highlighted by Holyoak and Thagard (1995) is similarity. When 
constructing an analogy between a source and a target, they argue that we are 
regularly guided by direct perceptual andlor semantic similarities between properties 
of the source and the target. For example, we may notice that two objects share 
similar features or that components of the source and target have simiiar functions or 
roles. According to Holyoak and Thagard, this natural 'overlap' between the source 
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and the target justifies establishing an initial mapping between them and provides a 
basis for investigating the possibility of more fundamental correspondences. 4 
The second class of constraints on analogical thinking concerns the structural 
consistency of mappings between the source and the target. According to the 
multi constraint theory, the pressure to establish consistent structural parallels means 
firstly, that each element in the source should map onto a unique element in the target 
(there is a one-to-one mapping between elements), and secondly, that when groups of 
elements with particular relations holding between them are mapped from source to 
target, the relations holding these elements together should be preserved. When both 
these criteria are met, the analogy is said to constitute an isomorphism (Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995). 
Finally, Holyoak and Thagard go beyond earlier accounts of analogy that focus only 
on 'internal' issues of similarity and structure, to argue that analogy use is also highly 
constrained by the 'external' goals of the person using it. These goals provide the 
purpose of the analogy. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) highlight a range of purposes 
for analogy in scientific and everyday contexts including explanation, problem 
solving, decision-making, communication, and educational instruction. In each case, 
the purpose for which the analogy was originally constructed is shown to have a 
powerful impact on the subsequent reasoning process. Purpose, then, constitutes the 
third class of constraints on analogical thinking. 
Importantly, the multiconstraint theory interprets the constraints of similarity, 
structure, and purpose as soft rather than inviolable constraints on analogy use that do 
not operate independently of one another. Rather, Holyoak and Thagard liken the 
function of these constraints to a complex of interacting pressures, some in agreement 
and some in opposition, the constant interplay of which pushes the reasoning process 
towards a satisfactory compromise. Successful attempts by Holyoak and Thagard to 
model this process as a constraint satisfaction problem in artificial neural networks, 
4 As an illustration from the child-as-scientist literature, researchers began by noticing that children's 
conceptual structures demonstrated some of the features of framework theories in science, which led to 
a search for further connections between them (see for example Carey, 1985; Wellman, 1990; Wellman 
and Gelman, 1992). 
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have provided concrete demonstrations of how the multiple interacting constraints of 
similarity, structure, and purpose can work together to promote effective analogical 
thinking (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989b; Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson & Gochfeld, 1990). 
Having specified the kinds of constraints that guide analogy use, and their interactive 
nature, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) develop an informative framework for 
representing analogies that identifies three successive levels at which correspondences 
between a source and a target can be established. These levels are differentiated from 
one another on the basis of increasing abstractness and complexity. The first and 
most concrete level concerns attribute mappings, that is, mappings between the basic 
attributes of the source and the target. For example, in comparisons of the 
development of knowledge in science and in childhood, "scientists" in the source 
domain can be taken to correspond to "children" in the target domain. Similarly, 
"scientists' theories" can be seen to correspond to "children's mental models". 
The second more complex level of correspondences identified by the multi constraint 
theory involves relational mappings. In contrast to the basic attribute mappings 
highlighted above, relational mappings are concerned with similar relations holding 
between attributes in the source and target domains rather than the particular attributes 
themselves. Claims that children actively "construct" their mental models in the same 
way that scientists "construct" theories, is an example of a relational mapping: the 
relation between scientists and their theories, namely that of construction, corresponds 
to the proposed relation holding between children and their mental models. 
A helpful way to express such propositions used by Holyoak and Thagard (1995) is 
construct (scientists, theories) 
where the predicate "construct" relates "scientists" and "theories" to one another by 
imposing the particular structure 
construct «constructor>, <constructed». 
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Using this notation, we can express the relational mappings identified above as 
construct (scientists, theories) 
construct (children, mental models) 
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which proposes that "scientists" are related to "theories" in the ·same way that 
"children" are related to "mental models"; in both cases the former "construct" the 
latter (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, p.27; see also Shelley, 1999a, 1999b for 
informative applications of the multiconstraint theory to multiple analogies in 
archaeology and in evolutionary biology), 
Finally, in addition to attribute and relational mappings, the multi constraint theory 
identifies a third level of mappings that is both more complex and more abstract than 
either of the previous two levels, These mappings, referred to as system mappings, 
focus on ", , , the systemic properties of the source and target" (Shelley, 1999a, 
p,583), and involve mapping interconnected systems of higher order relations,5 
Proposed system mappings suggested by advocates of the child-as-scientist analogy 
include the reasons or motivations underlying scientists' theory construction and by 
analogy, children's model construction, For example, Karmiloff-Smith (1988) has 
argued that both scientists and children construct theories in order to explain 
phenomena, which can be expressed as 
in-order-that (construct, explain), 
Alternatively, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) propose that evidence is the primary cause 
of theory change in science and, byeA1ension, conceptual change in childhood; that is, 
evidence causes knowledge to change in both domains which can be expressed as 
cause (evidence, knowledge change), 
5 There are similarities between Holyoak and Thagard's (1995) discussion of system mappings that 
centrally involve higher order relations such as "cause", and Hesse's earlier presentation of analogy in 
terms of (vertical) causal relations within analogues and (horizontal) similarity relations that map 
causal relations between analogues (Hesse, 1966), 
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Both these mappings provide examples of system mappings that can be differentiated 
from less complex attribute and relational mappings by the presence of higher order 
relations such as "cause", and by the fact that it is relations between relations that are 
being mapped from source to target rather than basic attributes or first-order relations 
between attributes. Examples of all three levels of mappings discussed are presented 
in Table 11. 
Table 1.1 The child-as-scientist analogy: Examples of attribute, 
relational, and system mappings. 
SOURCE TARGET 
Attribute scientists children 
scientific theories children's mental models 
Relational construct (scientists, theories) construct (children, mental models) 
System in-order-that (construct, explain) in-order-that (construct, explain) 
cause (evidence, knowledge change) cause (evidence, knowledge change) 
A template 
From the brief presentation given above, it is clear that the multiconstraint theory 
offers a comprehensive account of analogy and its role in creative thought. Firstly, by 
highlighting the operation of three classes of constraints on analogical thinking, the 
theory shows how it is possible to establish systematic correspondences between a 
source and a target. Secondly, by differentiating three levels of complexity in 
analogical reasoning, the multiconstraint theory demonstrates the capacity to represent 
even very complex analogies in a rich and meaningful way. As seen in Table 11 
above, this form of representation that parses an analogy into attribute, relational, and 
system mappings emphasizes the depth of the proposed parallels between source and 
target, and in doing so offers a basis for comparing competing analogies. 
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Finally, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) explicitly tie these increases in mapping 
complexity to the three constraints they have identified as fundamental to analogical 
thinking. Drawing on a wide range of examples, they show how more effective use of 
analogy is associated with a greater satisfaction of the constraints of similarity, 
structure, and purpose. This in tum lends support to their claim that reasoning by 
analogy can be profitably defined in terms of these multiple interactingconstraints. 
The above considerations suggest that the multi constraint theory offers a useful 
template for representing the various child-scientist mappings that have been 
proposed by researchers, as well as providing criteria for evaluating the goodness or 
coherence of various formulations of the analogy. Using Holyoak and Thagard's 
(1995) theory, we can determine that a productive analogy between children and 
scientists will be one that successfully establishes system mappings involving higher 
order relations between the source and the target and does so by applying the 
constraints of similarity, structure, and purpose. In Chapter 7, I will employ the 
specific taxonomy of attribute, relational, and system mappings to undertake a 
comparative evaluation of the theory theory (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997), and my 
alternative methods-centred model of child-scientist parallels that I will develop 
through the course of this thesis. However, first it is necessary to examine Gopnik 
and Meltzoff s theory theory in more depth and to consider some of the criticisms that 
have been levelled against it. These tasks form the basis of Chapter 1. 
Chapter 1 
The Child-as-Scientist Analogy: Current Research 
and Applications 
The central idea of this theory is that the processes of cognitive 
development in children are similar to, indeed perhaps even identical with, 
the processes of cognitive development in scientists. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1997, p.3) 
In the Introduction, I highlighted three major claims by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997): 
firstly, that children's conceptual structures are best described as theories; secondly, 
that their conceptual development is an ongoing process of theory construction and 
revision; and thirdly, that semantic development is effectively bootstrapped to this 
theory change process. Having provided a brief historical background to the theory 
theory, I now want to examine these claims in more detail by elaborating on the 
general framework Gopnik and Meltzoff develop in support of their proposals. 
Accordingly, in Section 1.1 I provide a more in-depth account of the theory theory as 
presented in two recent formulations (Gopnik, 1996b; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). 
Section 1.2 highlights a number of questions raised by this particular characterization 
of child-scientist parallels. In Section l.3, I suggest that these problems demand a 
reorientation of the debate and outline my arguments for an alternative methods-
centred model of cognitive change that I will develop in subsequent chapters. 
The Child-as..scientist Analogy 19 
1.1 The Theory Theory 
It would seem helpful to begin discussion of the theory theory by returning to the key 
developmental questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. That is, in attempting 
to account for the development of knowledge in childhood, how does the theory 
theory characterize the content of children's knowledge, their reasoning processes, the 
impact of initial structures, the nature of conceptual change, and the role of 
experience in development? 
Concerning the content of children's knowledge, the theory theory presupposes that 
children's conceptions of the world will be radically different from our everyday adult 
conceptions. In fact, it is a central tenet of child-scientist mappings that young 
children's knowledge of biological, physical, and psychological phenomena is 
embedded in distinctive frameworks that support different concepts and sets of 
relations amongst concepts from those found in adult theories (Carey, 1985, 1988; 
Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). This 'alternative models' view is 
strongly endorsed by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997), who argue for a knowledge 
continuum on which children's theories are as far removed from adult everyday 
theories in their content as our everyday theories are in turn from current scientific 
knowledge. 
While the theory theory predicts that children do know different things from adults 
about the world, it does not endorse the additional claim that this is due to immature 
reasoning abilities. Unlike Piaget's stage model, which essentially profiles a series of 
developmentally different thinkers (Wellman, 1990), a theory theory perspective 
'uncouples' the differences found in children's theories from the development of their 
central thought processes. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) draw heavily on the analogy 
with science to argue that successive knowledge systems can exhibit qualitative 
conceptual change without corresponding changes in the underlying capacity for 
thought. From this standpoint, they reject the demarcation of child and adult 
cognition, and propose an essential continuity in the processes by which children and 
scientists develop knowledge of the world. 
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Regarding the question of initial structures, the theory theory in its current form 
advocates a strong nativist position whereby humans are endowed with a set of initial 
theories and a capacity for reworking these theories based on experience (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997). Gopnik and Meltzoff argue that this position is in general agreement 
with the wealth of data from recent work on infancy and early childhood, indicating 
that we begin life with a far richer set of representations than previously believed 
(e.g., Spelke, 1991). However, the theory theory diverges from standard 
characterizations of these structures as innate constraints, biases, or modules, by 
allowing them the same form, and importantly the same capacity for revision, as later 
knowledge (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). 
As indicated above, the theory theory is distinctive as an account of development 
because it characterizes innate knowledge as theoretical and therefore open to 
fundamental revision. Further contrasts with competing accounts become apparent 
when attention is turned to the nature of the developmental process itself. From a 
theory theory perspective, the pattern of change is inherently domain-specific as 
opposed to domain-general, and involves radical conceptual reorganization within 
theoretical frameworks rather than a gradual accretion of knowledge. The analogy 
with revolutionary theory change in science is fully exploited by Gopnik and Meltzoff 
(1997), who characterize development as "a succession of theories" and claim that 
theory revision often involves an entire theoretical framework. Moreover, semantic 
development is explicitly drawn into the ambit of the theory theory, with the 
emergence of specific words in a particular domain, and the identification of close 
relations between semantic and conceptual developments being tied to the underlying 
theory change process. 
In this domain-specific restructuring account, children's everyday experience acquires 
an evidential role. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) set forth a particular perspective on 
the interaction between children's experience of the world and their developing 
representations that mirrors the relationship between empirical evidence and 
theoretical development in science. In their view, children's everyday experience is 
properly classified as evidence for or against their developing theories, and as such 
constitutes a bona fide mechanism of developmental change. This classification 
indicates that the causal factors operating in scientific theory change are also 
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operating in cognitive development, and grounds Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) call 
for a unitary model of knowledge development to be applicable across science and 
childhood. 
A consideration of the theory theory's stance on key developmental issues provides a 
useful overview of the main tenets of the theoretical framework. However, while 
versions of these ideas can be found in a number of earlier publications (e.g., Gopnik, 
1984, 1988; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 1994), the latest defence aims to develop the 
theory theory beyond its current heuristic status. In a bid to achieve this goal, Gopnik 
and Meltzoff (1997) advance four main strategies. 
1.1.1 Science and childhood: The cognitive connection 
Their first strategy is to give science a cognitive characterization (see also Giere, 
1988, 1992). In marked contrast to normative and sociological approaches, this 
characterization directs attention to the representational capacities and judgment 
strategies used by scientists to develop knowledge about the world, and therefore 
provides Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) with a common platform from which to posit 
child-scientist parallels. Working from this platform, Gopnik and Meltzoff look to 
focus on the similarities between representations and rules underlying scientific 
knowledge and children's everyday knowledge and the processes that effect change in 
these representations and rules over time. Objections relating to phenomenology, the 
social structures of science, and the uniform development witnessed in childhood, are 
countered by arguing that none of these differences between children and scientists 
undermines this proposed cognitive connection. 
Moreover, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) speculate that the close cognitive alliance 
between children and scientists may in fact have an evolutionary basis. According to 
Gopnik and Meltzoff, the key to uncovering this "common structure" lies in the basic 
theory formation capacities that have evolved in support of early childhood learning. 
They argue that these capacities not only play an important role in the growth of 
knowledge in childhood, but in a similar manner are also seen to underwrite scientific 
mqUIry. In short, Gopnik and Meltzoff claim that the cognitive processes of 
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generating, developing, and revising theories that drive scientists' knowledge 
construction efforts have precursors in cognitive development. They further suggest 
that scientific progress can be made intelligible through these links with childhood 
learning. Working from a theory theory perspective, Gopnik and Meltzoff propose 
that the success of science is largely due to the evolutionary history of the cognitive 
mechanisms it utilizes. The reason science "gets it right" is not because of its peculiar 
organizational structures or social practices, but rather because it exploits cognitive 
abilities that have evolved to ensure early learning gets off the ground successfully. 
1.1.2 Theories and theory change 
The second strategy employed by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) is to offer a detailed 
account of scientific theories that identifies key structural, functional, and dynamic 
features. They argue that if the theory theory is to be developed, then claims that 
children hold theories and that cognitive development mirrors scientific theory change 
need to be far more specific. However, they also acknowledge that the absence of a 
definitive account of theories in the philosophy of science makes this task difficult. 
Their solution is to distil the following account of theories and theory change from a 
variety of philosophical sources (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Hempel, 1965; Popper, 1965; 
Lakatos, 1970; Laudan, 1977). 
With regard to structural features, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue that theories can 
be distinguished from other sorts of knowledge in four principal ways. Firstly, 
theories are abstract structures that postulate entities removed from, and underlying, 
the evidence they are generated to explain. Secondly, theories demonstrate a degree 
of interconnectedness that goes far beyond that of loosely grouped collections of facts 
or beliefs. Rather, the concepts and theoretical terms encompassed by a theory are 
more or less defined by their place in a web of constructs. Thirdly, theories identify, 
and make explicit, the causal relations holding between the theoretical entities and the 
observed patterns in the data. Finally, theories make specific ontological distinctions 
or commitments. That is, an essential feature of theories is they specify the kinds of 
entities that exist in the domain in question. 
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Concerning functional features, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue that theories are 
distinctive because of their predictive, interpretative and explanatory abilities. They 
allow predictions about a wide variety of evidence, not simply the evidential base that 
the theory was originally constructed to explain. Theories also provide a particular 
perspective on the domain in which they operate, including interpretations of the 
relevance of evidence. Finally, theories are unique because of their explanatory 
powers. They offer causal explanatory frameworks that enable their adherents to 
make sense of phenomena in the world. 
The structural and functional features of theories listed above serve to differentiate 
theories from other knowledge structures. However, the most relevant features for 
Gopnik and Meltzoff s purposes are the dynamic processes involved in theory 
construction and revision. Working predominantly from a Kuhnian inspired account 
of scientific change, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) offer the following characterization 
of the epistemological processes involved in the shift from one theoretical framework 
to another.1 Theory change is often preceded by the build-up of counter-evidence to 
the theory. To begin with, the importance of such counter examples may not be 
recognized and the evidence is ignored. Eventually, the need to account for the 
evidence is acknowledged and a collection of auxiliary hypotheses are developed for 
this purpose. However, under the weight of these additional hypotheses the theory 
gradually loses its earlier simplicity and coherence. A final phase in the transition 
requires the construction of an alternative view that is often selectively applied at first 
to those areas where the original theory proved insufficient. Only later is it 
recognized to provide a coherent account of both the anomalies and the evidence 
accommodated by the earlier theory. During this transition, a period of relatively 
1 In an earlier presentation of this account of theories and theory change (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), 
Kuhn (1962) is cited (along with Lakatos (1970) and Laudan (1977», whereas in Gopnik and Meltzoff 
(1997), despite the characterization being virtually identical to that given in Gopnik and Wellman 
(1994), the authors cite Kuhn (1977). However, given the essential continuity in the content of Gopnik 
and Meltzoff's account of theory change with the earlier fonnulation (see also Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; Gopnik, 1996), specifically its focus on the pattern of change described by Kuhn (1962) where a 
proliferation of anomalies are ignored, then accommodated by auxiliary hypotheses, until eventually a 
new theory emerges that is incommensurate with the earlier theory, the critique that follows focuses on 
the authors' reliance on Kuhn's account of revolutionary theory change as a source model for 
understanding cognitive development. 
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atheoretical experimentation and observation may occupy centre stage and provide an 
impetus for change. 
1.1.3 Alternative accounts 
A third strategy employed by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) to develop the theory 
theory involves contrasting it with alternative accounts of the structure and 
development of knowledge. They focus on two important contrasts: the first being 
with innate modules, and the second with what they collectively term "empirical 
generalizations". In each case, they argue that the theory theory can be clearly 
differentiated from these alternatives along a number of dimensions. 
Regarding innate modules, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) suggest that the key 
differences relate to the dynamic features of theories. From a modularity perspective 
(e.g., Fodor, 1983), development is seen to involve the maturation of innate modules, 
with experience typically allocated a minor 'triggering' role. The representations that 
result are in a strong sense predetermined and are not open to fundamental revision 
via evidence. Gopnik and Meltzoff argue that this picture of development contrasts 
markedly with that proposed by the theory theory, according to which children's 
theories are inherently defeasible, and their experience functions as evidence in the 
knowledge development process. 
While the contrast with modules is primarily focused on theory dynamics, the contrast 
with empirical generalizations looks to the structural and functional dimensions of 
theories. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue that theories can also be distinguished 
from a variety of knowledge structures that are loosely grouped under the heading 
"empirical generalizations" because of their common ties to immediate experience. 
Examples given are scripts, narratives, and connectionist nets. 2 According to Gopnik 
and Meltzoff (1997), the organization of these knowledge structures and the ways in 
which they function provide a significant contrast with theories. In particular, 
2 Gopnik and Wellman's (1994) characterization of simulation accounts of the child's developing 
understanding of mind would seem to fit into this category as well. 
The Child-as-Scientist Analogy 25 
empirical generalizations do not show the abstractness and coherence typical of 
theoretical structures, and they offer only limited support for prediction, 
interpretation, and explanation. 
1.1.4 Empirical defence 
As a final strategy to develop their general explanatory framework, Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1997) turn to a detailed empirical defence of the theory theory. Focusing 
on the period from infancy to early childhood, they chart the specific sequence of 
conceptual and semantic developments in three important domains: the understanding 
of appearances, actions, and kinds. In each case, they argue the theory theory makes 
the most sense of the developmental data by providing a coherent framework for 
explaining the concepts, words, inferences, and correlations between conceptual and 
semantic changes that characterize early cognitive development. 
Specifically, their discussion of the evidence suggests that within each domain a 
continuous line of development can be traced through the non-verbal infancy data, 
recordings of children's spontaneous utterances, and later experimental work with 
preschoolers. They argue that this continuity is typically overlooked by conventional 
analyses that focus on the presence or absence of single concepts in children of a 
particular age. Moreover, Gopnik and Meltzoff propose that a theory theory analysis 
is able to deal successfully with seemingly incongruous evidence of both continuity 
and dramatic change in children's knowledge, by proposing an ongoing process of 
theory formation and revision that extends from infancy right through to adulthood. 
Gopnik and Meltzoffs detailed examination of children's understanding of 
appearances, actions, and kinds, also allows them to consider evidence for domain-
specific versus domain-general developments, and their discussion suggests that 
children's knowledge in these three areas may emerge relatively independently of one 
another. Finally, a great deal of Gopnik and Meltzoffs empirical defence involves 
mapping the relations between particular conceptual and semantic developments in 
each of the three domains, in terms of both their timing, and the rationale behind their 
joint appearance (i.e., why a particular word might plausibly be tied to a particular 
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conceptual development). They argue that the empirical relationships uncovered 
between specific words and concepts provides convincing evidence that theory 
changes lie at the heart of both cognitive and semantic development. That is, as in 
science, theory and language change in step with one another. 
1.2 Questioning the extant framework 
Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) presentation of the theory theory currently stands as the 
most detailed account of child-scientist parallels in the cognitive developmental 
literature. It also embodies a particularly strong version of the claim that continuities 
exist between scientific and lay cognition. Precisely because of this detailed and 
immoderate stance, the theory theory raises a number of questions that would not be 
prompted by weaker theoretical positions. In this section, I focus on three main areas 
of concern highlighted by critics: 1) the nature of the relations being established 
between science and childhood, 2) the extension of the theory theory to infant 
cognitIon, and 3) the source model of scientific change that underpins Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs formulation of the analogy. 
1.2.1 Children and scientists: Analogy or identity? 
An initial issue that relates directly to the strength of Gopnik and Meltzoff s· (1997) 
claims is whether they are arguing for analogy or identity between children and 
scientists. Gopnik and Meltzoff do not clearly state their position on this issue and 
blur the distinctions somewhat by arguing at different points throughout their defence 
that both sorts of relations hold (Downes, 1999). However, a close look at their 
arguments for the theory theory indicates an endorsement of identity, or something 
extremely close to it, at the cognitive level: 
Scientists and children both employ the same particularly powerful and 
flexible set of cognitive devices. These devices enable scientists and 
children to develop genuinely new knowledge of the world around them. 
(Gopnik, 1996b, p.486) 
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Our claim is that quite distinctive and special cognitive processes are 
responsible both for scientific progress and for particular kinds of 
development in children. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.49) 
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As indicated in Section 1.1, this claim for deep cognitive similarities between 
children and scientists is not seen to be jeopardized by differences in phenomenology, 
socialization, or timing. Moreover, an evolutionary argument is marshalled to explain 
why such cognitive similarities exist: 
Our hypothesis IS that the most central parts of the scientific 
enterprise, the basic apparatus of explanation, prediction, causal 
attribution, theory formation and testing, and so forth, is not a relatively 
late cultural invention but is instead a basic part of our evolutionary 
endowment. 
. . . we can think of organized science as taking natural mechanisms of 
conceptual change, designed to facilitate learning in childhood, and 
putting them to use in a culturally organized way. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1997, pp.20-21) 
However, if this assessment of cognitive identity is an accurate representation of 
Gopnik and Meltzoffs position, then it raises a number of questions concerning the 
relations between both scientific and lay cognition, and child and adult thought. The 
first, highlighted in different ways by Giere (1996), Faucher, Mallon, Nazer, Nichols, 
Ruby, Stich and Weinberg (2002), and Stich and Nichols (1998), is whether 
attributing common theory formation capacities to children and scientists is suffiCient 
to account for scientific development. For example, Faucher et al. (2002) point out 
that Gopnik and Meltzoff take the same theory revision process - innate theory 
revision mechanisms operating on existing theoretical structures in the face of 
competing evidence - to be at work in childhood and in science. By focusing 
exclusively on these three elements, they effectively rule out all other candidates 
vying for a significant role in scientific change including social and political 
processes (Stich & Nichols, 1998), instrumentation, symbolic notation, printing, and 
experimental methods (Giere, 1996), and culturally transmitted norms (Faucher et aI., 
2002). Yet, as Faucher et ai. and others have shown, this move yields a seriously 
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incomplete account of scientific inquiry. Moreover, it makes it difficult to see how 
the theory theory could illuminate scientific cognition beyond its illumination of 
human reasoning processes more generally. As Giere (1996) puts it, " ... [the theory 
theory's] implications for the study of science as a human activity ... seem limited to 
its implications for normal adults" (Giere, 1996, p.541). 
Secondly, if the claim is for identity between children and scientists, then where does 
this leave adult lay cognition? Gopnik and Meltzoff's argument for deep cognitive 
relations between children and scientists that somehow 'bypass' our commonsense 
adult inquiry practices sits uncomfortably with the more general thesis of continuities 
between everyday cognition and scientific cognition on which the theory theory 
depends. Indeed, proposing a closer link between science and childhood cognition 
than between science and adult lay cognition implies a peculiar sense of discontinuity. 
This impression is reinforced by Gopnik and Meltzoff's suggestions that adult 
everyday cognition is a 'starting state theory' for science in the same way that infant's 
innate theories form the starting state for later theories in childhood, and that children 
and scientists, but not lay adults, are active theorizers. However, this picture of 
inaction and atrophy in lay adults not only clashes with the continuity thesis, it also 
makes assumptions about inter-theoretic relations and the state of our commonsense 
explanatory frameworks that seem at odds with the realities of folk theoretical 
practice. 3 
Thirdly, if the cognitive devices responsible for key developments in childhood are 
identical to those responsible for theory change in science, then this forces a radical 
reconstrual of the cognitive development process. In particular, Gopnik and Meltzoff 
suggest that there will be little to distinguish the learning procedures of young 
3 To take folk psychology as one example, McCauley (1986) has argued that it is 1llllikely to be the 
case that neuroscientific explanations of human behaviour will eventually eliminate our belief-desire 
theoretical framework; rather, some form of co-evolution seems probable (see also Chi (1992) for 
empirical findings concerning intuitive physics that support this claim). Moreover, if lay adults are 
'inactive theorizers', then this would presumably mean that our folk theories have remained essentially 
static and non-progressive. Again using folk psychology as the example, this is clearly not the case. 
We only need to consider our current views of psychopathology and compare them with earlier 
conceptions, in order to see that significant conceptual development and change has occurred over time 
(e.g., Kemp, 1990). 
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children and adult scientists, and this theorizing account of knowle<;lge acquisition 
applies from the beginning oflife. 
1.2.2 Modularity, maturation, and baby theorists 
In Section 1.1, I indicated that a major tenet of the theory theory is to reject any 
fundamental demarcation of earlier and later thought in favour of an essential 
continuity in the processes by which children and adults develop knowledge of the 
world. A clearly stated aim of Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) formulation is to extend 
this continuity thesis to cognitive development in infancy and early childhood, 
thereby going beyond existing applications that have looked to investigate theory 
construction abilities in older children: 
If the theory is supposed to answer Socrates' question, that is, to account 
for our general capacity to develop new knowledge, it should apply more 
generally and be true from the beginnings of life. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1997, p.4) 
With this in mind, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue that we are endowed with rich 
innate theories of object appearances, human actions, and object kinds. The evidence 
that they present is taken to show that these "starting state theories" are very different 
in content from the commonsense theories that we subscribe to as adults, and this 
'distance' is argued to be an indicator of substantial conceptual change. Most 
significantly, these theories are seen to be open to revision in the face of competing 
evidence from birth. Therefore, in looking to apply the theory theory to infancy and 
early childhood, Gopnik and Meltzoff are not only arguing for "theories all the way 
down", but for theory revision as well: 
On the starting-state view, the child is innately endowed with a particular 
set of representations of input and rules operating on those representations. 
According to this view, such initial structures, while innate, would be 
defeasible; any part of them could be, and indeed will be, altered by new 
evidence. We propose that there are innate theories that are later modified 
The Child-as-Scientist Analogy 
and revised. The process of theory change and replacement begins at 
birth. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.51) 
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However, this proposal for theories and theorizing in infants can be seen to raise a 
number of issues concerning the origins of knowledge and the impact of developing 
cognitive resources on children's abilities to acquire knowledge. To begin with, 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) explicitly contrast their "starting-state nativism" with 
"modularity nativism", the view that knowledge is the product of innate modules and 
cannot be revised or overturned in response to evidence. As indicated in Section 1.1, 
it is this indefeasibility of modules that Gopnik and Meltzoff argue provides a key 
contrast with innate theories, and gives license to their claim that theory revision 
occurs from birth. Yet, as Stich and Nichols (1998) point out, nowhere in their book-
length defence of the theory theory do Gopnik and Meltzoff provide direct 
experimental evidence that the processes driving the development of these starting 
state theories are rational responses to evidence. As it stands, Stich and Nichols argue 
that later emerging conceptual structures could be the result of either an evidence 
driven process or " ... a modular system with a sufficiently varied set of parameters 
and triggers" (Stich & Nichols, 1998, p.443). 
Secondly, not only do Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) fail to discount a modularity 
explanation for the early developments they consider, but their extension of the theory 
theory to newborns further serves to highlight what many critics already regard as a 
significant source of dis-analogies between the child and the scientist. As Nersessian 
(1996) remarks in her commentary on Gopnik (1996b), it is an open question how 
maturation complicates the child-as-scientist analogy, and this point would seem to 
gain further purchase when the theorizers in question are 42-minute-old babies as 
claimed by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997). 
Moreover, by arguing that even newborns are active and competent theorizers, 
Gopnik and Meltzoff disregard a significant body of research that details the impact 
of maturational-driven changes in information processing capacities on cognitive 
performance. To take just a few examples, studies investigating the role of inhibitory 
control (e.g., Russell, Jarrold & Potel, 1994), working memory capacity (e.g., Keenan, 
Olson & Marini, 1998), and the capacity to construct hierarchies (e.g., Perner, 1991), 
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have all found significant correlations between conceptual developments (e.g., the 
development of a theory of mind) and these basic information processing capacities, 
suggesting that changes in these cognitive resources contribute to children's capacity 
for theory construction. 
For the knowledge developments they review, Gopnik and Meltzoff explicitly reject 
the proposal that non-conceptual development plays a significant role in cognitive 
change, and argue " ... relevant evidence, rather than theory-independent maturational 
or information-processing changes is responsible for the changes in the children's 
understanding of the world" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.185). Yet by ignoring the 
importance of maturational issues as they apply to the developing mind/brain, and 
hence to the young child's ability to theorize, the theory theory neglects some 
fundamental differences between the situation of the infant and that of the adult 
scientist. In my view, even more serious for the theory theory than its lack of 
integration with research on domain-general developments is the absence of any real 
mechanisms of developmental change. 
1.2.3 Kuhnian revolutions and cognitive mechanisms of change 
In the Introduction to this thesis, I indicated that a central criticism of the theory 
theory approach to cognitive development has been that the characterization it affords 
actively inhibits any useful discussion of developmental mechanisms. As Russell 
(1992) and Gellatly (1997) have argued, the idea that theory change is a model of 
cognitive development does not provide any clear directives about the sources of 
change. Likewise, Nersessian (1996) remarks: 
Precisely because the advocates of the "theory theory" are not Piagetian 
with respect to the processes of cognitive development and conceptual 
change, they owe an account of the nature of the processes through which 
theories form and change, i.e., of what the activity of ''theorizing'' 
comprises. (Nersessian, 1996, p.544) 
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The expressed aim of Gopnik and Meltzoff's latest defence of the theory theory is to 
rectify this problem by specifying the dynamics of theory change that they claim 
underpin knowledge development in science and childhood. In this section, I consider 
how successful Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) have been in achieving this goal. In 
particular, I question the ability of their research programme in its current form to 
deliver a fruitful characterization of knowledge acquisition in childhood. 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) acknowledge that when comparing conceptual change in 
children and theory change in science, the typical strategy of developmental 
psychologists has been to 'buy in' classical descriptions from the philosophy of 
science and utilize them to interpret the empirical data. As indicated in Section 1.1, 
they continue to endorse this approach elaborated by Gopnik and Wellman (1992), in 
which the child's development of an understanding of mind is seen to follow the same 
sequence of progression as the pattern of scientific theory change identified by Kuhn 
(1962). In particular, children are perceived to disregard anomalies initially, then 
resort to an ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis to deal with the counter evidence, use a new 
theoretical idea in restricted contexts, and finally restructure their folk understanding 
so that a new theory emerges that is incommensurate with the earlier theory (Gopnik 
& Wellman, 1992). While Gopnik and Wellman focus on highlighting these 
characteristic features of scientific theory change in the child's emerging conception of 
mind between the ages of two and a half and five years, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) 
want to take the analogy even further and consider what motivates this developmental 
process in the young child. 
Working largely from Kuhn's account of scientific development, they identify (1) the 
accumulation of counter-evidence, (2) theory-internal simplicity or coherence 
demands, (3) the availability of an alternative model, and (4) a period of relatively 
atheoretical experimentation and/or observation, as the critical factors in scientific 
theory change. Having identified these factors in scientific development, Gopnik and 
Meltzoff attempt to superimpose them onto the empirical data of children's conceptual 
development. In particular, for each of the three domains they consider, Gopnik and 
Meltzoff focus on the relation between theory change and the accumulation of 
evidence that weighs against the specific theories that young children hold, and argue 
that changes in evidence cause theory changes: 
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[Concerning the child's theory of kinds] ... [t]he theory theory proposes 
that the motivation for these changes comes from the infants' observations 
of the behaviour of objects. It is the result of evidence. (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997, p.l85) 
33 
Such arguments rest on the assumption that there are substantive parallels between 
historical transformations in science and psychological transformations in children 
(Levine, 2000). More specifically, Gopnik and Meltzoffs proposals indicate that 
theories in science and those held by young children change for the same reasons, and 
hence, that the dynamics of scientific change identified by Kuhn (1962) can provide a 
source of causal-explanatory mechanisms for informing the study of cognitive 
development. 
A major obstacle for this assumption however, is that Kuhn's theory of scientific 
development is not concerned with the scientist-as-individual. In a comprehensive 
review of Kuhn's ideas, Paul Hoyningen-Huene (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993) argues 
that Kuhn's focus is not on the cognitive structures and methods of analysis utilized 
by individual scientists to advance knowledge. Rather, his views of 
incommensurability and paradigmatic change are most accurately interpreted as a 
structural account of the development of science more generally. According to this 
account, it is the scientific community and not the scientist as an individual that is the 
'agent' of scientific activity, whether this activity takes place within a tradition of 
normal science or occurs during a period of revolutionary change: 
The agent of a scientific revolution is, like that of a tradition of normal 
science, a scientific community. This central thesis of Kuhn's is 
important above all for two reasons. First, an inquiry into the factors 
swaying theory choice in scientific revolutions amounts to an inquiry 
into the reasons behind the community's decision. In addition, the 
question of whether a given episode in scientific development should 
properly be ascribed to revolution or to normal science can only be 
answered relative to particular communities. (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, 
p.200) 
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Therefore, by drawing on Kuhn's account of scientific development as a source model 
for the dynamics of theory change in children, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) are 
appealing to terms and criteria that were devised to characterize social processes of 
change in the history of science. 
Not surprisingly, when Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) attempt to adapt Kuhn's 
revolutionary theory change model for their purposes, a number of difficulties and 
confusions arise (Downes, 1999; Bishop & Downes, 2002).4 The most significant of 
these for my purposes, is that Kuhn's (1962) account of revolutionary scientific 
change offers no insights about the process of theorizing as a cognitive activity. 
Hence, when Gopnik and Meltzoff propose that evidence causes theory change, and 
that simplicity or coherence demands playa major role in this process, they have no 
way of using the analogy with science to develop these proposals so that they become 
claims about cognitive mechanisms. As a result, Gopnik and Meltzoff offer no ideas 
about how information from the world might interact with children's conceptual 
representations to effect knowledge development. Similarly, they fail to indicate how 
children might monitor their representations of the world in terms of simplicity or 
coherence criteria. 
In sum, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) want to claim that children construct theories 
and that the cognitive mechanisms underlying this theorizing process are identical to 
those used by scientists. As they say, " ... scientists must be using some cognitive 
abilities to produce new scientific theories ... What else could they be using?" (1997, 
p.15) They further recognize the need to give prominence to individual scientists' 
cognition and look to cast both children and scientists as cognitive agents in their 
account of developmental change. Yet their arguments for the theory theory are 
ultimately wedded to a source model of scientific change whose mechanisms of 
development are not readily translatable into cognitive/psychological terms. As a 
result, Gopnik and Meltzoff are unable to persuasively argue that the cognitive 
4 For example, in a recent critique of the theory theory, Downes (1999) identifies eight separate theses 
concerning the relations between science and children's cognitive development, that suggest Gopnik 
and Meltzoffs defence of the theory theory conflates scientists' cognitive development with the 
historical development of science as a body of knowledge. 
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processes of theory construction and revision are common to children and scientists, 
and fail to offer a convincing account of the mechanisms responsible for cognitive 
development. 
1.3 Refocusing the debate: A methodological perspective 
The above critique of the theory theory has raised a number of questions about the 
relations between science and childhood, the application of the theory theory to infant 
cognition, and the inappropriateness of the source model of scientific development 
that underpins Gopnik and Meltzoffs formulation of child-scientist parallels. A 
number of researchers have taken such problems as sufficient reason to dispense with 
the analogy. In this thesis however, I propose a different route. Rather than 
discounting the utility of child-scientist parallels altogether, I intend, in the chapters 
that follow, to propose a detailed reformulation of the child-as-scientist analogy. I 
will argue that in looking to the scientific analogy to inform our investigations of 
children's knowledge acquisition, we need to select an account of inquiry that 
illuminates the methodological processes by which scientists, rather than the 
community at large, develop knowledge. Having indicated that a Kuhnian account of 
revolutionary change is unable to satisfy this requirement suggests that an alternative 
approach to developing the analogy is required, one that gives serious attention to the 
cognitive character of science, and provides a framework for promoting useful 
discussion of the knowledge development process. I will argue that recent 
developments in methodology, specifically the emergence of a general abductive 
theory of scientific method meets these demands, and when adopted as a source 
model for the child-as-scientist analogy, this theory has the capacity to illuminate the 
process of knowledge acquisition in childhood. 
Accordingly, in Chapter 2 I present a general argument for a methods-centred model 
of cognitive change. I then tum my attention to selecting a specific methodological 
source model, and examine two orthodox theories of scientific method for this 
purpose. In Chapter 3, I consider a third alternative - a comprehensive abductive 
theory of scientific method - and argue for its adoption as an appropriate source 
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model for the scientific analogy. With this source model in place, Chapter 4 aims to 
establish meaningful relations between the abductive account of scientific method and 
the knowledge construction efforts of young children by defining a narrower role for 
the child-as-scientist analogy within an interactionist account of development. 
Working within this framework, compelling parallels are identified between the 
theory building strategies of scientists highlighted by abductive method and the data-
to-theory moves uncovered in micro genetic analyses of children's problem solving. 
Having identified an abductive pattern of reasoning in children's spontaneous theory 
building, Chapter 5 extends the analogy to the processes by which children evaluate 
the quality of everyday explanations, drawing on a computational model of theory 
evaluation for this purpose. In Chapter 6, the focus turns to speculations regarding the 
cognitive origins of science, in light of the theory theory's appeal to an evolutionary 
warrant for child-scientist parallels. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main 
arguments and reinforces proposals for the utility of a methodological perspective on 
the child-as-scientist debate by undertaking a detailed comparative evaluation of the 
theory theory and the abductive-methods account along a number of dimensions. 
Chapter 2 
Choosing a Source Model 
In the previous chapter, I challenged Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) formulation of the 
child-as-scientist analogy, and suggested that a Kuhnian model of scientific change is 
incapable of moving the theory theory beyond its current heuristic status. I pointed 
out that Kuhn's (1962) general description of the rise and fall of scientific theories 
says nothing about the methods scientists use to generate, develop, and evaluate their 
theoretical constructions. Yet, an account of this theorizing process is vital if science 
is to provide a useful source model for thinking about childhood cognitive 
development. 
Having rejected the model of scientific change that underpins the theory theory, I 
therefore begin my reformulation of the analogy by examining options for a more 
appropriate source model. With this in mind, Section 2.1 provides a general rationale 
for a methodological model, based on the centrality of method in science. In Section 
2.2, I suggest that Gopnik and Meltzoffs specific attempt to develop the analogy via 
the interplay between theories and evidence in science requires a methods-centred 
approach. Section 2.3 then reviews the two major orthodox theories of scientific 
method as candidate source models for the analogy, and argues that neither account 
can offer an adequate portrayal of scientific inquiry. I conclude that if the child-as-
scientist analogy is to be successfully developed beyond its current heuristic status, 
then an alternative theory of scientific method will need to be recruited. 
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2.1 Science as method 
Given that throughout the remainder of this thesis I will develop a specifically 
methods-oriented perspective on the child-as-scientist analogy, an initial task is to 
defend this methodological reformulation of the debate. That is, what reasons do we 
have for characterizing science primarily in terms of method? And how does a 
science-as-method view help us develop the analogy beyond its current heuristic 
status? In an attempt to answer these questions and thereby provide a rationale for my 
proposed reformulation, I first present arguments from evolutionary epistemology 
supporting the centrality of method in science. I then tum to the specific claims for 
the theory theory made by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) and suggest that they can only 
be effectively developed within a methods-centred framework. 
2.1.1 Evolutionary epistemology: An overview 
Epistemology is the study of the origins, nature, and growth of knowledge. A 
minimal characterization of evolutionary epistemology provided by Campbell (1974) 
is that this study takes account of, and is consistent with, our evolutionary 
circumstances. Simply stated, this means that when we develop ideas about human 
knowledge, they are in accord with our status as products of biological and social 
evolution given by contemporary science (Campbell, 1974). Defined in this way, an 
evolutionary approach to epistemological issues can be seen to form part of the wider 
domain of naturalistic epistemologies. Such epistemologies interpret humans and 
human knowledge as natural phenomena that are the legitimate subject of scientific 
investigation, and hence recognize the relevance of scientific evidence for resolving 
epistemological problems. Within this broad framework, however, evolutionary 
epistemologists argue for a specific relationship between biological evolution and the 
growth of human knowledge. The exact nature of this relationship has been subject to 
a variety of interpretations. 
Bradie (1986), for example, identifies two distinct interpretations concerning the 
application of biological evolutionary insights to the mechanisms versus the content 
of cognition. The first view, labelled the "evolution of cognitive mechanisms 
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program", argues simply that the biological substrates that support cognitive activity 
have evolved through a Darwinian evolutionary process. The second view, referred to 
as the "evolution of theories program", extends the application of evolutionary 
insights to the content of cognition itself by suggesting that there is an analogical 
relationship between the processes of biological evolution and the processes of 
knowledge development (Bradie, 1986). 
An alternative classification system provided by Hooker (1989) forgoes the bipartite 
distinction between material mechanisms and cognitive content proposed by Bradie 
(1986) in favour of a continuum of positions that vary according to the strength of the 
relationship proposed between biological and cognitive evolution. Hooker 
distinguishes six positions along this continuum that range from the weak claim that 
evolutionary insights can be applied only to the biological substrates of particular 
cognitive ftmctions such as perception, through the partial application of a natural 
selection analogy to the content of human knowledge, to a strong claim for a unified 
evolutionary model in which cognitive evolution is understood as ". . . a literal 
extension of biological evolution" (Hooker, 1989, p.10S). According to Hooker, this 
last claim for identity between biological and cognitive evolution removes an artificial 
dichotomy between the evolution of the brain and the evolution of ideas inherent in 
the weaker claims. Moreover, by removing this distinction and replacing it with a 
thoroughly naturalistic view of human knowledge as simply the "cutting edge" of a 
single dynamic process, Hooker clears the way for the development of an adequate 
epistemology based on the evolution of complex regulatory structures (Hooker, 1989). 
Hooker makes a persuasIve case for his strong VIew of biological-cognitive 
relationships and the broad outline of his position will be adopted in the discussion 
that follows. However, if we accept that evolutionary insights extend in even a 
minimal (i.e., analogical) fashion to the content of human knowledge, then the 
evolutionary picture of human development can be seen to have important 
implications for our ideas of knowledge and knowing. Firstly, as a number of authors 
have emphasized (Campbell, 1974; Hooker, 1987, 1989; Popper, 1973), due 
consideration of our evolved status undermines the assumption that our interactions 
with the world have always been conducted from a position of knowledge and 
privileged understanding. Instead, our 'starting state' is revealed as one of complete 
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ignorance, including ignorance of ourselves and our surroundings, and even ignorance 
of what it is to know (Hooker, 1987). By taking ignorance rather than knowledge as a 
starting point, subsequent evolution can be seen to be total in every respect. As 
Campbell (1974) puts it "[w]e once 'saw' as through the fumblings of a blind 
protozoan, and no revelation has been given to us since" (Campbell, 1974, p.414). 
Secondly, by rejecting a position of privileged understanding that sets us apart from 
other species and replacing it with one of 'evolution from ignorance', we are forced to 
recognize a fundamental continuity between ourselves and other species that extends 
to our knowledge-making efforts. If, as suggested above, human knowing has not 
been the subject of any special creation but has evolved along with all other 
components of life, then we would expect to find basic continuities with the processes 
by which other species interact with, and learn about, their respective environments. 
Regarding the form of this continuity, there is a consensus among a number of 
evolutionary epistemologists (e.g., Campbell, 1974; Hooker, 1987; Popper, 1973) that 
the fundamental process for achieving knowledge gains is best conceived as one of 
trial and error. This process is seen to be the only means available to creatures 
evolving from a state of ignorance (Hooker, 1987). Furthermore, its range of 
application is argued to extend from the simplest organism's interactions with its 
surroundings to human scientific endeavour (Campbell, 1974; Hooker, 1987; Popper, 
1973). 
I have suggested that an epistemology compatible with the evolutionary view of 
human development is one that adopts ignorance as its starting point and recognizes a 
fundamental continuity in intelligent activity across species. What are the 
consequences of these evolutionary considerations for our understanding of science? 
In what follows I argue that their impact lies in the challenge posed to traditional 
views of our knowledge situation, both in relation to other species and to our position 
in the world. This challenge in turn demands a radical reconceptualization of 
scientific endeavour in which questions of method come naturally to the fore. 
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2.1.2 Implications for understanding science 
To begin, by highlighting the belief that human understanding has evolved along with 
all other aspects of life, an evolutionary perspective is fundamentally at odds with 
traditional empiricist views of science, which characterize the scientific enterprise as a 
hierarchy of knowledge structures built on indubitable foundations. As Hooker 
(1987) has argued, if we recognize that nothing is given in advance, then empiricism 
loses its claim to such a guaranteed basis for knowledge and with it the rationale for 
erecting science, including its methodology, on top of this foundation: 
If one knows in advance the nature of true knowledge (e.g., that it is 
grounded in sensory givens, or in mystical access to Platonic heavens) 
then an epistemology may be erected in these terms (using this 
knowledge!) and method deduced as the most efficient means to maximise 
knowledge thus understood. But if one knows nothing in advance, not 
even what it is to know, then the only thing that can matter is a study of 
the methods of relieving ignorance (Hooker, 1987, p.141). 
From this evolutionary standpoint, it makes no sense to define science in terms of 
either direct knowledge received via the senses or a priori valid truths. Rather, 
Hooker (1987) argues that given the totality of our cognitive evolution and the 
absence of any 'givens', the only rational strategy is to focus attention on the methods 
by which we develop knowledge of the world. What Hooker shows then, is that by 
taking our evolutionary position seriously we are led away from a view of science 
built on privileged knowledge and towards one that is centrally concerned with 
method. 
Moreover, by revealing the absence of any knowledge foundations on which to base 
the scientific enterprise, an evolutionary perspective not only supports a science-as-
method view, but also indicates that an appropriate view of scientific methodology 
will be one that recognizes fundamental continuities with our commonsense modes of 
mqmry. As indicated above, the basic process of trial and error is generally 
recognized by evolutionary epistemologists to have broad application across nature, 
including application to human scientific endeavour. However while endorsing this 
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insight, some commentators such as Popper (1973) continue to assume an isolationist 
view of scientific inquiry, in which science is sharply demarcated from commonsense, 
and where scientific method is described in abstract terms. 
In contrast, Hooker (1987) argues that if we are consistent in our application of 
evolutionary naturalist insights to questions of knowledge and knowing, then there is 
no justification for retaining a logical distinction between science and commonsense 
modes of inquiry. In particular, Hooker points out that science is not distinguished 
from other forms of human knowing by any privileged foundations that in turn dictate 
unique methodological practices for scientific inquiry. Moreover, he proposes that a 
scientific methodology that is suited to our evolutionary situation needs to frame 
questions of scientific method specifically in terms of its method users. For Hooker 
(1987), this means reinstituting the human scientist at the centre of science and 
defining scientific methodology not in abstract terms but in terms of our evolved 
cognitive and social capabilities for learning. 
The above considerations suggest that by taking our currently best available scientific 
knowledge about our evolutionary origins seriously, we are led to a view of science in 
which methodological considerations are central. Further, an appropriate conception 
of scientific methodology is revealed as one that rejects any logical demarcation 
between the methods of science and everyday inquiry, and thereby encourages the 
development of a unified account of cognitive learning. Turning to the question of 
child-scientist parallels, a science-as-method view indicates that jf we want to 
consider the ways in which children are like scientists, then it is both plausible and 
appropriate to locate our search for similarities at the methodological level. 
Arguments for the continuity of basic inquiry processes across science and 
commonsense add further weight to a methodological formulation of the debate by 
discounting any a priori distinction between scientific methods and commonsense 
methods and more generally supporting the search for interesting parallels between 
the knowledge construction efforts of children and scientists. 
In this section, I have provided a general rationale for adopting a methods-centred 
view of science. However, in order to support my proposed reformulation of the 
debate, I need to show not only that a science-as-method view is an appropriate 
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perspective to take on science, but also that construing science in these terms can 
promote the development of the child-as-scientist analogy beyond its current heuristic 
status. In order to do this, I return to Gopnik and Meltzoff s (1997) attempt to extend 
the theory theory, and in particular, their focus on theory-evidence relations in science 
as the key to developing an explanatory account of cognitive development. 
2.2 Theory-evidence relations: The key to explaining cognitive 
development 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the Kuhnian model of scientific change underpinning the 
theory theory was an inappropriate source model for the analogy because it failed to 
offer any insights about the mechanisms responsible for cognitive development. 
Building on this point, I now want to highlight the potential utility of an alternative 
method-oriented approach by examining in more detail the nature of Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs (1997) argument for identification of theory change in science and 
cognitive development in childhood. With this in mind, I turn to the philosophical 
questions Gopnik and Me1tzoff (1997) use to structure their discussion of the theory 
theory, as a way of clarifying the intended purpose of the analogy for cognitive 
developmental research. 
2.2.1 Revisiting Socrates' and Augustine's problems 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) open their extended argument for the theory theory by 
posing two general philosophical problems. The first problem, attributed to Socrates, 
involves explaining our capacity to develop new knowledge. That is, given the 
concrete nature of our sensory experience, how is it possible to develop complex 
abstract representations of the world? The second problem, which Gopnik and 
Meltzoff attribute to Augustine, concerns our ability in early childhood to learn our 
first words. In particular, recognizing the arbitrary nature of the connections between 
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specific words and the things in the world that they represent, how do we manage to 
make these connections so quickly and so successfully?l 
Having selected these problems as a way of introducing the theory theory, Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1997) align contemporary investigations of children's cognitive and 
linguistic development with these broader philosophical concerns, and propose that the 
analogy with science offers a solution to the questions posed by Socrates and 
Augustine, as well as providing an explanatory framework for the developmental data 
In particular, by redefining cognitive development as theory change Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1997) argue that the theory theory can be seen to chart a viable middle 
course between the extremes of rationalism and empiricism, allowing researchers to 
discard various versions of the claims that either we are born knowing everything 
(rationalism), or we learn everything (empiricism). The analogy with science, they 
suggest, offers the key to explaining how knowledge develops, and this key lies in the 
relations between scientific theories and evidence: 
Scientific theory change is, after all, one of the clearest examples we 
know of the derivation of genuinely new abstract and complex 
representations of the world from experience. The model of scientific 
change might begin to lead to answers to the developmental questions 
and, more broadly, might begin to answer Socrates' philosophical 
question. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 3) 
... the answer we will propose to Socrates' question is also an answer to 
Augustine's question, and an answer that can explain the empirical facts 
about early meanings that were discovered by developmental 
psycholinguists. Thinking of cognitive development as theory change 
also gives us a new and better way of thinking about semantic 
development. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.6) 
1 For the original presentations of these problems, see Plato's Meno and Saint Augustine's Confessions 
(1.8). 
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In Chapter 4, I question Gopnik and Meltzoffs claims to have successfully defined a 
viable 'middle ground' for cognitive developmental research. The point to be made 
here, however, is that by weaving together philosophical questions about how we 
come to understand the world with findings from developmental research, Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1997) can be seen to extend the analogy beyond earlier applications that 
focused primarily on descriptions of conceptual change (e. g., Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992). Specifically, by placing the theory theory in direct competition with the 
theoretical frameworks of rationalism and empiricism, and by suggesting that it 
demonstrates the ability to provide answers to the philosophical questions raised by 
Socrates and Augustine, Gopnik and Meltzoff indicate they are concerned with 
developing an explanation of knowledge acquisition in the broadest possible sense. 
However, while the authors explicitly endorse this shift in the purpose of the scientific 
analogy, they continue to rely on a source model that at most offers them only a 
general description of the knowledge development process. 
2.2.2 Theories and evidence: How does knowledge develop? 
In order to collapse the distinctions between the development of knowledge in 
childhood and science, Gopnik and Meltzoffrecast children's conceptual structures as 
theories, their experience of the world as evidence for or against these theories, and, as 
highlighted above, propose that children's development of successive representations 
of the world can be seen as the outcome of an interplay between the two. While this 
'coalescence' gives them access to the resources used to explain scientific 
development, it also shifts the burden of proof onto this evidence-driven process. This 
in turn demands that their statements about the nature of the relations between 
evidential input and theories are not left open to interpretation but are instead anchored 
to an adequate theory of scientific method that provides them with a detailed 
explanation of how inquiry proceeds. 
However, although Gopnik and Meltzoff recognize the explanatory demands their 
knowledge-driven account of development places on theory-evidence relations, they 
continue to rely on the following non-methodological account of scientific 
development, drawn largely from Kuhn (1962): 
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1. Counter evidence accumulates against the theory in question 
2. Initially this counter evidence is disregarded 
3. Ad hoc hypotheses are subsequently invoked to account for the anomalies 
4. Over time these auxiliary hypotheses undermine both the theory's simplicity and 
its coherence 
5. An alternative model to the original theory comes to light (often an extension of an 
idea that is already implicit in a peripheral part of the theory) 
6. Initially the model is applied only to evidence not explained by the original theory 
7. Eventually the new idea is adopted as a coherent explanation of both the anomalies 
and the evidence explained by the earlier theory 
8. A period of intense experimentation and/or observation spans this theory change 
process (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 39). 
This is the most detailed account of theory-evidence relations to be found in Gopnik 
and Meltzoff's (1997) defence of the theory theory. Indeed this description of the 
interplay between theories and evidence in science forms the template used by the 
authors in later empirical chapters of their book to characterize domain-specific 
developments as instances of the theory theory in action. Yet, in light of Gopnik and 
Meltzoff's explanatory goals, this list of "epistemological processes" would seem to 
be an inadequate source model for the theory theory in at least two fundamental 
respects. 
Firstly, the general description of scientific theory change it provides fails to specify 
the crucial relations holding between theories and evidence, beyond saying that 
theories somehow come into contact with evidence and this 'contact', whatever it 
amounts to, somehow causes them to change. Secondly, this description says nothing 
about how the interplay between theories and evidence determines the truth or 
'goodness' of scientific theories. Yet, Gopnik and Meltzoff rely on the view that 
science progresses towards an increasingly accurate account of the world, in order to 
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argue that theory change is a good model of cognitive development? Gopnik and 
Meltzoff (1997) acknowledge this ambiguity to some extent: 
Though the relation between the evidence and the change in the theory is, 
of course, far from simple, the theory theory proposes that there is 
something about the world that causes the mind to change, and that this 
fact ultimately grounds the truth of theories. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, 
p.53) 
If the above assessment is correct, then the theory theory's focus has shifted from 
describing the content of children's knowledge and how it changes over time, to 
developing an explanation of the process by which this knowledge is generated, 
without undertaking a corresponding shift to a source model of scientific development 
that meets these new explanatory demands. Recognizing this fundamental mismatch 
between Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) model of scientific change and the purpose of 
the analogy, indicates the need for an alternative source model - one which offers a 
detailed reconstruction of the knowledge development process in science and, 
following Hooker (1987), frames questions of scientific method in terms of its method 
users. Adopting such a methods-centred account for the analogy would not only 
render the relations between theories and evidence explicit, but as will be shown in 
later chapters, also facilitate the investigation of common inquiry processes across 
scientists' knowledge-seeking endeavours and children's everyday problem solving. 
Up to this point, I have focused on providing a rationale for adopting a 
methodological perspective on the child-as-scientist debate. This has involved 
reconstructing arguments from evolutionary epistemology that indicate the centrality 
of method in science, and demonstrating how the purpose of current attempts to 
develop the child-as-scientist analogy is consistent with a methods-oriented approach. 
Given the potential utility of a methodological source model for investigating child-
2 The ambiguity in Kuhn's writings over the question of whether science progresses through 
revolutions (see Chalmers, 1999), would also appear to be at odds with Gopnik and Me1tzoffs 
intention to use a broadly Kuhnian source model to explain children's cognitive progress. 
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scientist parallels, I therefore tum in the next section to examine two specific theories 
of scientific method as candidate source models for the analogy. 
2.3 Orthodox theories of scientific method 
Given the importance of theory-evidence relations to the explanatory arsenal of the 
theory theory, we can structure our search for an adequate theory of scientific method 
by asking how philosophers of science have traditionally interpreted these relations. 
That is, how do the different accounts on offer construe the interplay between the 
mind and the world? What roles have variously been attributed to perceptual 
experience and abstract conceptual representations in the construction of scientific 
knowledge? How does one constrain the other? Does information gathered from the 
world provide a foundation for scientists' theorizing about it and, if so, how? Finally, 
what mechanismls of scientific method operate to ensure as far as possible that 
scientists are capturing the causal structure of the phenomena being studied? That is, 
what aspects of scientific method are responsible for ensuring the rigour of the 
knowledge construction process in science? These questions seem both important and 
useful if we are to settle on an adequate theory of scientific method that holds the 
promise of informing our theorizing about the development of knowledge in 
childhood. 
2.3.1 An inductive account 
A common perception of science holds that scientific knowledge is unproblematically 
derived from the facts of experience, and it is this view that lies at the heart of an 
inductive account of scientific method, expressed in the following quote by A. B. 
Wolfe: 
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If we try to imagine how a mind of superhuman power and reach, but 
normal so far as the logical processes of its thought are concerned, . . . 
would use the scientific method, the process would be as follows: First, all 
facts would be observed and recorded, without selection or a priori guess 
as to their relative importance. Secondly, the observed and recorded facts 
would be analyzed, compared, and classified, without hypotheses or 
postulates other than those necessarily involved in the logic of thought. 
Third, from this analysis of the facts generalizations would be inductively 
drawn as to the relations, classificatory or causal, between them. Fourth, 
further research would be deductive as well as inductive, employing 
inferences from previously established generalizations. (Wolfe, cited in 
Hempel, 1966, p.ll) 
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According to this conception of scientific inquiry, often referred to as 'nai've 
inductivism', scientists have at their disposal a procedure for mechanically generating 
true theories about the world from a secure base of observable facts. 3 Scientific 
inquiry proceeds by gathering all the facts in a disinterested manner to preserve their 
objectivity and then applying the rules of inductive inference to arrive at 
generalizations or laws concerning these facts. Precisely because of their solid basis 
in observation and the mechanical process by which they are derived from this 
foundation, these laws or theories are assumed to capture regularities actually existing 
in the world (see Figure 2.1). 
From the description given, the inductive method seemingly offers the promise of an 
algorithm for truth. Critics of the inductive method however have identified a number 
of issues that undermine this promise. These issues concern both the nature of the 
facts from which scientific knowledge is supposedly derived, and the derivation 
process itself 
3 More recent attempts to articulate a viable inductivist account of scientific inquiry have softened the 
requirement that scientific knowledge be proven true. Instead, inductive arguments are given a 
probabilistic interpretation; that is, they are seen at best to lead to probable truth. For the sake of 
simplicity, the commentary that follows concentrates on a critique of naIve inductivism. However, 
most of these criticisms can also be made against a more sophisticated inductive probability account. 
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Figure 2.1 The main inferential move In an inductive account of 
scientific method. 
Firstly, a number of commentators (e.g., Hempel, 1966; Curd, 1980) have argued that 
scientific inquiry on an inductivist view could never get underway if scientists were 
expected to collect all the facts while operating in a theoretical vacuum. Not only is 
an exhaustive recording of all facts impossible, it is also inappropriate. Scientists are 
typically interested only in those facts that pertain to the specific problem they are 
investigating. However as Curd (1980) makes clear, without a pre-existing theory to 
direct inquiry there is no way of determining which facts are relevant. Against the 
prescriptions of the inductive method, the observation and recording of facts will be 
necessarily circumscribed and guided by a scientist's theoretical preconceptions. This 
in tum means that these facts are to a certain extent dependent on the theories they 
presuppose (Chalmers, 1999). Acknowledging the theory dependence of the facts that 
constitute the foundation for science, then, suggests that this 'foundation' is not nearly 
as secure or infallible as the inductive method implies. 
A second problem examined at some length by Chalmers (1999) concerns the issue of 
accessibility to these facts. The main reason facts are seen to offer scientific 
knowledge a secure base is that they are assumed to be directly established by the 
senses. This assumption, however, fails to recognize that a great deal of a scientist's 
time and energy is dedicated to active intervention in the world (Hacking, 1983). The 
rationale for conducting experiments would lose much of its force if facts relevant to 
science were readily observable and only needed recording. The reality of scientific 
practice where scientists regularly attempt to isolate the factors or processes under 
study and control for the effects of confounding variables speaks against such a 
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passive model. Rather it suggests that the facts of interest to science are typically 
abstracted from the world rather than 'given' in any straightforward sense. 
The forgoing issues highlight problems with the inductivist view that directly 
observable facts provide a secure foundation for scientific knowledge. Even more 
problematic is the claim for a set of mechanical rules for inductively deriving true 
theories from this factual base. Not only does no such algorithm for truth exist, it is 
difficult to see how one could be conceived that would be capable of assuming the 
role it is allocated in the inductive account. To begin with, there are difficulties 
specifying what a satisfactory inductive argument actually amounts to (Chalmers, 
1999). To illustrate, the principle of induction states: 
If a large number of A's have been observed under a wide variety of 
conditions, and if all those A's without exception possess the property B, 
then all A's have the property B. (Chalmers, 1999, p.47) 
However as Chalmers (1999) points out, this meager characterization is not very 
helpful. It does not specify what "a large number" means, or indicate that this 
demand cannot be fixed in advance for all instances but will vary enormously 
depending on the particular problem under study. Similarly, this characterization 
provides no clues as to what constitutes a significant variation in conditions and on 
what grounds we are to make such a decision in any particular situation. Yet 
delimiting the potentially endless number of variations is essential if we are to reach a 
precise statement of the conditions under which a generalization constitutes a 
justifiable inductive inference (Chalmers, 1999). 
A further point made by Curd (1980) indicates that important scientific discoveries 
involve " ... an essential element of creativity and conceptual innovation which could 
never be performed by a machine following an algorithm" (Curd, 1980, p.207). The 
transition from data to a theory that delineates novel concepts not present in the 
evidential base seems to demand a certain degree of creative ingenuity. This suggests 
that even if a set of generally applicable and adequately specified rules of induction 
were made available, they would at most provide only a partial formula for generating 
scientific knowledge. 
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The problems with inductive method highlighted above, suggest the claim that science 
proceeds by mechanically deriving true theories from a secure base of observable 
facts, is untenable. The stipulation that scientists gather data in an undirected manner 
effectively means that inquiry proceeds in a blind fashion. The claim that scientific 
knowledge is inductively derived from these given facts is problematic because no 
one has been able to come up with an adequate account of this derivation process. 
Recognition of these difficulties has forced philosophers of science to consider 
alternative proposals for a workable account of scientific method. Not surprisingly, 
the successor to inductivism is an account in which the inductive generation of 
theories plays no part. 
2.3.2 A hypothetico-deductive account 
Carl Hempel, one of the primary advocates of the hypothetico-deductive account of 
scientific method, suggests that science proceeds by" ... inventing hypotheses as 
tentative answers to a problem under study, and then subjecting these to empirical 
test" (Hempel, 1966, p.17). According to this view, also referred to as "the method of 
hypothesis", a hypothesis or theory is indirectly tested by deriving from it a ''test 
implication" or prediction via a deductive reasoning process. This prediction is then 
checked by observation or experiment. If the prediction is found to be false then the 
hypothesis is rej ected. If the prediction is borne out by the test then, at least on 
Hempel's view, it confers a degree of retrospective justification or confirmation of the 
original hypothesis (see Figure 2.2).4 
In stark contrast to naIve inductivism then, the hypothetico-deductive model solely 
provides general operational guidelines for testing theories against the world. There 
are no prescriptions for generating theories in the first place. Neither Hempel nor 
Popper view discovery as a process of systematic inference that is amenable to logical 
analysis. Instead theories are seen to be "free inventions of the human mind" 
(Einstein, 1934), and therefore more relevant to psychology's interests than to the 
4 According to Karl Popper who argues for a falsificationist construal ofhypothetico-deductive 
method, while successful tests of a theory's predictions can be understood to offer some degree of 
corroboration for the theory, a theory can never be confmned, only falsified (popper, 1959). 
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philosophy of science. The essence of the inductivist programme is therefore 
dismissed as falling outside the bounds of scientific method. There is no logic to the 
discovery of theories, only to their subsequent confirmation. 
Hypothesisl 
Theory 
Figure 2.2 
Test 
Prediction 
CONFIRMATIONI 
FALSIFICATION 
Hypothetico-deductive method. 
At first glance, hypothetico-deductivism appears to provide scientists with a far more 
manageable formula for knowledge production. Appealing to deductive logic to 
derive predictions from a theory, and then checking these predictions for their 
empirical adequacy, invokes a (logically) rigorous test of a knowledge claim in terms 
of its consequences. However, despite claims to have achieved a workable account of 
inquiry by restricting science to a logic-and-testing exercise, this account of scientific 
method exhibits a number of serious failings. 
Firstly and most seriously, is the inability of the hypothetico-deductive model to do 
what it claims to do, namely to adequately test the theories it seeks to evaluate. As a 
number of critics have pointed out (e.g., Glymour, 1980; Rozeboom, 1972; Salmon, 
1967), in any realistic test situation as opposed to the pared-down examples used to 
exemplify a deductively valid argument, there will be a number of auxiliary 
assumptions or theories operating in conjunction with the theory under evaluation. 
This means that any predictions are not derived solely from the theory put forward for 
test, but from the conjunct of this theory and its associated auxiliary assumptions. In 
the case of an unfavourable test outcome, it will not be possible to identify whether 
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the responsibility for the failed test lies with the theory in question or with one of the 
auxiliary assumptions. Therefore, despite its promises to the contrary, the 
hypothetico-deductive account is unable to provide conclusive grounds for rejecting a 
knowledge claim. 
Further limitations of this view of scientific method are revealed when we consider 
how little of the process of knowledge development in science it actually covers. In 
fact by confining methodological attention to theory testing, this approach leaves 
much of scientific inquiry unaccounted for. Most noticeably, hypothetico-
deductivism disregards the methodology of theory generation, assuming that the 
initial "creative leap" to the theory is an activity that defies rational characterization. 
Accordingly, this account begins with the theory already formulated. However, such 
a disregard for discovery processes is both unhelpful and misleading. Specifically, it 
fails to acknowledge the existence of patterns of reasoning underpinning theory 
generation that indicate the strong possibility of a logic to discovery (e.g., Peirce, 
1931-58; Thagard, 1988; Josephson & Josephson, 1994). 
While the hypothetico-deductive model places theory generation outside the bounds 
of science, the methodological process of theory development is overlooked 
completely (Haig, 1987). The fact that this account begins with theory testing implies 
that theories are generated in a mature form. This assumption, however, fails to 
recognize the inherently developmental nature of scientific theories. As a result, this 
model of inquiry encourages the premature testing of undeveloped, often singular 
knowledge claims in science. Gains in the way of valuable knowledge from such a 
practice are, not surprisingly, negligible (Rozeboom, 1972). 
Finally, hypothetico-deductivism presents an unduly restrictive notion of theory 
evaluation. The baseline assumption of this account is that testing theories for their 
empirical accuracy provides scientists with a conclusive test of a theory's value. I 
argued above that in any actual scientific situation this assumption is unwarranted 
because the hypothetico-deductive model fails to test a theory in isolation from other 
knowledge claims. In addition, the recognition often referred to as the Duhem-Quine 
thesis, namely that theories will always be underdetermined by the available evidence 
(Duhem, 1954; Quine, 1963), indicates that any evaluation process based solely on 
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this criterion will be incomplete. Alongside predictive success, a range of super-
empirical criteria including explanatory power, simplicity, fertility, and practical 
utility will need to be deployed. By demonstrating an exclusive concern with 
empirical adequacy however, the hypothetico-deductive account ignores this need to 
develop a multi-criterial perspective on theory evaluation. 
In summary, while an inductivist conception of scientific method was shown to be 
untenable, a consideration of hypothetico-deductivism suggests that it fails to do 
justice to the actual structure of scientific reasoning. Relegating theory generation to 
the status of guesswork that involves no codifiable pattern of reasoning, ignoring 
theory development, and restricting the focus of evaluation to a theory's predictive 
success, all serve to reduce scientific method to a simple logic-and-testing model. By 
employing this reductive approach, a hypothetico-deductive account produces 
operational guidelines for what is in effect a highly circumscribed theory testing 
strategy. By itself, this strategy is insufficient to meet the demands of an adequate 
theory of scientific method. 
2.4 Beyond orthodoxy 
In this chapter, I have argued in favour of a methodological reformulation of the 
child-as-scientist debate, and have examined two orthodox theories of scientific 
method with a view to selecting an appropriate source model for the analogy. 
Specifically, I have evaluated each account in terms of the process by which it claims 
to give us knowledge of the world, and the various roles it assigns theories and 
evidence in this knowledge construction process. 
According to a narve inductivist account, scientists gather data and then derive true 
theories as output. This view stresses the primacy of observation; that is, information 
from the world provides an infallible and secure foundation for the theory generation 
process that follows. In contrast, a hypothetico-deductive account stresses the 
primacy of theory. According to its prescriptions, scientists begin with a theory 
already formulated and use deductive logic to derive predictions from this theory that 
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are amenable to empirical test. On both accounts then, the world constrains scientists' 
theorizing efforts, but in fundamentally different ways. While naIve inductivism 
advances a form of foundational generation where theories are constrained by the 
factual base from which they are derived, hypothetico-deductivism advocates 
foundational justification, in which the world is the reference point for evaluating 
scientists' guesswork and where theoretical constructions are only accepted into the 
body of scientific knowledge if they withstand the rigours of an empirical testing 
process. 
A review of the range of criticisms that have been levelled at these two orthodox 
theories of scientific method by philosophers of science reveals that neither account is 
capable of providing an adequate perspective on scientific inquiry. This suggests that 
if we are to develop the child-as-scientist analogy along methodological lines, then we 
must adopt a more informative theory of scientific method as our source model. With 
this aim in mind, I move beyond orthodox accounts in the next chapter to examine 
recent developments in scientific methodology, and in particular the emergence of a 
comprehensive abductive theory of scientific method. 
Chapter 3 
An Abductive Theory of Scientific Method: A 
Third Alternative 
In Chapter 2, I provided a general rationale for a methodological reformulation of the 
child-as-scientist analogy and argued that the investigation of child-scientist parallels 
would benefit from a methods-oriented approach. Specifically, I showed that Gopnik 
and Meltzoff's (1997) focus on theory-evidence relations in science needs to be tied 
to a codified account of the inquiry process. A review of the major two theories of 
scientific method, however, revealed that neither inductivism nor hypothetico-
deductivism has the resources to provide an adequate portrayal of this process. In 
order to recruit a workable account of scientific method as a source model for the 
child-as-scientist analogy, it is therefore necessary to consider a third alternative. The 
alternative to be presented in this chapter, drawn from recent developments in 
methodology, is an abductive theory of scientific method (Raig, 2002). 
In Section 3.1, I introduce the abductive theory by way of its dual focus on the 
detection and explanation of empirical phenomena, and highlight links to both a 
renewed philosophical interest in the empirical base of science and a growing 
recognition of abduction as an important species of scientific inference. Section 3.2 
presents the abductive framework in more depth by detailing the multiple interacting 
contexts of inquiry that comprise abductive method. In Section 3.3, I conclude by 
briefly examining arguments for the domain and context specificity of methods in 
science and suggest that such arguments do not undermine the abductive theory's 
status as a general theory of scientific method. 
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3.1 Detecting and explaining empirical phenomena: Twin goals for 
inquiry 
3.1.1 (Re)focusing on empirical phenomena 
In the previous chapter, I identified a number of limitations facing inductivism and 
hypothetico-deductivism and suggested that neither account met the demands of an 
adequate theory of scientific method. An inductive or 'bottom-up' approach, as 
Chalmers (1999) terms it, places undue stress on the infallibility of observations and 
fails to demonstrate how scientific knowledge is derived from this secure foundation. 
In contrast, a hypothetico-deductive or 'top-down' approach side steps the generation 
process altogether, locating the interplay between theory and evidence within a 
justificationary context. However, this received view of scientific method is unable to 
show how the process of checking a theory's test predictions against the world affords 
a decisive assessment of a theory. 
The failures of orthodox accounts of scientific method to adequately characterize the 
relationship between scientific theories and the material world, has led one group of 
philosophers to challenge widely held assumptions about the nature of empirical facts 
and their role in scientific inquiry. In their view, many of the problems confronting 
contemporary philosophy of science stem from an inaccurate rendering of the 
empirical base of science and can be resolved by redirecting philosophical attention to 
experimental practice. The proponents of this view are collectively known as the new 
experimentalists and the school of thought they have engendered as "the new 
experimentalism" (Ackermann, 1989). 
The new experimentalism 
According to Ian Hacking, one of the pIOneers of the new experimentalism, 
contemporary philosophy of science is curiously anti-experimental in its outlook. 
This is odd, Hacking insists, because 'experimental method' used to be synonymous 
with 'scientific method' (Hacking, 1983, p.149). For example, during the scientific 
revolution of the seventeenth century, comments by the philosopher Francis Bacon 
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that scientists should 'twist the lion's tail' - actively intervene in the world rather than 
merely observe it - were representative of, and in keeping with, scientific practice. In 
contemporary philosophy of science, however, such references to experimental 
manipulation have (until recently) been conspicuously absent (Hacking, 1983). 
In an attempt to identify the historical reasons behind this shift to an anti-experimental 
stance in the philosophy of science, Hacking (1983) points to both the rise of 
positivism with its corresponding focus on observation, and the subsequent 
emergence of the theory dependence movement, as pivotal in the divorce of scientific 
method and experimentation. Concerning the impact of the positivist tradition, 
Hacking argues that prior to about 1800 (which he identifies as the starting point for 
positivism), the notion of observation was not central to philosophy of science. Yet 
after this date, observation, and in particular the creation of a fundamental distinction 
between observation and theory became increasingly important to discussions of 
science and scientific reasoning. 
According to Hacking (1983), the creation of this distinction in philosophy of science 
altered what was understood to be real, with reality becoming confined to what could 
be observed with the unaided senses. Having this firm foundation of observational 
facts as a starting point, philosophical attention was redirected towards the 
development of increasingly sophisticated accounts of how theoretical statements 
could be logically derived from this observational base. This focus, however, meant 
that questions about the production of these empirical facts were virtually ignored. 
As Ackermann (1989) puts it, "[0 ]ne simply began to philosophize on the assumption 
that science was capable of delivering a data base of settled observational statements" 
(1989, p.l85). 
By ignoring the ways in which reliable observational facts are produced, positivism 
encouraged the view that the process by which scientists obtained such facts was 
straightforward and unremarkable. This view in turn offered little rationale for 
directing philosophical attention to issues of how scientists manipulated or intervened 
in the world, and consequently the perceived importance of experimentation to the 
task of characterizing scientific method was noticeably downgraded (Hacking, 1983). 
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While Hacking (1983) credits positivism with initiating a reduction in the perceived 
importance of experimental practice, he argues that it has been the subsequent theory-
dependence movement that has been primarily responsible for its disappearance from 
philosophy of science discussions. Beginning with Kuhn (1962), this movement 
proceeded to dismantle the secure foundation of observable facts that had provided 
the starting point for positivist accounts of scientific knowledge. In its place, all 
observation was argued to be theory-laden to the extent that even the most 
commonplace observations were seen to depend to some degree on theoretical 
assumptions (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1959). 
With theory dictating, or at least having an influential role in, observation the 
fundamental division between observations and theoretical inferences promoted by 
positivism was held to be no longer sustainable. However, in addition to sweeping 
away the positivist legacy of secure facts, Hacking (1983) argues that the currently 
dominant theory-dependence movement has also pushed experimental practice even 
further into the philosophical background. History of science, he suggests, has 
become the history of scientific theories, and the role of experimentation in this 
history is either downplayed, ignored or in some cases actively rewritten. 1 Moreover, 
it is accepted that theory precedes experiment both temporally and in terms of its 
overall importance to an account of scientific method. A quote from Popper attests to 
the relative weightings given to theory and experiment in contemporary philosophy of 
science: 
1 Hacking (1983) provides some interesting examples in which important experimental episodes in the 
history of science have been misrepresented as simply exercises in theory testing or confirmation, 
supporting his claim that experimental science is often rewritten as "theory history". 
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The theoretician puts certain definite questions to the experimenter, and 
the latter, by his experiments, tries to elicit a decisive answer to these 
questions, and to no others. All other questions he tries hard to exclude .. 
. it is a mistake to suppose that the experimenter ... [aims] 'to lighten the 
task of the theoretician', or ... to furnish the theoretician with a basis for 
inductive generalizations. On the contrary the theoretician must long 
before have done his work, or at least what is the most important part of 
his work: he must have formulated his question as sharply as possible. 
Thus it is he who shows the experimenter the way. (Popper, 1959, p. 107) 
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This 'theory-before-experiment' view suggests not only that theory is logically prior 
to experiment in scientific inqll;iry, but that the only role of experiments is to test 
theories. In short, there is no generative role for experimental findings in scientific 
research. Rather, an experiment makes sense only if it is providing an answer to 
questions that are first put forward by theoreticians (Hacking, 1983). 
By highlighting the rejection of pre-theoretical observations or experiments in theory-
driven philosophy of science, Hacking (1983) shows how the theory dependence 
movement has shifted the onus of responsibility for scientific knowledge squarely on 
to the shoulders of theoretical conjecture. However, he points out that with this shift 
has corne many of the problems that confront contemporary philosophy of science, 
most notably the absence of any secure base for scientific knowledge and the 
accompanying threat of disintegration into an anarchic state of 'anything goes' when 
the notion of theory-dependence is taken to its extreme conclusion (e.g., Feyerabend, 
1975). 
Against this backdrop, Hacking and other experimentally inclined philosophers argue 
for what Hacking terms a "Back-to-Bacon movement" in philosophy of science 
(Hacking, 1983, p.l50; see also Franklin, 1986, 1990; Galison, 1987; Mayo, 1996). 
These new experimentalists reject outright Popper's dictum that the only role of 
experiment is to test theories. In doing so, however, they do not attempt to resurrect 
the earlier positivist assumption that observational facts are unproblematically given 
by the senses. Instead, they argue that attending closely to actual experimental 
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practice offers an alternative to both traditions, in which a revised empirical base for 
science is located in the results of experiment. 
From the detailed narratives of experimental episodes in the history of science 
constructed by the new experimentalists, three important themes emerge (Mayo, 
1996). Firstly, the fine-grained analyses of what actually goes on in experimental 
practice indicate that understanding the role of experimentation in science offers a 
means of removing doubts about the objectivity of observation introduced by a 
theory-dominated picture of inquiry. In-depth discussions of the techniques and 
procedures employed in experimental research indicate the availability of a range of 
practical strategies and intervention tactics for reliably establishing experimental 
effects that do not depend on the application of high-level theory. 
Secondly, the existence of such theory-independent warrants for determining the 
reality of empirical findings has led Ian Hacking to argue that "[e]xperimentation has 
a life of its own" (Hacking, 1983, p.150), and the results of such experiments 
constitute a body of controllable and reproducible empirical facts that do not 
disappear in the face of changing theory. Moreover, recognition of the stability and 
permanence of such experimental knowledge suggests an important form of 
(empirical) continuity and progress in science that is not apparent from a theory-
dominated stance (Chalmers, 1999; Hacking, 1983; Mayo, 1996). 
Finally, a consistent finding by the new experimentalists in their probing of 
experimental episodes is a focus of activity on what Deborah Mayo terms "the local 
discrimination of error" (Mayo, 1996, p.60). According to Mayo, these experimental 
narratives reveal that much experimental testing involves breaking a substantive 
problem or inquiry down in such a way that it is amenable to techniques that test for, 
and rule out, specific errors. Such a focus suggests it is the ability to differentiate real 
effects from artifacts, and thereby establish the existence of empirical phenomena, 
that is the cornerstone of experimental knowledge. What the new experimentalists 
have begun to develop with their detailed historical narratives of experimental 
episodes in science is a catalogue of methods and techniques for reliably achieving 
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such knowledge that has been overlooked by contemporary accounts of scientific 
inference focused on the appraisal of large-scale theories.2 
To sum up, the impact of the new experimentalist movement in the philosophy of 
science has been to rekindle interest in the empirical base of science by providing a 
wealth of information about actual experimental practice, including the focus of 
researchers' efforts on obtaining reliable data, the experimental processes and 
techniques that are used to achieve this end, and the role that the resulting empirical 
knowledge plays in scientific inquiry. In keeping with these insights, a related body 
of work has attempted to refine ideas about the exact nature of this empirical base by 
introducing an important distinction between data and phenomena. 
Data and phenomena 
The popular or characteristic view of inquiry maintained by contemporary philosophy 
of science is that scientific theories explain and predict facts about what is observed. 
However, in a series of influential papers (Bogen & Woodward, 1988, 1992; 
Woodward, 1989, 2000), James Bogen and James Woodward argue that this 
assumption is fundamentally mistaken, and stems from a failure by philosophers of 
science to distinguish claims about data from claims about phenomena. 
Bogen and Woodward describe phenomena as stable, general features of the world. 
Phenomena are the robust empirical regularities or 'effects' that scientists attempt to 
detect using a variety of experimental and statistical techniques, and explain by 
appealing to general theory. Bogen and Woodward point out that it is claims about 
phenomena that are the focus of scientific explanation and prediction and can serve as 
evidence for a theory under investigation. Examples of phenomena given by Bogen 
and Woodward include the melting point of lead, weak neutral currents, and recency 
effects in short-term memory (Bogen & Woodward, 1992). 
2 Mayo (1996) builds on the experimental narratives provided by Ian Hacking and others to construct a 
comprehensive philosophy of experiment that focuses on the process of validating claims 
experimentally by subjecting them to severe tests. 
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In contrast, data are public records or reports of discrete measurements or readings on 
a recording device (e.g., a thermometer, a questionnaire, etc.), that comprise the 
results of a particular experiment or study. Data are in a form that is accessible to the 
senses, and hence are open to public inspection and scrutiny. The publicly accessible 
nature of data is essential for the evidential role that data play in science. As Bogen 
and Woodward (1988) point out, data constitute the observational eviderice for the 
existence of phenomena, which are typically unobservable. Data, therefore, provide 
researchers with their 'window' on phenomena. They (potentially) carry information 
about the existence of phenomena and as such are produced and interpreted by 
scientists for the sole purpose of extracting that information. Examples of data that 
might serve as evidence for the phenomena listed above, include reports of individual 
temperature readings in the case of the melting point of lead, bubble chamber 
photographs in the case of weak neutral currents, and reports of reaction times and 
error rates in certain psychological experiments in the case of recency effects in short-
term memory (Bogen & Woodward, 1992). 
Given the lack of attention to experimental practice in theory-dominated accounts of 
inquiry highlighted by the new experimentalists, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
data-phenomena distinction advocated by Bogen and Woodward has been ignored in 
philosophy of science until recently. However, in detailing the points on which 
phenomena and data differ, Bogen and Woodward (1988) discuss why it is a mistake 
to confuse or conflate the two and assume that science explains facts about observed 
data. Firstly, this assumption fails to acknowledge the proper objects of scientific 
explanation. While data are usually straightforwardly observable, they cannot be 
predicted or explained in any systematic way. This is because the data produced in an 
investigation will reflect not only the causal influences of the phenomenon under 
study (assuming it is successfully detected), but also a complex combination of causal 
factors that are peculiar to the specific experimental setup. Therefore, data will not 
possess the recurrent invariant features that make phenomena natural candidates for 
systematic explanation and prediction. 
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Secondly, the assumption that scientific theories explain and predict facts about what 
we observe obscures the evidential role that data play in science and with it the set of 
procedures scientists use to reason from claims about data to claims about phenomena 
- procedures that indicate scientists are primarily concerned with ensuring data 
reliability. Drawing on the narratives of important experimental episodes in science 
constructed by the new experimentalists, Bogen and Woodward (1988) highlight a 
wide range of these procedures routinely used in experimental practice including 
control of possible confounding factors, replications, statistical analysis, data 
reduction, and the empirical investigation of equipment including calibration of 
instruments. They argue that despite the popular view of science, none of these 
procedures are concerned with explaining the data. Rather, their aim is to identify and 
control for factors that could adversely affect the data's reliability. Therefore, 
sufficiently distinguishing data and phenomena not only accords with what scientists 
engaged in experimental work actually do, but also clarifies why they do it - ensuring 
the reliability of data is critical because it forms the grounds for claiming that 
phenomena exist (Woodward, 1989). 
In summary, the refined understanding of what science should be attempting to 
explain and predict offered by Bogen and Woodward, together with the more general 
resurgence of interest in the empirical base of science promoted by the new 
experimentalists, reveals the neglect of experimental practice in philosophy of science 
and indicates the benefits of refocusing on the role of empirical phenomena as a 
solution to problems that have plagued theory-dominated accounts. For the purposes 
of this chapter, this work is instructive because it suggests that a more adequate theory 
of scientific method will need to incorporate an account of how reliable empirical 
facts are produced in science, and give greater attention to their role in scientific 
inquiry than orthodox accounts have previously allowed. 
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3.1.2 The role of abduction in scientific explanation 
In the previous section, I focused on the detection of empirical phenomena and 
suggested the need to incorporate a role for such detection processes in a more 
satisfactory theory of scientific method than that offered by either naIve inductivism 
or the received hypothetico-deductive view. Giving due attention to how scientists 
manage to reliably detect phenomena and move from claims about data to claims 
about phenomena, suggests the need for a corresponding focus on how phenomena 
are explained, that is, an account of the forms of reasoning that allow scientists to 
move from descriptive claims about phenomena to explanatory theory. Drawing on 
insights from the new experimentalists together with the work of Bogen and 
Woodward, I indicated in the previous section that reasoning from data to phenomena 
is predominantly empirical in character. Here I draw on the work of the American 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-58) and those who have followed him, to 
suggest that reasoning from phenomena to theory is predominantly a matter of what 
has been termed abductive inference. 
Introducing abduction 
The term 'abduction,3 was first used by Peirce to refer to the process by which 
explanatory hypotheses or theories are formed. According to Peirce (1934), 
abduction or "the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis" in order to 
account for some puzzling phenomenon, constitutes a distinctive kind of reasoning 
that is pervasive in science and in everyday life. To take an example, I was recently 
on a bus travelling to university, when I noticed an elderly woman who ran into the 
middle of the busy road ahead of the bus and frantically waved her arms up and down. 
With no conscious effort, I found myself thinking she must be trying to 'flag down' 
the bus. Abductively I formed the hypothesis that she wanted the bus driver to stop 
3 Peirce also used the tenus 'hypothesis' and 'retroduction' to refer to this form of explanatory 
reasoning. Other labels given to the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis (although differing 
from Peircean abduction in some respects), include 'inference to the best explanation' (Harman, 1965) 
and 'explanatory induction' (Rozeboom, 1972, 1990, 1997). In this thesis I use the term 'abduction' to 
reflect its increasing prominence in philosophy of science discussions (e.g., Niini1uoto, 1999) and 
widespread application in artificial intelligence (AI) research on problem solving (e.g., Josephson & 
Josephson, 1994), as well as its adoption in cognitive science (e.g., Magnani, Nersessian & Thagard, 
1999; Magnani, 2001). 
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and pick her up, which provided a plausible explanation for her rather unusual (not to 
mention risky) behaviour.4 
The above example demonstrates the ubiquitous human tendency to postulate motives 
or particular states of mind in order to explain the actions of other people. Further 
instances of everyday hypothesis formation are found in perception, for example 
when we are faced with incomplete or ambiguous visual stimuli that we need to make 
sense of In science, researchers frequently construct hypotheses to attempt to explain 
puzzling facts such as observations by nineteenth century astronomers that the orbit of 
Uranus diverged from what was expected, or experimental findings by Lavoisier and 
others that objects gain rather than lose weight during combustion. In all these cases, 
abduction plays a pivotal inferential role (Thagard, 1988). 
Peirce identified abduction as a valid form of inference that is importantly distinct 
from the classically conceived forms of induction and deduction. That is, he 
observed: 
There is a large class of reasonings which are neither deductive nor 
inductive. I mean the inference of a cause from its effect or reasoning 
to a physical hypothesis. (Peirce, 1982, vol.1, p.180) 
Moreover, Peirce's analysis of the inferences scientists make in reasoning to their 
hypotheses suggested to him that abduction exhibits a definite logical form: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (Peirce, 1934, vo1.5, p.1l7) 
4 Presumably, the driver abduced a similar hypothesis to account for the woman's behaviour because 
he immediately pulled over, let her on the bus, and reproached her for risking her life in order to get 
him to stop. 
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According to Peirce, while deduction involves reasoning from a hypothesis to an 
empirically testable consequence that can be checked by experiment, and induction 
involves reasoning from a class of observations to descriptive generalizations based 
on those observations such as reasoning from a sample to a population, abduction is 
primarily an explanatory move in which we create a hypothesis or theory to account 
for observed phenomena by postulating the (potential) causes of those phenomena: 
All the ideas of science come to it by the way of Abduction. Abduction 
consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. 
(Peirce, 1934, vo1.5, p.90) 
The great difference between induction and hypothesis [i.e. abduction] 
is, that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we have 
observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes 
something of a different kind from what we have directly observed, and 
frequently something which it would be impossible for us to observe 
directly. (Peirce, 1932, vo1.2, p.385) 
Abductive inference and the logic of discovery 
Concerning the role of abduction in scientific inquiry, Peirce most consistently 
emphasized its operation in the initial creation of hypotheses and his ideas have been 
seen as providing the basis for a logic of scientific discovery (see also Hanson, 1958). 
To take one example, in a useful analysis of the arguments both for and against the 
possibility of such a logic, Curd (1980) attempts to resolve the debate by analyzing 
three major positions: the hypothetico-deductive account championed by Popper and 
Hempel; the inductive-probability account attributed to Reichenbach and Salmon; and 
the abductive inference account offered by Peirce. To begin, Curd argues it is 
necessary to distinguish between two fundamentally different components of a logic 
of discovery that are typically conflated: a logic of prior assessment and a logic of 
theory generation. According to Curd, a logic of prior assessment deals with " ... the 
methodological appraisal of hypotheses after they have been generated but before 
they have been tested" (Curd, 1980, p.203). Such prior assessments can be of two 
kinds: a logic of probability, namely probability judgments of the truthfulness of a 
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hypothesis either in isolation or relative to competing hypotheses; and a logic of 
pursuit, which offers assessments of the pursuit-worthiness of a hypothesis or 
competing hypotheses based on more practical questions such as whether it makes 
sense to work on a particular hypothesis given certain constraints operating (e.g., 
time, money, resources, and the current state of knowledge), and which hypothesis of 
a range of possibilities recommends itself for detailed examination and testing (Curd, 
1980). 
The second component of a logic of discovery, namely a logic of theory generation, 
differs from a logic of prior assessment in that it is concerned with the initial creation 
of theories. In terms of possible characterizations of a logic of theory generation, 
Curd (1980) offers three alternatives: the production of a procedure or algorithm for 
generating meaningful hypotheses; historical narratives of periods of theory 
generation in the history of science; and a rational reconstruction of the theory 
generation process that includes both a classification and accompanying justification 
of the inferential strategies involved (Figure 3.1). 
Logic of 
discovery 
Logic of prior / ~ Logic of theory 
assessment generation 
/\ / ~ 
Logic of Logic of Algorithm Historical Rational 
probability pursuit narrative reconstruction 
Figure 3.1 Curd's (1980) classification of the components of a logic of 
discovery. 
Having made the above distinctions, Curd draws on Peirce's insights concerning 
abductive inference to argue that none of the objections traditionally raised against the 
possibility of a logic of discovery count against a logic of prior assessment understood 
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in terms of pursuit-worthiness or a logic of theory generation conceived as a rational 
reconstruction, and it is these senses of a logic of discovery that Peirce was committed 
to in his explication of abduction. Moreover, Curd suggests that these two conceptions 
are in fact reconcilable because the logic of prior assessment formulated as a logic of 
pursuit supplies the justification for the inferential strategies involved in a rational 
reconstruction. Therefore, Curd employs Peirce's broad ideas about abduction to 
argue that it is the logic of pursuit that is the key to constructing a logic of discovery 
(Curd, 1980). 
"Good Science is Abductive, Not Hypothetico-Deductive" 5 
While Peirce's general treatment of abduction is most commonly referenced in 
connection with attempts to construct a logic of discovery, more recent investigations 
that extend his ideas to include detailed accounts of abductive inferential strategies, 
suggest the need to recognize a wider role for abduction in scientific inference. To 
take one example, Thagard (1988) has developed a detailed computational model of 
problem solving and discovery, which suggests that abductive reasoning is central to 
both the discovery and justification of scientific theories. Rejecting the traditional 
division between these two contexts of inquiry (e.g., Reichenbach, 1938), Thagard 
draws on computational analyses of the inferences involved to show that abduction is 
a key mechanism in the discovery of hypotheses as well as being an important 
element in their justification. Moreover, through the development of this 
computational model (named PI for "processes of induction"), and subsequent 
analyses of its performance on a range of different problem solving tasks, Thagard 
argues that there are a number of different ways in which hypotheses can be 
abductively obtained that have been overlooked by a traditional focus on 'simple 
abduction' or the formation of "hypotheses about individual objects" (Thagard, 1988, 
p.54). Specifically, he identifies four subspecies of abductive inference that are 
distinct from simple abduction, namely existential abduction, rule-forming abduction, 
analogical abduction, and inference to the best explanation. According to Thagard 
5 Rozeboom, W. W. (1997). Good science is abductive, not hypothetico-deductive. In L. L. Harlow, S. 
A. Mulaik, & J. H. Steiger (Eds.), What if there were no significance tests? (pp. 335-391). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
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(1988) all four kinds of abductive inference have been neglected in attempts to 
characterize scientific inference, yet all can be recognized as playing an important 
role in the inquiry process. 
Further work by artificial intelligence researchers who capture the algorithmic nature 
of how we reason abductively in a range of problem solving situations, reinforces 
Thagard's call for abductive reasoning to be allocated a central place in scientific 
methodology. For example, Josephson and Josephson (1994) report a range of 
findings made in the course of designing and testing systems that can successfully 
perform explanatory reasoning tasks and argue that abduction constitutes a family of 
"reasonable and knowledge-producing inferences" (Josephson & Josephson, 1994, 
p.1) with broad application in science and everyday life. And in philosophy of 
science, Rozeboom (1997) surveys a range of recent work that has contributed to the 
revival of interest in abduction, including his own research, which details the 
operational specifics of reasoning from data regularities to explanations of those 
regularities (e.g., Rozeboom, 1972). On the basis of these investigations, he argues 
that the abductive model of rational belief change offers a superior alternative to both 
the Bayesian and received hypothetico-deductive views of scientific' method, and 
should be installed as " ... our premier account of scientific reasoning" (Rozeboom, 
1990, p.555). 
Collectively, this body of recent work that investigates how we reason abductively 
has built on the general ideas formulated by Peirce to produce computationally 
rigorous and operationally specific guidelines for explanatory reasoning. In doing so, 
moreover, this research has highlighted the need to incorporate a central role for 
abductive inference in any adequate account of scientific method. Attending to the 
actual reasoning strategies deployed by scientists in their theory formation efforts, 
together with mounting evidence that abductive inferences offer the only viable 
means of reasoning successfully from phenomena to theory, suggests a focus for 
attempts to develop a theory of scientific method that surmounts the problems 
inherent in inductive and hypothetico-deductive accounts. It is time then, to tum to a 
theory of scientific method that attempts just this. 
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3.1.3 Abductive method: An overview 
Against the background of a renewed philosophical interest in the empirical base of 
science and a growing support for abductive reasoning to occupy a central place in 
scientific methodology, a recently developed abductive account suggests itself as a 
promising candidate for a general theory of scientific method. In contrast to both 
inductive and hypothetico-deductive accounts, this theory, advanced by Brian Haig 
(Haig, 2002), takes scientific inquiry to be a problem-focused endeavour that is 
centrally concerned with the detection and explanation of empirical phenomena. 
According to the abductive theory, inquiry proceeds through a number of phases: 
• Guided by an evolving problem that directs and constrains inquiry, data are 
collected and analysed in order to detect robust empirical regularities or 
phenomena. 
• Once these phenomena have been reliably detected, they are explained by 
generating ideas about the mechanisms that are producing them. This 
abductive process involves reasoning back from the phenomena to the causal 
mechanisms underlying the phenomena in order to generate a rudimentary 
explanatory theory of those phenomena. 
• Following its generation, the theory is developed by employing one or more 
modelling strategies that serve to elaborate on the nature of the causal 
mechanisms involved. 
• When a theory is well developed, it is evaluated against competing theories on 
a range of empirical and super-empirical criteria that emphasize the 
explanatory worth of theories (Haig, 2002). 
Theory construction is therefore conceived as an extended reasoning process in 
abductive method in which phenomena provide the focus for inquiry and 
abduction assumes a prominent role in all three contexts of theory generation, 
development, and evaluation. The main inferential move in abductive method 
from phenomena to theory is depicted in Figure 3.2: 
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Theory 
Development 
Theory 
Evaluation 
ABDUCTION 
Figure 3.2 The explanatory move from phenomena to theory in the 
abductive method. 
By recasting scientific method broadly in terms of the detection and explanation of 
empirical phenomena, the abductive theory is well placed to overcome the limitations 
of inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism highlighted in Chapter 2. Firstly, by 
codifying how these twin objectives guide scientific research, the abductive theory 
necessarily covers a broad range of investigative tasks. The result is a wholistic 
conception of method that includes the formulation of the research problem and the 
collection and analysis of data to facilitate phenomena detection, as well as the 
extended process of theory construction that incorporates generation, development, 
and appraisal dimensions. 
Secondly, the abductive theory doesn't just provide a more complete framework for 
understanding scientific method. Instead, it embodies a significant reinterpretation of 
the 'theory-evidence' relationship that carves up their respective roles and 
responsibilities in a fundamentally different way. Whereas inductivism stresses the 
primacy of observed facts and hypothetico-deductivism emphasizes the primacy of 
theory, the abductive theory reinterprets the empirical base of science in terms of 
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phenomena and accords equal weighting to both their detection and theoretical 
explanation. According to abductive method, scientists construct theories in order to 
explain phenomena The development of new knowledge is therefore grounded in, 
and constrained by, an initial search for robust empirical regularities. In tum, the 
theorizing process that follows goes beyond a description of the phenomena to 
abductively infer the existence of causal mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. 
Therefore, rather that the foundational generation advocated by naIve inductivism, or 
the foundational justification touted by hypothetico-deductivism, the abductive 
account codifies the methodological processes involved in moving from phenomena 
to theory to advance a form of what I will call 'empirically grounded explanation '. 
The following sections clarifY and elaborate this idea. 
Thirdly, in its role as a general theory of scientific method, the abductive theory 
provides a broad conceptual framework that attempts to capture how scientists 
typically develop new knowledge. In contrast to inductive and hypothetico-deductive 
accounts, the abductive theory does not advocate a simplistic algorithm for knowledge 
production. Rather, it provides an integrative super-structure highlighting the 
multiple phases of inquiry, that frames and informs more specific methods and 
procedures. The framework or super-structure explains and regulates the knowledge 
construction process as a whole, while the specific research methods give the theory 
its operational force in each of the phases of inquiry that together comprise the 
general framework. 
With a brief overview of the abductive theory of scientific method in place, the 
following sections look to provide a more detailed characterization of the framework. 
In undertaking this characterization, my aim is twofold: firstly, to clarifY how the 
multiple interacting contexts of inquiry form a cohesive whole; and secondly, to show 
how this particular construal of the interplay between the 'mind' and the 'world' 
provides us with a workable general theory of scientific method.6 
6 The following depiction of abductive method draws heavily on Haig (2002). For earlier formulations 
of the abductive theory see Haig (1987, 1996); for applications of the theory to clinical assessment see 
Ward and Haig (1997) and Ward, Vertue and Haig (1999). 
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3.2 The abductive framework 
3.2.1 Research problems 
In an attempt to improve on the strictures of inductivism and hypothetico-
deductivism, Haig (2002) begins by emphasizing the importance of understanding 
method within the context of problem solving. While the selection and formulation of 
research problems is an integral part of scientific inquiry, neither of the orthodox 
theories of scientific method examined in the previous chapter takes the idea of a 
research problem seriously. In fact, this neglect of problems is arguably a 
contributing factor to the inability of inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism 
(standardly conceived) to adequately explain how science progresses. For example, 
an inductive account instructs researchers to gather data in a free and undirected 
manner but offers no guidance concerning which facts are relevant and therefore is 
incapable of showing how an investigation could get underway. A standard 
hypothetico-deductive account also ignores research problems by initiating inquiry 
paradoxically with theories or problem solutions (Nickles, 1981). However, in doing 
so, hypothetico-deductivism effectively confines its attention to the final phase of 
inquiry and fails to demonstrate how scientists actually reach this endpoint. 
In contrast, Haig (2002) explicitly acknowledges the need for a problem-oriented 
conception of inquiry and incorporates a "constraint inclusion" account of problems 
within the abductive theory (Nickles, 1981; Haig, 1987). In brief, this account defines 
a problem as comprising all the constraints required for its solution as well as the 
demand that the solution be found. According to this characterization, research 
problems are not divorced from relevant background theory or from constraints 
imposed by heuristics, principles and rules. Rather, these constraints are included in 
the research problem itself and actually define what the problem is by determining its 
structure. Moreover by including the basic demand that they be solved, problems are 
necessarily connected to the goals of the research programme in which they arise. 
Adopting this account of problems then, not only indicates that problems sit at the 
heart of inquiry, but also reveals how they provide an inherent road map for the 
inquiry process. Specifically, given that articulating the research problem involves 
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articulating the constraints on what would count as an admissible solution, the 
problem effectively regulates inquiry by directing progress towards its own solution. 
As both Haig (1987) and Nickles (1981) remark, the constraint inclusion account of 
problems reveals that stating the problem is literally half the solution! 
Incorporating this account of problems within the abductive theory, Haig contends 
that a scientific investigation is often launched by a poorly structured problem that 
evolves through the course of inquiry. From a constraint inclusion perspective, a 
poorly structured problem is one that lacks many of the constraints that are required to 
solve it. Building in these constraints to get a better idea of the nature of the problem 
(and by implication its solution) will generally occupy an extended period of research 
time. Because of this, Haig dismisses the idea that a problems component is merely 
the first phase of an investigation. Instead, he suggests that the problem extends right 
through the inquiry process, directing research by pointing the way to its own solution 
and therefore determining the parameters on scientists' decision making as the 
investigation moves through the contexts of phenomena detection and theory 
construction that comprise the abductive framework. Therefore, by incorporating a 
constraint inclusion account of problems, the abductive theory is able to both explain 
how inquiry proceeds and at the same time harness the regulative power of problems 
to effectively govern the investigative process (Haig, 2002). 
3.2.2 Phenomena detection 
Under the guidance of a developing problem that regulates and directs inquiry by 
imposing a number of constraints on the knowledge construction process, the 
abductive theory turns to the collection and analysis of data. In contrast to 
hypothetico-deductivism, which begins with a theory or hypothesis, abductive 
method, in accord with insights provided by the new experimentalists, demands that 
empirical facts be given precedence and emphasizes the role that these facts play in 
knowledge generation not merely its validation. However, unlike naIve inductivism, 
which fails to provide a tenable account of this generative process, the abductive 
theory outlines a defensible strategy for grounding scientific explanations in the 
world. Firstly, the initial collection and analysis of data is explicitly directed by an 
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evolving research problem, thereby overcoming the difficulties encountered by 
inductivism concerning which data should be collected and analysed. Secondly, the 
abductive theory endorses the fundamental distinction highlighted earlier between 
data and phenomena (Bogen & Woodward, 1988, 1992; Woodward, 1989,2000): 
Phenomena are relatively stable, recurrent general features of the world 
that we seek to explain. By contrast, data are idiosyncratic, ephemeral, 
and pliable and serve as observable evidence for phenomena 
Phenomena comprise a varied ontological bag that includes objects, 
states, processes, events, and other features that are hard to classify. It 
is, therefore, more useful to characterize phenomena in terms of their 
role in relation to explanation and prediction. Phenomena, not data, are 
the proper objects of scientific explanation; it is phenomena that give 
scientific explanations their point; and it is the· generality and stability 
of phenomena that make them the appropriate focus of theory 
construction. (Raig, 2002, p.4) 
While both inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism ignore the task of phenomena 
detection, we saw in Section 3.1.1 that it is necessary for a satisfactory account of 
scientific method to adequately distinguish data and phenomena, and recognize the 
different roles that each play in scientific inquiry. Accordingly, the abductive theory 
takes phenomena, rather than data, to provide the focus for inquiry. Phenomena are 
what scientists attempt to construct systematic explanations about and in this sense 
comprise the most important constraint on directing the inquiry process. Because of 
this role in theory generation, Raig argues that it is vital that the phenomena in 
question are robust - that they are genuine effects and not merely artifacts of a 
particular experimental setup or statistical technique.? Given this demand, and given 
the inherent difficulties involved in reliably establishing the existence of a genuine 
phenomenon highlighted for example by the new experimentalists' narratives (e.g., 
7 Phenomena can also be detected in non-experimental contexts. To take one example, meta-analysis 
comprises a bundle of data analytic techniques that is widely employed in psychological research to 
establish claims about phenomena or, as they are often tenned, 'effects'. 
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Franklin, 1990), the abductive theory advocates a multi-stage model of data analysis 
that includes: 
• initial examination of the data to determine its quality and structure as a 
means of assessing its suitability for further analyses (Chatfield, 1985); 
• exploratory data analysis, utilising multiple forms of description and 
display in an effort to detect data patterns (Tukey, 1980); 
• confirmatory data analysis 1: close or internal replications usmg 
computer intensive resampling techniques such as the jackknife, the 
bootstrap, and cross validation (Efron & Gong, 1983), to provide an initial 
confirmation or check on the reliability of the data patterns; 
• confirmatory data analysis 2: constructive or external replications using 
different data sets and different measurement techniques to determine the 
reproducibility and therefore generalizability of the results. Successful 
constructive replications, which systematically vary the conditions under 
which the data patterns are produced, go beyond the initial confirmation 
provided by internal replications and are essential for justifying claims 
about the existence of phenomena (Haig, 2002). 
Haig argues that all four stages of data analysis are typically required for phenomena 
detection. That is, he suggests it is only by sifting and resifting the data in this way 
and employing multiple means of establishing the nature and existence of phenomena 
that researchers can hope to reliably produce empirical facts worthy of scientific 
explanation. 8 
8 It is worth noting that Haig's acknowledgement of the need for an initial examination of data to 
assess its quality that is distinct from later phases of confIrmatory data analysis where the concern is 
establishing claims about phenomena, is in accord with Woodward's (1989) contrast between data and 
phenomena in terms of the notions of error that are applicable to each. SpecifIcally, Woodward points 
out that 'error' in the case of data relates to simple perceptual or recording mistakes, for example " ... 
misreading a dial or transposing digits when a number is entered into a laboratory notebook" 
(Woodward, 1989, p.394). In contrast, 'error' in relation to phenomena involves much more 
complicated and subtle kinds of problems such as " ... failure to adequately control for various 
background and confounding factors or mistakes in statistical analysis or in procedures for data 
reduction (Woodward, 1989, p.394). On the model of data analysis outlined above, when researchers 
undertake a preliminary screening of their data during the initial phase of analysis, they are concerned 
with identifying errors of the fIrst sort. In contrast, it is only during subsequent confmnatory data-
analysis phases, that the concern is with errors of the second sort, i.e., whether one is detecting a real 
effect or an artifact of the experimental setup or data analysis/detection procedures employed. 
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3.2.3 Theory generation 
According to the abductive theory, it is necessary to distinguish between data and 
phenomena and deploy multiple data analyses in order to unearth facts adequate for 
science. Once obtained, these facts or descriptive claims about phenomena will 
require systematic explanation. For orthodox inductivism, theory generation is an 
inductive reasoning process in which theories are somehow mechanically derived 
from a secure observational base. For hypothetico-deductivism, theory generation is 
amethodological, involving free use of the imagination. For abductive method, 
empirical phenomena provide the stimulus for theory generation, and the explanatory 
move from phenomena to theory is achieved through abductive reasoning (Haig, 
2002). 
Specifically, Haig endorses Peirce's insights about the creative inference involved in 
theory formation and argues that the generation of theory is typically a process of 
reasoning back from puzzling phenomena to an explanation of the causes underlying 
the phenomena. Reworking Peirce's characterization to include the recognition that 
theories explain phenomena rather than observed data, Haig presents the moves 
involved in abductive inference as follows: 
[S]ome observations (phenomena) are encountered which are surprising 
because they do not follow from any accepted hypothesis; we come to 
notice that those observations (phenomena) would follow as a matter of 
course from the truth of a new hypothesis in conjunction with accepted 
auxiliary claims; we therefore conclude that the new hypothesis is 
plausible and thus deserves to be seriously entertained and further 
investigated. (Haig, 1996, p.286) 
In connection with this characterization of abductive reasoning, Haig draws attention 
to a number of regulative principles that constrain abductive inferences, and thereby 
ensure that scientists generate theories that provide the most plausible explanations of 
the phenomena. Discovery is not conceived as a process in which any novel 
hypothesis will be entertained, but as one in which only the most plausible hypothesis, 
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determined by reasoning abductively within a context of regulative constraints, is 
considered worthy of pursuit (Haig, 2002). 
Moreover, Haig endorses Thagard's (1988) differentiation of Peirce an abduction into 
a number of different subspecies, and argues that three of these subspecies are basic to 
the abductive account of scientific method and can be distinguished in terms of their 
respective roles in the framework. In particular, existential abduction, which 
postulates the existence of previously unknown objects, is located in the context of 
theory generation. 9 Analogical abduction, which employs past cases of hypothesis 
formation to produce new hypotheses, is situated in the context of theory development 
but can also function in the context of theory generation. Finally, inference to the best 
explanation, which involves the comparative appraisal of mature theories, occurs in 
the context of theory evaluation. 
The suggestion that abduction is a valid means of generating knowledge, runs counter 
to the view endorsed by proponents ofhypothetico-deductivism (e.g., Hempel, 1966; 
Popper, 1959) who argue that there is no logic to discovery. For example, Popper 
argues: 
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me 
neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible to it. The question 
how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man - whether it is a musical 
theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory - may be of great interest 
to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of 
scientific knowledge . . . My view of the matter . . . is that there is no such 
thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction 
of this process (Popper, 1959, pp.31-32). 
I argued in Chapter 2 that one of the predominant reasons why hypothetico-
deductivism fails to provide a methodological account of theory generation, viewing it 
9 Exploratory factor analysis is one example of a generative method used in psychological research 
that employs existential abduction to reason from correlational data to factorial proto theories via the 
principle of the common cause. 
An Abductive Theory of Scientific Method 81 
as an activity beyond rational characterization, is that it operates with an overly 
restrictive model of scientific reasoning centred on deductive logic. In contrast, the 
abductive theory rejects such a narrow construal of rationality and is therefore able to 
characterize the supposedly indescribable 'creative leap' as a "discursive reasoning 
complex" (Haig, 1987) that pivots on the natural human ability for abductive 
inference. 
Having admitted a logic to discovery however, the abductive theory stops short of the 
assumption embodied in naive inductivism that scientists could algorithmically 
generate true theories from data. Rather, it is envisaged that scientists' natural talent 
for abductive inference, appropriately constrained by various regulative principles, is 
more likely to produce a number of plausible explanations of the phenomena that will 
require further investigation. Therefore, Haig, in accord with Curd's (1980) 
interpretation of Peircean abduction outlined in Section 3.1.2, explicitly characterizes 
the logic embodied in abduction as a logic of "pursuit", and emphasizes the need for a 
recognition and tolerance of pluralism in this generative phase of inquiry. 
3.2.4 Theory development 
In Chapter 2, we saw that the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific method not 
only places theory generation outside of science, but also ignores the methodological 
process of theory development. The fact that this received view begins with theory 
testing, only serves to encourage the assumption that theories are generated in a 
mature form. However, this assumption sustains the myth that discovery is an event 
rather than a process (Curd, 1980), and ignores the reality of scientific practice where 
new ideas typically require nurturing and maturation. In particular, theory 
development frequently involves extending knowledge of a theory's proposed causal 
mechanisms. Critical to this development process, is the application and employment 
of models (Haig, 2002). 
In a comprehensive account of the role of models in scientific inquiry, Harre (1976) 
reveals how a model as a representative device can enable scientists to develop their 
understanding of a theory's underlying causal mechanisms. In Harre's view, the 
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creative task involves inventing a plausible analogue of the causal mechanism that is 
responsible for the phenomenon. This is achieved by enlisting an appropriate source 
model, often via a process of analogical abduction. A number of constraints on the 
modelling process, such as the fact that the mechanism must behave analogously in 
relevant respects to the known source, and the need for the model to maintain a 
relation with the real processes and patterns of nature, serve to constrain analogical 
reasoning and encourage a developed formulation of the scientific theory (Harre, 
1976). 
While both inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism treat models simply as 
dispensable psychological aids, the abductive theory encourages the incorporation of 
a variety of different modelling strategies into the inquiry process and allocates them 
a genuine methodological role within its framework. Specifically, Haig (2002) 
identifies two modelling strategies that are important in scientific theory construction. 
Firstly, paramorphic models, which have a different source and subject, such as the 
widely applied thinking-as-computation model in cognitive science research, can be 
used to facilitate a detailed knowledge of a theory's proposed causal mechanisms. 
Secondly, homoeomorphic models, in which the source and subject are the same, such 
as causal modelling methods employing structural equation modelling procedures, can 
be effective in building up a picture of the wider causal network into which the 
proposed mechanisms enter. Haig (2002) argues that details of the causal 
mechanisms themselves and details of the causal network of which they form part are 
compatible kinds of causal knowledge, and both may be utilized during theory 
development. 
3.2.5 Theory evaluation 
Traditional approaches to theory evaluation, for example hypothetico-deductive and 
Bayesian accounts, largely confine their focus to the issue of empirical adequacy 
understood as a theory's predictive success. In contrast, the abductive theory 
endorses a flexible, multi-criterial perspective on theory evaluation. More 
particularly, Haig (2002) takes the evaluation of well-developed or mature theories to 
be largely a matter of establishing their explanatory worth through inference to the 
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best explanation (Harman, 1965). Inference to the best explanation involves 
accepting a theory when it is seen to provide a better explanation of the phenomena 
under investigation than its competitors do. As Haig (2002) remarks: 
The phrase, inference to the best explanation, captures the basic idea that 
much of what we know about the world is based on considerations of 
explanatory worth and it involves the process of judging the best of 
competing explanatory theories. (Haig, 2002, p.8) 
Critics of Harman's account have suggested that his idea is too vague to provide 
adequate guidance for theory appraisal. More recently however, Paul Thagard (e.g., 
Thagard, 1989, 1992) has provided researchers with a workable formulation of 
inference to the best explanation that involves making judgments of explanatory 
coherence. According to this formulation, which has been implemented in a computer 
program (ECHO) and has demonstrated widespread application, the evaluation of 
competing theoretical candidates is determined on the basis of three criteria: 
consilience or explanatory breadth, simplicity, and analogy. The criterion of 
explanatory breadth judges a theory to be more explanatorily coherent if it explains 
more facts than its competitors. The criterion of simplicity captures the idea that 
preference should be given to theories that require fewer ad hoc hypotheses. The 
third criterion, analogy, indicates that a theory demonstrates greater explanatory 
coherence if it is consistent with currently accepted theories that explain similar 
phenomena. Further discussion of Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence and its 
implementation in ECHO is given in Chapter 5. 
Haig (2002) endorses Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence as a useful 
framework for assessing the explanatory worth of theories, but points out that it 
intentionally omits the criterion of predictive success from its evaluative machinery. 
He argues that while prediction is typically overemphasized in theory evaluation, and 
often at the expense of explanation (Haig & Durrant, 2000) the predictive success of a 
theory remains an important criterion of a theory's worth. Accordingly, there is a 
need to recognize that a theory's capacity for successful predictions will often feature 
in evaluative contexts, with its role dependent upon the nature of the theory under 
investigation. In addition, Haig draws attention to a number of other criteria that are 
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often utilized in scientific theory appraisal, namely initial plausibility, existential 
depth, and fertility, and suggests that all deserve consideration in a flexible model of 
theory evaluation that is adequate to the realities of scientific practice. 
3.3 The abductive theory as a general theory of scientific method 
In this chapter, I have presented an abductive theory of scientific method and 
suggested that it provides us with a workable theory of scientific inquiry. As an 
introduction to the abductive account, I began with an examination of recent work by 
the new experimentalists who argue for a renewed focus on the empirical base of 
science. Following Hacking's (1983) commentary I highlighted how, due largely to 
the prevailing philosophies of first positivism and then the theory-dependence 
movement, the importance of empirical phenomena to the development of scientific 
knowledge has been largely ignored by orthodox accounts of scientific method. I 
further suggested that a more adequate theory of inquiry needs to recognize the 
importance of codifying the methods by which scientists arrive at reliable empirical 
facts and, as part of this process, acknowledge that these facts will involve claims 
about phenomena rather than claims about observed data. 
I then highlighted an increased interest by philosophers in abduction as an important 
species of scientific inference. Beginning with the work of Peirce (1931-58), I 
demonstrated that a focus on abductive inference offers a valid means of 
characterizing the supposedly indescribable creative move from phenomena to 
explanatory theory. I further outlined recent developments in artificial intelligence 
research on problem solving, which not only provide computationally rigorous and 
operationally specific guidelines for explanatory reasoning, but also indicate the need 
to recognize a central role for abduction in scientific inference, over and above the 
focus of orthodox accounts on induction and deduction. 
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Against this background, I presented Haig's abductive theory of scientific method 
(Haig, 2002). I argued that this theory incorporates insights from both these 
movements, and offers a promising alternative to orthodox accounts of scientific 
method. 
Firstly, the abductive theory allocates phenomena a central role in its characterization 
of scientific method and gives equal methodological attention to both their detection 
and explanation. In order to adequately articulate these two major foci of scientific 
research, the abductive theory necessarily attends to much more of the inquiry process 
than either nafve inductivism or hypothetico-deductivism, and is therefore well placed 
to provide an informative perspective on scientific inquiry. In particular, the 
abductive theory offers methodologists a wholistic conception of method that 
incorporates a positive account of research problems, and recognizes the extended and 
often difficult nature of phenomena detection via multiple phases of data analysis, as 
well as highlighting the various contexts of theory construction that incorporate 
generation, development, and appraisal dimensions. 
Secondly, I have attempted to show that the abductive theory does not merely furnish 
a more complete account of scientific method, but also embodies a significant 
reinterpretation of the relationship between 'theories' and 'evidence' that I have 
labelled 'empirically grounded explanation'. Specifically, on abductive method's 
characterization of the inquiry process, scientists construct theories in order to explain 
phenomena The development of new knowledge is therefore grounded in, and 
constrained by, an initial search for robust empirical regularities. . Moreover, the 
theorizing process that follows goes beyond a description of the phenomena detected 
to postulate via an abductive reasoning process the causal mechanisms that are 
producing the phenomena Therefore, in contrast to the untenable foundational 
generation advanced by naIve inductivism and the unsatisfactory foundational 
justification touted by hypothetico-deductivism, I have argued that the abductive 
theory offers a defensible strategy for grounding scientific explanations in the world 
Finally, in its role as a general theory of scientific method, the abductive theory 
provides a broad conceptual framework that attempts to capture how scientists 
typically develop new knowledge. Unlike naIve inductivism, the abductive account 
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does not advocate a simplistic algorithm for truth production; neither does it advance 
a narrow prescription for evaluating theories in terms of their empirical consequences 
as promoted by the received hypothetico-deductive view. Rather, the abductive 
theory offers an integrative framework or super-structure that both frames and 
informs a variety of specific research methods. The superstructure explains and 
regulates the knowledge construction process as a whole, while the specific research 
methods give the theory its operational force in each of the contexts that comprise the 
general framework. 
The abductive theory, then, offers a useful general theory of scientific method, but as 
Raig points out, it is not to be understood as an all purpose or universal account of 
method (Raig, 2002). A number of recent commentators on the nature of science 
(e.g., Chalmers, 1999; Nickles, 1990) have argued against the view that scientists in 
all disciplines employ a single method of inquiry. Drawing on contemporary analyses 
of the history of science, these commentators suggest that methods will necessarily be 
dependent on the particular subject matter under investigation and therefore are more 
appropriately conceptualized as domain-specific rather than domain-general in their 
application. Proponents of both the inductive and hypothetico-deductive accounts 
have been criticized for claiming that their respective account captures 'the scientific 
method', and for their failure to recognize the diverse modes of investigation actually 
operating in science. In contrast, the abductive theory, by providing a broad 
conceptual framework within which more specific research methods can be located 
and understood, has the flexibility to recognize the domain and content specificity of 
methods in science highlighted by these commentators, while at the same time 
providing an informative general perspective on the inquiry process. 
In conclusion, I have argued that the abductive theory of scientific method provides 
an adequate third alternative to the orthodox accounts of method that were examined 
in Chapter 2. Specifically, by adopting a problem-oriented conception of inquiry and 
by giving attention to both the detection and explanation of empirical phenomena, the 
abductive account offers an informative portrayal of scientific inquiry that is not 
undermined by arguments for methodological pluralism in science. In the chapters 
that follow, I consider whether this abductive framework can also function as a source 
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model for the child-as-scientist analogy, and inform deliberations about the 
development of knowledge in childhood. 
Chapter 4 
From Source Model to Target: Mapping Relations 
between Scientists and Children 
In Chapter 3, I presented an abductive theory of scientific method and argued that it 
offers researchers an informative general perspective on scientific inquiry. Having 
selected this theory as an appropriate source model for the analogy, the focus now 
turns to the issue of establishing meaningful relations between this account of 
scientific method and the knowledge construction efforts of young children. 
With this aim in mind, Section 4.1 raises questions about the scope of Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs (1997) application of the theory theory to the development of knowledge 
in childhood, and suggests that their attempts to use the analogy to define a broad 
constructivist view of cognitive development do not facilitate the mapping of deep 
correspondences between scientists and children. I then outline an alternative 
interactionist perspective on development advanced by Jeffrey Elman and colleagues 
(Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi & Plunkett, 1996), and argue that it 
offers a more promising framework theory for cognitive developmental research. 
Section 4.2 subsequently looks to define a narrower role for my methodological 
formulation of the child-as-scientist analogy, and in doing so reveals some compelling 
parallels between the theory building strategies of scientists highlighted by abductive 
method and the problem solving activities of children detailed by Annette Karmiloff-
Smith (Karrniloff-Smith, 1992). In Section 4.3, I conclude that enlisting the abductive 
framework and mapping relations from this source model to children's problem 
solving strategies uncovers deep correspondences between scientists and children that 
indicate the utility of this approach for investigating cognitive change. 
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4.1 "Interactions all the way down": An alternative perspective on 
development 
4.1.1 The story so far 
In the Introduction to this thesis, I surveyed a range of positions taken by researchers 
on the question of whether the child-as-scientist analogy has utility as a model for 
cognitive developmental research. For those advocating the analogy as a source of 
useful ideas, I pointed to varying interpretations of what this might mean in terms of 
actual similarities or commonalities existing between children and scientists. These 
included the proposal that children's everyday knowledge inheres in framework 
theories, claims for structural correspondences between knowledge systems and the 
ways in which these systems are restructured over time, and process-oriented analyses 
of the interplay between theories, heuristics, and data in effective problem solving. 
Similarly, for those researchers opposing the analogy, I highlighted a number of 
different reasons for their rejection of child-scientist parallels. These ranged from 
empirical claims for significant dis-analogies between children and scientists, to a 
priori arguments concerning the improbability of common mechanisms from the 
standpoints of developmental theory and social-constructionist analyses of the history 
of science. 
Following this overview, I suggested that attempts to clarify the issue of child-
scientists parallels would benefit from current investigations of the nature of analogy 
itself, and the ways in which effective analogical reasoning promotes theoretical 
innovation in science. Having identified the basic principles of analogical thinking 
common to many philosophical and cognitive science accounts, I subsequently 
outlined a multi constraint theory of analogy that characterizes analogical thinking in 
terms of the interplay of multiple competing constraints and identifies a range of 
levels at which mappings can occur. Adopting this multiconstraint theory as a 
template for the child-as-scientist analogy, I suggested that a productive formulation 
of child -scientist parallels will necessarily promote system mappings of higher order 
relations between children and scientists, and will achieve these mappings by 
applying the constraints of similarity, structure, and purpose. 
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Following these methodological provisions for developing a productive scientific 
analogy, Chapter 1 turned to the most recent and detailed formulation of child-
scientist parallels provided by Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) theory theory. After 
considering the major tenets of their position and highlighting some of the criticisms 
that have been levelled against it, I argued that these researchers fail to demonstrate 
convincingly that the cognitive processes of theory construction and revision are 
common to scientists and children. Moreover, I suggested that the theory theory is 
unable to offer any substantive ideas about the mechanisms responsible for cognitive 
development, and this is largely due to its dependence on an inappropriate source 
model of scientific inquiry. 
With this diagnosis in hand, Chapter 2 focused on the task of selecting a more 
appropriate source model for the child-as-scientist analogy. Working from an 
evolutionary epistemological standpoint, I pointed out that due consideration of our 
evolutionary origins strongly supports a methods perspective on science and leads us 
to expect fundamental continuities, rather than discontinuities, between everyday 
cognition and scientific inquiry methods. Further, I showed how Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs focus on theory-evidence relations to explain conceptual and linguistic 
developments requires a methods-centred view of science. I therefore concluded that 
if the aim is to develop the child-as-scientist analogy beyond its current heuristic 
status, then a methodological reformulation must take place. 
Having considered and discounted the two major orthodox theories of scientific 
method as potential source models for the analogy, Chapter 3 presented an alternative 
abductive theory of scientific method. I argued that this theory offers an informative 
general perspective on the process of knowledge construction in science, and 
therefore has the potential to inform deliberations about cognitive change in 
childhood. With this source model in place, the following chapters develop my 
proposed methodological model of cognitive change. More specifically, the focus of 
this chapter is to establish the initial plausibility of the claim that the abductive 
framework offers a source of ideas about children's knowledge construction 
strategies. In order to do this, I return to the broader issue of how best to characterize 
cognitive development, and to the major criticism of the theory theory highlighted in 
earlier chapters, namely its failure to offer any substantive ideas about the processes 
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through which children's theories are developed. Using this criticism as a starting 
point, I consider an interactionist account of cognitive development as an alternative 
general framework for investigating developmental change, before going on to define 
a narrower role for my proposed model of child-scientist parallels that focuses on one 
level of organism-environment interactions in particular. 
4.1.2 Navigating between the poles of nativism and empiricism: Attempts to 
chart a viable "radical middle" 
In earlier chapters, I indicated that the most serious charge against the theory theory is 
its failure to explain how theory development occurs in the young child. By recruiting 
Kuhn's description of scientific change, and couching conceptual and semantic 
developments in terms of theory-evidence relations, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) 
suggest that the burden of explanation for cognitive development lies with the same 
mechanisms that are responsible for development in science. Yet detailing the ways 
in which evidence motivates children to change their theories, in other words, 
explaining how experience interacts with existing representations of the world to 
produce new representations, remains profoundly mysterious on the theory theory 
model. 
Another way in which to highlight these concerns is to consider the theory theory's 
claim on what has become known as the "radical middle". In a recent review article 
(Newcombe, 1998; see also Newcombe & Learmonth, 1999), Nora Newcombe 
identifies an emerging trend amongst cognitive developmentalists to eschew the 
extremes of nativist and empiricist approaches to learning and cognition: 
In the past several years . . . there has been a mounting backlash against 
nativist dogma, as well as a continuing suspicion about simple 
empiricism. There is a feeling of excitement and competition abroad, as 
investigators vie to defme a view of cognitive development neither 
radically nativist nor radically empiricist - a possibility I have heard 
called the 'radical middle'. (Newcombe, 1998, p.210) 
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As Newcombe points out, the trend is not towards replacing a radical nativist position 
with an equally radical empiricist one. Nor is it an attempt to resurrect Piaget's 
particular version of constructivism. Rather, the aim of these recent theoretical 
endeavours is to develop a new kind of developmental theory, in which the traditional 
dichotomies of nature versus nurture and continuity versus change are discarded in 
favour of a genuinely interacti anal account of development (Figure 4.1). 
Constructivism 
Nativism Empiricism 
Figure 4.1 Claims on the "radical middle" position: attempts to define 
a new theory of cognitive development at the 'intersection' 
of nativism, empiricism and constructivism. 
Working from Newcombe's characterization, Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) 
'cognitive development as theory change' approach represents one attempt to claim 
this radical middle ground. 1 Specifically, by adopting a model of revolutionary 
scientific change and by proposing that the key to explaining knowledge development 
lies in the interactions between theories and evidence in science, Gopnik and Meltzoff 
draw on the analogy with science to lay the groundwork for a viable constructivist 
1 In addition to Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997), Newcombe identifies Karmi10ff-Smith (1992), Thelen & 
Smith (1994), Siegler (1996), and Elman et al. (1996) with this trend. 
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theory of cognitive development.2 However, in line with the criticisms highlighted in 
Chapters 1 and 2, the theory theory can be seen to fail in its bid to define the 'radical 
middle' on at least two counts. 
Firstly, while Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue that thinking of cognitive 
development as theory change offers a workable interactionist framework for 
cognitive developmental research, they demonstrate an unwillingness to relinquish 
their commitment to a strong form of representational nativism. As they say, " ... our 
claim that there are innate theories . . . is in many ways as powerfully nativist a 
position as one could have" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.221). Yet by promoting the 
idea of "elaborate, rich, representational structure from birth" (p.220), Gopnik and 
Meltzoff deny themselves the opportunity to rid their model of the 'innate' versus 
'learned' dichotomy that has proved such a stumbling block for traditional accounts. 
The result is an uneasy alliance between a rich representational endowment on the one 
hand and a revisionist empiricism on the other. Despite Gopnik and Meltzoff s claims 
to the contrary, the nature of this alliance suggests that the theory theory is less a 
viable new interactionist position on development than a compromise between nativist 
and empiricist views. 
Secondly, in addition to retaining a strong version of nativism, Gopnik and Meltzoffs 
theory theory offers few details about the ways in which intrinsic structure and a 
structured environment interact to shape cognition and behaviour. As other 
contributors to the nativist-empiricist dialogue have pointed out: 
... the problem is not so much that we do not know what the sources of 
knowledge are. The problem is rather in knowing how these sources 
combine and interact. The answer is not Nature or Nurture; it's Nature 
and Nurture. But to say that is to trade one platitude for another; what is 
necessary is to understand the nature of that interaction. (Elman et al., 
1996, p.357) 
2 In addition to Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) presentation of the theory theory, further support for this 
interpretation is fOlmd in Gopnik's (1 996a ) commentary on the post-Piagetian era, in which she 
promotes the theory theory as "[t]he most influential contemporary constructivist theory" in cognitive 
developmental research (Gopnik, 1996a, p.221). 
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By redefining children's conceptual structures as theories and giving experience an 
evidential role in a theory revision process, Gopnik and Meltzoff try to engage a 
model of scientific change in an attempt to illuminate this interactive process. 
However, the paucity of ideas about how such interactions, couched in theory-
evidence terms, actually occur, substantially weakens the theory theory's claim to 
have shown how children derive new representations of the world from their 
experience. These problems with the theory theory, then, suggest the need to consider 
alternative ways of defining development that are neither radically nativist nor 
radically empiricist, and that offer some substantive ideas about the reciprocal actions 
of organism and environment in producing developmental change. With this aim in 
mind, the following section outlines a broad perspective on development that makes a 
strong bid to chart such a 'radical middle' course. According to the proponents of this 
approach, the key to capturing the nature of development lies in the recognition that it 
is 'interactions all the way down'. 
4.1.3 Development as a truly interactive process 
While Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) look to the analogy with science to provide 
answers about the knowledge acquisition process in the young child, an alternative 
perspective on development suggests that such answers are far more likely to arise 
from the intersection of developmental neurobiology and connectionist modelling. In 
a recent collaboration (Elman et al., 1996), Jeffrey Elman and colleagues put forward 
their views on development, the nature/nurture controversy, and the question of 
innateness, from the standpoint of a biologically inspired connectionism. They argue 
that dramatic advances in the neurosciences coupled with the conceptual and 
computational tools provided by neural network or connectionist models, offer a new 
and powerful framework for investigating developmental change: 
Two recent developments ... suggest that the view of development as an 
interactive process is indeed the correct one, and that a formal theory of 
emergent form may be within our grasp. The first development is the 
extraordinary progress that has been made in the neurosciences. The 
second has been the renascence of a computational framework which is 
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particularly well suited to exploring these new biological discoveries via 
modeling. (Elman et aI., 1996, p.2) 
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In particular, the authors argue that this framework encourages a truly interactive 
perspective on development, according to which: 
(1) the responsibility for change is far more evenly distributed between a 
structured environment and innate predispositions than with Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs theory theory; 
(2) conceptual and linguistic achievements are reconceived as emergent products 
of a dynamic interactive process. 
The following sections elaborate on this sketch by highlighting the basic 
commitments underlying the authors' approach, before moving on to consider some 
of the key insights offered by this theoretical framework for developmental 
psychology. 
Basic commitments 
Biology and connectionism: A natural synthesis Elman et ai. (1996) begin 
their presentation by considering the problem of change. They argue that while an 
interactionist view of development is an attractive alternative to the extremes of 
nativism and empiricism, traditional formulations have been hampered by the lack of 
details about the nature of gene-environment interactions. 3 According to Elman et aI., 
however, recent advances in two fields not only endorse an interactionist view but 
also have the potential to advance it by providing the basis for a formal theory of 
emergent form. In the neurosciences, Elman et ai. highlight recent findings regarding 
the complexity of genetic functioning and the indirectness of genes' effects on the 
emerging phenotype that overturn the assumption of a static genetic blueprint for 
biological form and behaviour. In addition to this research on the genetic basis of 
behaviour, they highlight current data from a range of sources indicating that the brain 
3 For a classic presentation of the interactionist position, see Waddington (1975). 
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is initially equipotent (or at least multipotent) at the cortical leveI.4 According to 
Elman et aI., these findings undermine claims for fixed, immutable forms of neural 
organization, and instead support a model in which patterns of regional specialization 
are progressively built up over time. 
In combination with these recent advances in the neurosciences, Elman et al. draw 
attention to the field of computational modelling, where there has been a resurgence 
of interest in neural network or connectionist models. Elman et al. argue that these 
models are particularly pertinent to the concerns of developmental researchers 
because they offer concrete demonstrations of how the application of simple learning 
algorithms operating on local information can produce global behaviours (see also 
Plunkett, Karmiloff-Smith, Bates, Elman & Johnson, 1997). In particular, such 
demonstrations have forced researchers to revisit assumptions about what can be 
learned as opposed to what is prespecified, and to recognize that far more structure is 
latent in the environment and capable of being abstracted by basic learning algorithms 
than previously imagined. Elman et al. propose that when taken together, these 
advances in neural network modelling and in the neurosciences are mutually 
constraining and serve to form the basis of a powerful framework for rethinking 
fundamental issues of developmental change. 
The role of interaction in development Elman et al. stress throughout their 
defence that adopting a bio-connectionist framework reveals the fundamental 
dependence of development on multi-level interactions. They highlight research in 
molecular genetics that underscores the need to investigate the workings of genes in 
concert to build an accurate picture of genetic functioning. Similarly, they point out 
that at higher levels of organization, recognizing the dependence of processes such as 
cell differentiation and tissue formation in regulatory systems on multiple interactions, 
is crucial to understanding how complexity is progressively built in to a system over 
time. Elman and colleagues argue that while developmentalists have long recognized 
the importance of interactions to development, the problem has been how to formalize 
this relationship. They propose that the ability of connectionist models to capture the 
4 See Johnson (1998) for a review of neural development that emphasizes the plasticity of the 
developing brain. 
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dynamics of interactions between pre-specified biases and a learning environment in 
an artificial system over time, offers a potential solution to this problem. Moreover, 
the striking resemblance between this process of error reduction in an artificial neural 
network and earlier depictions of the developmental process in natural systems (e.g., 
Waddington, 1975), is taken as further evidence of the utility of connectionism to 
formalize the interactional nature of development. 
Clarifying innateness A key part of the authors' argument for the utility of 
their biologically oriented connectionism concerns the implications of this framework 
for understanding innateness. They suggest that although few researchers would 
propose a simple one-to-one relationship between genes and behaviour, far greater 
clarity needs to be injected into current discussions of innate properties in the 
developmental and cognitive science literature. Moreover, Elman et ai. point out that 
very little attention is given to issues of biological plausibility in these discussions. 
That is, they argue " ... [t]he problem with current nativist theories is that they offer 
no serious account of what it might mean in biological terms for something to be 
innate" (Elman et aI., 1996, pA8). Finally, Elman et ai. emphasize that despite the 
current dominance of nativist approaches to the development of language and 
cognition, there has been little investigation of the potential variety of ways in which 
behaviours could be innate. 
In an attempt to address these issues, Elman et al. begin by adopting a working 
definition of 'innate' that refers to features of brain structure, cognition, or overt 
behaviour that result from interactions that occur within the organism, as opposed to 
interactions between the organism and its external environment (see also Johnson & 
Morton, 1991; Johnson, 1998). On this view, as the authors make clear, the term 
'innate' is not equivalent to 'coded in the genes'. With this working definition in 
place, Elman et al. proceed to construct a taxonomy of ways in which properties can 
be usefully classified as innate that attempts to identify the range of possible 
constraints on development. The result is a three-Iayerel taxonomy that classifies 
constraints at the levels of representation, architecture, and timing. 
To begin, positing the existence of representational constraints on development 
suggests that the representations that underlie knowledge are themselves innate or 
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'hard-wired'. This claim for representational nativism is common to accounts of 
development that argue for innate domain-specific knowledge systems, irrespective of 
whether these systems are conceptualized as modules in the Fodorian sense (e.g., 
Leslie, 1992; Spelke, 1994), or as indicated earlier, innate theories (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997). Elman et al. identify representational nativism as the strongest level 
of claims about innateness because of the direct and unmediated relationship assumed 
to obtain between the innate representations and the resulting knowledge and 
behaviour. However, they argue that given neuroscientific evidence of substantial 
cortical plasticity, innate representations - understood as "fine-grained patterns of 
synaptic connectivity at the cortical level" (p.2S) - are likely to be relatively rare. 
Accordingly, they argue that there is a need to identify alternative and more 
biologically viable ways in which innate constraints could operate in development. 
While Elman et al. argue that evidence supporting the tenets of representational 
nativism is unlikely to be forthcoming, they suggest that claims for constraints at the 
levels of architecture and timing demonstrate far greater promise.· Architectural 
constraints, which they subdivide into unit-based (e.g., specification of neuron types), 
local (e.g., number of layers, packing density of cells), and global (e.g., connections 
between regions of the brain, input/output channels), raise the possibility of critical 
pressures operating at the level of the structure of the network or subparts of the 
network rather than at the level of representations. Elman et al. propose that such 
pressures, while less direct and specific in their effects, could nevertheless 
significantly constrain cognition and behaviour, for example, by determining that a 
specific cortical region receives a particular form of input that in turn dictates the type 
of representations developed by that region. Finally, the possibility of chronotopic 
constraints suggests that the actual timing of developmental sequences is a significant 
force in determining outcomes. That is, instead of solutions to problems being 
encoded in advance in the form of innate representations, such solutions could be 
rendered inevitable through the particular timing of input to the brain. Elman et al. 
argue that while behaviours will typically result from the operation of constraints at 
multiple interacting levels, further investigations of the possibilities suggested by both 
architectural nativism and particularly, chronotopic nativism, are likely to reveal 
powerful mechanisms for developmental change. 
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Key insights for developmental psychology 
Having outlined the basic commitments underlying the bio-connectionist approach, it 
is useful to briefly consider some of the key insights for developmental psychology 
afforded by this theoretical framework. In other words, how does an account that 
rejects complex representational start states in favour of complex organism-
environment interactions, and does so via the synthesis of biological and connectionist 
insights, offer researchers a viable alternative theory of cognitive development? 
Anticipating this question, Elman et al. identify the primary contributions of their 
approach as follows. 
Innateness and domain-specificity: Distinguishing mechanism from content 
To begin, constructing a taxonomy of innate constraints on development that 
identifies the multiple levels of representations, architectures, and timing, serves to 
clarify understanding of innateness in at least two fundamental respects. Firstly, this 
biologically informed taxonomy indicates the potential variety of ways in which a 
behaviour could be classified as innate, and in doing so challenges researchers to be 
far more precise in their discussions of innate properties. Secondly, this taxonomy 
marks an important distinction between innate mechanisms and innate content. Elman 
et al. stress that the trio of mechanisms they postulate is logically independent of the 
possible content domains over which these mechanisms operate. Moreover, this 
distinction is critical to the task of teasing apart issues of innateness from issues of 
domain-specificity, where 'specificity' may relate to anyone of a number of different 
levels including tasks, behaviours, representations, processing mechanisms, and 
genes. By distinguishing mechanisms and content, Elman et al. highlight the 
inferential leap that separates claims about the specificity of certain abilities from 
claims about the nature of the mechanisms that subserve those abilities, and propose 
that in the case of higher-level cognition, most domain-specific outcomes are likely to 
result from the operation of domain-general mechanisms. 
Non-linear change One of the key insights provided by connectionist models 
is that the mapping between overt behaviour and underlying mechanism is often non-
linear. Elman et al. stress that contrary to assumptions underpinning much 
developmental research, qualitative changes in behaviour do not necessarily signal 
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qualitative changes in the mechanisms responsible for the behaviour. Instead, these 
models demonstrate that sudden dramatic effects in terms of the output of a system 
can be produced by small, incremental changes in internal processing. In the case of 
ontogenetic development, this suggests that apparent discontinuities in conceptual or 
linguistic understanding may not be the outcome of new mechanisms coming 'on-
line' at certain points in development as has often been assumed, but instead reflect 
the continuous operation of a single mechanism over time. 
Outcome and cause: Not a one-to-one relation In addition to showing that a 
single mechanism can be responsible for multiple behaviours, connectionist models 
can also illuminate the reverse case in which a single outcome or behaviour arises 
through the action of multiple interacting mechanisms. Further, Elman et al. point to 
instances where the same behavioural outcome can be produced in a number of 
different ways, as in the case of degraded performance in artificial neural networks. 
Precisely because they allow researchers to probe the potential range of relations that 
can exist between behavioural outcomes and their underlying causes, Elman et al. 
argue that connectionist models overturn assumptions of straightforward one-to-one 
mapping between mechanisms and behaviour. 
Explicating knowledge Throughout their book-length investigation of what it 
means for something to be labelled innate, Elman et al. stress the need for researchers 
to be more explicit in their discussions of knowledge and knowing, and they highlight 
the utility of their bio-connectionist framework in achieving this end. Moreover, the 
characterization of knowledge that results from this exercise has important 
implications for developmental research. Specifically, Elman et al. argue that 
adopting a precise definition of knowledge that is capable of being implemented in an 
artificial neural network significantly undermines the case for representational 
nativism in development, and therefore forces researchers to rethink ways in which a 
behaviour could plausibly be considered 'innate'. 
The role of development The authors' rejection of innate representational 
constraints on development has further implications for the developmental process 
itself Specifically, by renouncing rich representational start states as incompatible 
with current neuroscientific evidence of the developing brain, Elman et al. shift the 
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burden of explanation for development onto the developmental process itself They 
argue that an extended period of immaturity allows time for the environment to fully 
participate in the structuring of the maturing organism, and suggest that some 
complex behaviours may not be achievable without passing through a developmental 
process. For Elman et aI., development itself is a prime causal factor in the mastery of 
complex cognitive abilities. As they state: 
. . . development is the key to the problem of how to get complex 
behaviours (in the mature animal) from a minimal specification (in the 
genes). It's Natures's solution to the AI "scaling problem". (Elman et 
a!., 1996, p.365) 
Connectionism is not radical empmClsm A commonly held view is that 
connectionism embodies a radical empiricist approach to human learning and 
development, and the authors' bio-connectionist framework comes in for similar 
criticism (see for example Fodor, 1997). However, as these authors are at pains to 
point out, all connectionist models necessarily assume some kinds of architectural and 
computational constraints. These constraints determine the information processing 
capabilities of the networks and therefore are critical to ensuring that network learning 
gets off the ground in each instance. Similarly, the authors' bio-connectionist 
perspective is not anti-nativist; their disagreement is with representational nativism 
more specifically. Further, they support their rej ection of innate representations by 
undertaking an e:Aiended examination of alternative and more biologically viable 
sources of constraints on development, and draw directly on connectionist insights 
regarding the impact of differing initial architectures and timing of events to facilitate 
this process. 
Development as emergence Finally, in addition to providing a valuable means 
of investigating the necessary conditions for development, connectionist models offer 
a vehicle for exploring the dynamics of development and in particular the issue of 
emergent form. Elman et a!. endorse the tradition in developmental psychology and 
developmental biology that locates the design for final form neither in the organism 
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nor in the environment but in emergence from the rich interactions between them. 5 
Moreover, by advancing a dynamic framework that implements this concept in neural 
networks and bolsters these implementations with neuroscientific data, Elman et al. 
move this developmental tradition closer to a formal theory of emergent form. 
4.2 Theory building in scientists and children 
4.2.1 Narrowing the focus: Repositioning the child-as-scientist analogy 
From the considerations highlighted above, the biologically inspired connectionism 
advocated by Elman et al. recommends itself as a viable theoretical alternative to the 
extremes of nativism and empiricism. In contrast to the theory theory, which retains a 
strong commitment to representational nativism, the approach of Elman et al. 
radically rethinks the notion of innateness and develops alternative, more biologically 
plausible proposals for innate predispositions, using the operation of architectural and 
chronotopic constraints in artificial neural networks as a guide. More generally, this 
bio-connectionist framework makes significant gains towards a formal theory of the 
processes by which innate predispositions and a structured environment interact. 
Whereas the theory theory is marked by the absence of any real details about the 
nature of these interactions, the approach of Elman et al. draws together 
comprehensive examples from developmental neurobiology, with concrete 
demonstrations of how emergent form can be implemented in connectionist models, 
to advance their claim that the developmental process rests on multi-level interactions. 
The result is a complex interactionist account of development that is broad enough to 
encompass the developing organism-environment relationship in its entirety. This 
integrated treatment further contrasts with that given by the theory theory where a 
reliance on theory-evidence relations to explain how change occurs restricts the theory 
theory's application to a narrow band of conceptual and semantic developments. 
5 Elman et al. cite the following figures as representative of this tradition: Baldwin, Bateson, D' Arcy, 
Thompson, Oyama, Piaget, Vygotsky, Waddington, and Wimsatt (Elman et al., 1996, p.366). 
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I have suggested, then, that the interactionist perspective advocated by Elman and his 
colleagues offers a promising framework theory for investigations of cognitive 
development. Adopting this framework, moreover, has implications for the role of the 
chi1d-as-scientist analogy in developmental research. Specifically, by endorsing 
Elman et al's interactionist approach, the debate over whether the child can be 
usefully conceived as an intuitive scientist takes on a decidedly narrower focus. 
Rather than defining the tenets of an overarching constructivist view of cognitive 
development as Gopnik and Meltzoff propose, the analogy is redeployed as a 
theoretical tool for illuminating parallels at one level of organism-environment 
interactions in particular. In the sections that follow, I look to reposition the chi1d-as-
scientist analogy in such a way, focusing on the specific theory building strategies 
employed by scientists and children in their respective attempts to achieve 
explanatory understanding. With this aim in mind, I tum to a body of work by 
Annette Karmi10ff-Smith, whose detailed investigations of children's discovery 
processes have led her to conclude that theory building is a core component of 
everyday reasoning. 
4.2.2 The child as a spontaneous theory builder 
As one of the key contributors to the bio-connectionist framework outlined above, it is 
perhaps not surprising that even a cursory examination of Karmi10ff-Smith' s research 
publications reveals a strong and persistent commitment to an interactionist account of 
developmental change. 6 Within this general orientation, Karmiloff-Smith has 
endorsed the chi1d-as-scientist analogy, arguing that children can be usefully 
characterized as spontaneous theory builders: 
6 For an early and comprehensive statement regarding the necessity of an interactionist perspective see 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992); for arguments highlighting the utility of integrating connectionist insights into 
this perspective refer to Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993); for recent applications of an interactionist 
approach to investigations of developmental disorders see Karmiloff-Smith (1998); Oliver, Johnson, 
Karmiloff-Smith and Pennington (2000). 
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For a number of years, I have argued that the child is a spontaneous 
theoretician, i.e. that the way in which children go about discovering how 
. the world functions (the physical, social and linguistic worlds) is by 
building theories, not by simply observing facts. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988, 
p.183) 
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Moreover, by endorsing the analogy Karmiloff-Smith looks to direct research 
attention away from discrete measures of behavioural performance on circumscribed 
tasks and towards an investigation of the processes underlying developmental change. 
As she states in response to a recent critique of the child -as-scientist analogy: 7 
cognitive developmentalists originally introduced the notion of 
theory-in-action and explicit theory building to move beyond the mere 
age-related success/failure measurement of children's behaviour to try to 
account for the processes by which children come to achieve success. 
(Spencer & Karmiloff-Smith, 1997) 
In keeping with this aim, Karmiloff-Smith puts the analogy to work in quite a different 
way from the majority of developmental researchers. Rather than exploring structural 
analogies between knowledge acquisition in childhood and historical development in 
science, Karmiloff-Smith's approach has been to advocate a process-oriented or 
"synchronic" perspective on the question of child-scientist parallels. According to this 
perspective, the focus of comparisons is on the processes underlying scientific 
discovery, and in particular, the changing relations between data and theory that give 
rise to successful problem solving. 
In her 1988 article entitled 'The child is a theoretician not an inductivist', Karmiloff-
Smith describes her results from a range of different problem solving situations 
designed to reveal these discovery processes in action. To take one example (see 
Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974 for details), children were given a variety of 
different blocks and asked to balance them on a narrow metal support bar. The blocks 
differed from each other in ways that affected how they balanced on the support. That 
7 See Gellatly (1997). 
From Source Model to Target: Mapping Relations between Scientists and Children 105 
is, some blocks had their weight evenly distributed and balanced at their geometric 
centre. Other blocks had weights visibly attached to one end, and accordingly 
balanced off centre. A third type of block was "invisibly-weighted" With lead drilled 
into one end, so although it looked identical to the first type of block, it actually 
balanced off centre. By employing microgenetic analyses of children's performance 
on this and other tasks,8 Karmiloff-Smith abstracts the following pattern of data-theory 
relations from children's problem solving attempts: 
• Initially, children are "data-driven", and solve the task simply by 
utilizing information present in the external environment. For example, 
in the block-balancing task, children began by concentrating on 
proprioceptive information and treated each block as a new problem. 
• Having succeeded at the task, children go beyond behavioural success to 
generate a theory that provides them with some initial explanatory 
understanding of the problem space. Specifically, children become 
"theory-driven"; they temporarily suspend their focus on solving the task 
and ignore or discard data that fails to fit with their nascent theory. For 
example, in the block-balancing task children went beyond the goal of 
successfully balancing the blocks to spontaneously generate a 
"geometric-centre theory in action" by focusing on their internal 
representations and rejecting data that did not agree with their theory. 
• Finally, data and theory are realigned with one another and children re-
engage with the original goal of successfully solving the task. However, 
in contrast to the pattern of initial success, this later achievement arises 
from the utilization of a consolidated and generalized framework. Using 
the block-balancing task as an example, children employed an intuitive 
version of the law of Torque to consider environmental feedback and 
successfully balance all the blocks. 
8 Other tasks discussed include modified balance-scale problems involving the quantification of weight 
and length, problems investigating action and reaction as compensating forces, and spatial construction 
problems. See Karmiloff-Smith (1984) for more details. 
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Based on this robust pattern of data-theory relations that generalizes across a range of 
different tasks, Karmiloff-Smith concludes that children do not solve problems by 
progressively building up a store of atheoretical facts about the world. Rather, like 
scientists, their actions are constrained by powerful explanatory theories (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1988). 
More recently, Karmiloff-Smith has incorporated these findings into a broader 
conceptualization of knowledge development that details the operation of a process 
for increasing cognitive flexibility in human representational systems (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992, 1994). In brief, Karmiloff-Smith proposes that a fundamental aspect of 
human development that underscores our capacity for creative thought, involves a 
shift in the way in which knowledge is represented in the mind. Focusing on the 
status of representations that underpin different abilities and the multiplicity of levels 
at which knowledge is stored and available for processing, Karmiloff-Smith postulates 
the existence of a representational redescriptive process, whereby". . . information 
that is in a cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledge to that 
system" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994, p.694, italics in original). 
According to this representational redescription hypothesis, development incorporates 
three recurrent phases. During Phase 1, learning is "data-driven" with the child's 
achievement of "behavioural mastery" largely the result of a focus on information 
present in the external environment. Crucially, however, development does not end 
with the establishment of efficient learning procedures. Rather, successful 
performance is followed by an "internally driven phase", in which the focus shifts 
from features of the external environment to internal representational change. As 
Karmiloff-Smith remarks, it is during this intermediate phase that "system-internal 
dynamics" predominate, and while this may result in a temporary decrement in 
performance, this "deterioration" is at the behavioural, as opposed to representational, 
level. Finally, during the third phase, internal representations and the external 
environmental data are "reconciled" with one another. 
In terms of the format of the representations involved in this reiterative process, 
Karmiloff-Smith distinguishes four successive levels. At the initial level, Implicit (I), 
information is embedded within special-purpose procedures and is not yet available as 
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manipulable data to other parts of the cognitive system. In contrast, representations at 
the subsequent level,· Explicit-1 (E1), which result from redescriptive processes 
operating on the implicit representations, are available for cross-domain applications. 
Specifically, Karmiloff-Smith argues that these redescribed representations "go 
beyond the constraints imposed at level I, where procedure-like representations are 
simply used in response to external stimuli" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994, p.701). In this 
respect, E1 representations mark the beginnings of a cognitively flexible system, in 
which explicit, manipulable, and transportable representations provide the foundations 
for children's early theorizing. However, while E-1 representations are available as 
data structures to other parts of the cognitive system, they are not yet available to 
consciousness. Rather, further redescription is required before knowledge becomes 
available to conscious access at Explicit-2 (E2) level and finally to verbal report at 
Explicit-3 (E3) level. On Karmiloff-Smith's account, then, humans are active 
"redescribers" of their own knowledge, exploiting information that initially exists in 
an implicit procedural form, so that it becomes progressively explicit and accessible. 
It is this capacity for representational redescription that allows for flexible thought in 
humans, including, importantly, the ability for creative theory construction. 
Concerning the issue of whether young children can be accurately characterized as 
theory builders, a crucial aspect of Karmiloff-Smith's proposals is her insistence on 
more than two levels of representation and her rejection of the assumption that 
consciousness is essential for the appearance of flexible thought. As she remarks: 
The most important and subtle data ... are, in my view, those pointing to 
a level of representation in which knowledge is explicitly defined (i.e., 
represented differently from the information embedded in special-
purpose domain-specific procedures of the earlier phase) but not yet 
available to conscious access and verbal report. Spontaneous repairs to 
linguistic output, unsuccessful problem solving subsequent to success, 
redundant behaviors, and so forth (data often ignored in developmental 
and adult research) are all used as vital clues to this phase of 
development. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994, p.698) 
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By promoting a conception of E-1 level representations in which knowledge is 
explicitly represented and available as data to the cognitive system, but not yet 
available to conscious access, Kanniloff-Smith suggests a potential base for young 
children's spontaneous theory building. Further, Karmiloff-Smith stresses that these 
recurrent phases should not be thought of as age-dependent stages, signalling domain-
general changes in representational format. Instead, her model posits that this 
representational redescription process occurs repeatedly within micro domains 
throughout development, and is constrained by the particular structure of the domain-
specific representations on which it operates. 
In summary, Karmiloff-Smith, working from an interactionist perspective on 
development, can be seen to fully exploit the constructivist implications of the child-
as-scientist analogy as a way of investigating the processes by which children learn 
about the world. By granting children theories-in-action, and by focusing on the 
interactions between theories and data in children's problem solving, Karmiloff-Smith 
identifies a robust pattern of data-theory relations that supports the view that children 
generate theories to achieve coherent explanations of phenomena. More generally, by 
characterizing children's problem solving in terms of theory formation, and providing 
justification for this characterization via a representational redescriptive process, 
Karmiloff-Smith convincingly overturns the belief that theory building is the 
exclusive domain of meta-conceptually aware scientists. In its place, she paints a 
picture of theory formation as a core component of everyday reasoning, and in doing 
so points to a basis for mapping meaningful relations between scientists and children. 
As she states: 
[t]he tendency to explain phenomena by a unified theory, the most 
general or simplest one possible, appears to be a natural aspect of the 
creative process both for the child and the scientist. (Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder, 1974) 
If we accept Karrniloff-Smith's claim, then the issue becomes how to best utilize the 
analogy with science to further our understanding of this common theory building 
process. And it is here that a methodological reformulation of child-scientist 
parallels, employing the abductive framework as a source model, offers a natural 
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extension of Karmiloff-Smith's proposals regarding the child asa spontaneous 
theoretician. 
4.2.3 Detecting and explaining empirical phenomena: A framework for 
investigating theory building across scientific and everyday contexts 
To demonstrate the potential utility of this methodological reformulation, I want to 
focus on the parallels between the pattern of data-theory relations uncovered by 
Karmiloff-Smith and the corresponding picture of these relations given by the 
abductive theory of scientific method. To recap briefly on the presentation given in 
Chapter 3, the abductive theory characterizes scientific inquiry as a problem-oriented 
enterprise that centres on the reliable detection and coherent explanation of empirical 
phenomena. According to the abductive account, inquiry typically proceeds under the 
direction of an evolving research problem and involves a number of interrelated 
phases: 
• Data are initially collected and analysed to detect robust empirical regularities. 
• These phenomena are then explained by abductively generating a rudimentary 
theory about the causal mechanisms responsible. 
• Modelling strategies are subsequently deployed in an attempt to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding of the nature of these causal mechanisms. 
• The theory is evaluated against competing alternatives on a range of criteria 
that emphasize the theory's capacity to provide a coherent explanatory account 
of the phenomena. 
More generally, the abductive theory demonstrates a significant reinterpretation of 
data-theory relations when compared to orthodox accounts of scientific method. On 
the abductive method, theory construction is seen to be firmly grounded in a prior 
search for robust empirical regularities so that the primary inferential move is from 
empirical phenomena to theory. Moreover, this move is not characterized as 
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inductive but abductive, and involves going beyond a description of the phenomena to 
postulate causal mechanisms that are producing the phenomena. According to the 
abductive theory, then, scientists construct theories to explain phenomena, with 
empirical phenomena providing the initial stimulus for theory construction, and 
abductive inference assuming a pivotal role in the theory construction process. 
Similarly, Karmiloff-Smith's investigations of children's problem solving strategies· 
lead her to propose an account of spontaneous scientific discovery that endorses a 
data-to-theory move and focuses on the generation of explanatory understanding. 
More specifically, as indicated above, she identifies the following complex of 
recurrent interrelated phases in children's theory building attempts: 
• data-focused - children display an initial concern with data, engaging in a 
period of rich interaction with the environment; 
• theory-focused - they shift to a concern with theory, become organization 
oriented, and attempt to apply a single explanation to a range of disparate data; 
• effective co-ordination of data and theory - data and theory are reconciled, the 
newly consolidated and generalized theory provides a coherent explanatory 
account of the problem under investigation. 
Karmiloff-Smith emphasizes that this pattern of data-theory relations reoccurs 
repeatedly throughout development as children approach new problems in different 
microdomains,9 thereby suggesting that this domain-specific pattern is not captured by 
a domain-general view of scientific discovery in which children initially consider data 
and at a subsequent stage become capable of abstract theorizing. 10 
9 Karmi1off-Smith (1992) characterizes 'microdomains' as "subsets within a particular domain" 
(Karmi1off-Smith, 1992, p.6), and gives the problem of gravity in physics and the problem of pronoun 
acquisition in language learning as examples. 
10 See also Simons & Kei1 (1995) for an extended argument against a domain-general shift in 
development from concrete to abstract thought. 
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Moreover, Karmiloff-Smith argues that this data-to-theory move has an explanatory 
function in children's problem solving. l1 In fact, the orienting focus of her 1988 
paper is to substantiate the claim that the child is a spontaneous theoretician by 
contrasting both children's and scientists' theory building activities with a naive 
inductivist account of scientific inquiry. On this account, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
scientific inquiry proceeds by gathering all the facts in a non-judgmental manner to 
retain their objectivity and then applying the rules of inductive inference to arrive at 
generalizations or descriptive laws about those facts. Karmiloff-Smith's 
investigations however, lead her to reject inductivism as an accurate picture of 
children's scientific practice: 
Both for the child and the adult researcher, scientific progress does not 
stem from the use of logical criteria on the basis of rational induction 
from observations. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988, p.183) 
Furthermore, having generated their initial explanatory theories, Karmiloff-Smith 
argues that children do not attempt to falsify them, as Popper's hypothetico-deductive 
account of scientific inquiry would dictate. Instead, she repeatedly emphasizes the 
tenacity of children's theories and their constraining influence on children's problem 
solving behaviour on the tasks, describing how children will ignore "glaring counter 
examples" to their theories and even invent 'observable' data in order to maintain 
their theoretical commitments. Based on such findings, then, it would seem that the 
logic-and-testing model at the heart of hypothetico-deductive method also fails to 
capture the process of spontaneous scientific discovery in children: 
. . . clearly children are not falsificationists. They constantly develop 
theories and create domains, carving and re-carving nature at new joints. 
And they simplify and unify incoming data to make them conform to 
their theories. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988, p.192) 
11 See also Keil (1998) for the speculation that explanation may be more central to cognitive 
development than prediction. 
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Based on the above analysis, it seems clear Karmiloff-Smith endorses the view that 
the component processes of scientific discovery are not qualitatively distinct from 
those seen in children's problem solving. However, when she looks to an account of 
scientific inquiry to illuminate these parallels, she finds that neither inductive nor 
hypothetico-deductive accounts are adequate source models. From the standpoint of 
abductive method however, the pattern of data-theory relations in children's problem 
solving that she describes can be seen to bear some striking parallels to the picture of 
these relations defended by Haig (2002). Firstly, Karmiloff-Smith's account of 
children's actual scientific practice alludes to the activity of phenomena detection by 
indicating that children initially exploit information present in the environment to 
identify empirical regularities or patterns in the data. Secondly, the generative move 
from data (phenomena) to theory in children's problem solving is best described as 
abductive in character. Instead of simply observing facts and reasoning via inductive 
logic to descriptive generalizations about them, Karmiloff-Smith suggests children 
spontaneously generate rudimentary explanatory theories to make sense of the data 
patterns they are confronted with, by going beyond the data to identify causes that 
explain these patterns or 'effects'. 
Further, concerning the strategies available to children for developing their theoretical 
explanations, Karmiloff-Smith highlights the role of various modelling strategies in 
children's theory building. For example, in a spatial construction task, children were 
observed explicitly employing symmetry as a heuristic to potentiate their search. 
Likewise, children were also seen to use quantification as a promising search path, 
counting elements in a physics problem to see if the resulting pattern was suggestive 
of the causal entities at work (Karmiloff-Smith, 1984). Finally, while not dealing 
explicitly with the question of how (or if) children evaluate their theories, Karmiloff-
Smith explicitly rejects the idea that children reason like falsificationists. Moreover, 
in emphasizing how children go beyond behavioural success to spontaneously 
restructure their knowledge base, she suggests that it is the achievement of a coherent 
explanatory framework that signals to children that they have successfully solved the 
problem under study. 
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4.3 Beyond the theory theory 
In this chapter, I have attempted to establish the initial plausibility of the proposal that 
the abductive framework can inform deliberations about the knowledge construction 
strategies of young children. In order to achieve this end, I began by considering the 
intended scope of Gopnik and Meltzoff s theory theory to the development of 
knowledge in childhood. I argued that these researchers employ the analogy with 
science as a means of overcoming the limitations of existing theoretical frameworks, 
and look to a particular model of scientific change to define a viable alternative theory 
of cognitive development. However, given the inability of the theory theory to offer 
any substantive ideas about the processes through which children's theories are 
developed, I suggested that this formulation fails to cultivate meaningful 
correspondences between children and scientists, and in doing so indicates the need to 
consider alternative frameworks for developmental inquiry. 
Following this recognition, I turned to examine a broad interactionist perspective on 
development advanced by Elman and colleagues. I demonstrated how these 
researchers draw on recent advances in the neurosciences and in computational 
modelling to define a bio-connectionist approach, that is neither radically nativist nor 
radically empiricist in its commitments. Specifically, this integration of biology and 
connectionism affords a unique view of development as a cascade of multi-level 
interactions, and is therefore capable of encompassing all aspects of the organism-
environment relationship that are relevant to an understanding of developmental 
change. I concluded that the work of Elman et al. offers researchers a promising 
theoretical framework for investigations of cognitive development, and a superior 
alternative to the theory theory model, which demonstrates only limited application to 
a restricted set of developmental issues. 
Having endorsed this interactionist framework, I subsequently set about repositioning 
the child-as-scientist analogy in order to focus on the specific theory building 
strategies of children and scientists. Drawing on the detailed investigations of 
children's problem solving undertaken by Karmiloff-Smith, I highlighted some 
significant parallels between the pattern of data-theory relations identified by 
Karmiloff-Smith, and the corresponding picture of these relations articulated by 
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abductive method. Based on these parallels, I believe it is plausible to argue that this 
methodological reformulation has the potential to move the analogy beyond the 
current theory theory model and develop system mappings of higher order relations 
between children and scientists. With this aim in mind, therefore, Chapter 5 extends 
the abductive-methods analogy to the context of theory evaluation and examines the 
processes by which children evaluate the quality of their explanations. 
Chapter 5 
Evaluating Ideas: The Role of Coherence in 
Scientific and Everyday Thought 
In Chapter 4, I sought to establish the initial plausibility of my methodological 
reformulation of the child-as-scientist analogy by identifying an abduCtive pattern of 
reasoning in accounts of children's spontaneous theory building. Given evidence that 
children generate explanatory theories, and do so by reasoning abductively, the focus 
of this chapter turns to theory evaluation; that is, how children appraise the quality of 
everyday explanations, and whether the cognitive strategies they employ bear any 
significant resemblance to those employed by scientists. 
Accordingly, in Section 5.1 I begin by reviewing recent comparisons of theory use in 
scientific and everyday contexts that offer both indirect and direct evidence for a 
substantial overlap in the criteria used by scientists and children to evaluate 
explanations. Section 5.2 ties these findings to the computational model of theory 
evaluation advanced by Paul Thagard, which demonstrates how these criteria are 
combined in inferences to the best explanation on ~he basis of explanatory coherence. 
In Section 5.3, I conclude that a methods-centred approach to theory evaluation that 
incorporates precise computational models of the mechanisms underlying explanatory 
reasoning, reveals significant relations between the cognitive strategies employed in 
scientific and everyday thought. 
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5.1 Employing theories in scientific and everyday contexts 
In the previous chapter, I repositioned the child-as-scientist analogy to focus on the 
specific methods and strategies employed by children in their knowledge-seeking 
endeavours. Using the abductive theory of scientific method as a source model, I 
argued for meaningful relations between the particular sequence of data-theory 
relations underpinning children's theory generation efforts, and the codified account 
of this generative process provided by the abductive theory. Given these suggestive 
parallels between children and scientists in the context of theory generation, this 
chapter further develops the claim that the abductive framework offers a source of 
ideas about children's knowledge construction strategies, by investigating the role of 
abductive reasoning in the context of evaluation. I 
Concerning the issue of how children evaluate ideas, is it plausible to suggest they 
reason like scientists? That is, when faced with competing explanations of a 
phenomenon, do children possess the cognitive skills to make a rational judgment 
about which alternative provides the best explanation of the phenomenon in question? 
And if so, are their judgments constrained by the same sorts of criteria that feature in 
contemporary models of scientific theory evaluation? 
While such questions would seem central to comparisons of theory use in scientific 
and everyday contexts, there is little research to date that bears directly on these 
Issues. With the exception of the process-oriented investigations conducted by 
Karmiloff-Srnith reviewed in Chapter 4, the majority of studies examining children's 
commonsense theories have focused on the underlying theoretical frameworks that are 
argued to constrain core knowledge in foundational domains (e.g., Carey, 1985; Keil, 
1989; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992, 1998). While this emphasis on 
1 I have chosen to focus specifically on theory evaluation rather than theory development issues, 
because theory theory analyses have tended to concentrate efforts on theory formation and revision, as 
opposed to theory development. As I indicated in Chapter 4, indirect evidence from Karmiloff-Smith's 
studies demonstrating children's effective use of heuristics on problem solving tasks is suggestive of 
the early use of modelling strategies in theory construction. However, see Wilson and Keil (2000) for 
the proposal that everyday explanations employed by children and lay adults demonstrate a lack of 
systematic development when compared to scientific explanations. 
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framework theories has been helpful for determining the ways in which knowledge is 
structured and organized within domain-specific systems, questions about the specific 
strategies children use to evaluate the adequacy of their knowledge, and the 
similarities and/or differences to strategies employed by scientists, have been 
relatively neglected. One notable exception is a body of research investigating 
children's theories of the natural world undertaken by William Brewer and colleagues 
(Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Brewer, Chinn, & Samarapungavan, 2000; 
Samarapungavan, 1992; Samarapungavan & Wiers, 1997; Vosniadou & Brewer, 
1987, 1992, 1994), which provides some informative comparisons of theory use in 
scientific and everyday contexts. In what follows, I draw on both indirect and direct 
evidence from this body of work to examine the strategies children use to choose 
between competing explanations of phenomena, and whether these evaluative 
strategies bear any significant relation to theory evaluation practices in science. 
5.1.1 Children's theories of the natural world: Examples from observational 
astronomy 
Undertaking an analysis of possible child-scientist parallels in the context of theory 
evaluation, presupposes not only that children construct theories about the world on 
the basis of their everyday experience, but also that these knowledge structures 
display, at least in part, what we take to be crucial features of theory goodness. In 
Chapter 3, I highlighted a range of criteria that are generally taken to be important for 
evaluating the worth of scientific theories, including empirical accuracy, consilience 
or explanatory breadth, simplicity, and consistency (Haig, 2002; Thagard, 1992). An 
initial question, then, is whether children's theories also display these features. 
Coherence versus fragmentation 
A review of descriptions of children's knowledge structures by researchers who 
endorse some version of the analogy with science (e.g., Carey, 1985; Karmiloff-
Smith, 1988; Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974; Wellman, 1990; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997), reveals an emphasis on the coherence and 
systematicity of children's intuitions. Moreover, these features are often explicitly 
employed as diagnostic criteria for determining the theoretical status of children's 
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knowledge (Wellman, 1990; Gopnik, 1996b; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). In addition, 
researchers have also stressed the consilience of children's theoretical constructions 
and the importance of the resulting explanatory understanding for successful problem 
solving (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988; Keil, 1998). Similarly, science education researchers 
who propose that intuitive knowledge has the status of a naIve theory, have 
highlighted the explanatory power of these alternative frameworks to integrate and 
make sense of a wide range of disparate phenomena (e.g., Driver & Easley, 1978; 
Kempton, 1987; McCloskey & Kargon, 1988). Further, they argue that this feature 
contributes to the well-documented resistance of intuitive ideas to formal science 
instruction. 
In contrast, other researchers who reject the idea that initial knowledge is theory-like 
(e.g., diSessa, 1983, 1988, 1993; Solomon, 1983, 1996), have tended to support their 
claims by highlighting the absence of these features in children's cognitive 
constructions. For example, diSessa (1988) has argued that intuitive knowledge is 
typically fragmented and inconsistent, and does not demonstrate the explanatory 
breadth or depth characteristic of scientific theories. Taking naIve physics as a case 
study, he proposes that everyday intuitions about the physical world are best described 
as loose assortments of discrete pieces of information or knowledge fragments, rather 
than coherent explanatory theories. According to diSessa, these intuitions are simple 
abstractions from everyday experience and tend to be inconsistently applied in 
problem solving (diSessa, 1988). 
In light of such fundamental disagreements about the character of intuitive 
knowledge, a large-scale research project investigating children's theories of 
astronomical phenomena (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, 1994) is informative. Working 
from the assumption that children are spontaneous theory builders, these researchers 
have undertaken detailed examinations of children's mental representations of various 
phenomena that form part of the domain of scientific astronomy. Specifically, 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, 1994) conducted structured interviews in which 
elementary school children were asked a series of factual and generative questions 
about the shape of the earth and the day/night cycle. Based on children's verbal 
responses and their associated drawings, Vosniadou and Brewer attempted to identify 
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the mental models held by elementary school children, and to determine whether these 
models were applied in a consistent manner across a range of problems. 
The results of these studies indicate that even young children develop coherent 
explanatory theories of natural world phenomena, which they apply in a systematic 
and consistent fashion. In the case of children's models of the earth, Vosniadou and 
Brewer (1992) identified five well-defined alternative models to the spherical earth 
model, depicted in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 
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Children's mental models of the earth. Reproduced from 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, p.549). 
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The responses of the youngest children (first graders) suggested that many of them 
held flat earth models (i.e., disc earth and rectangular earth). These models, in which 
the earth is supported by ground, were in keeping with children's everyday experience 
and were unaffected by the culturally accepted spherical earth model. At the other 
end of the spectrum, many of the older children's (fifth graders) protocols indicated 
that they had formed the culturally accepted scientific model in which the earth is a 
sphere surrounded by space. In addition to these models, Vosniadou and Brewer 
(1992) also uncovered a number of creative "synthetic models" of the earth (dual 
earth, hollow sphere, flattened sphere), which were formed by a significant proportion 
of the participants. 
Close examination of these models by the researchers revealed they were the outcome 
of a concerted attempt by children to reconcile their everyday experience of a flat 
earth with culturally conveyed information that the earth is a sphere (Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992). For example, children who constructed the dual earth model 
demonstrated the belief that there are two earths: one that is flat, where people live, 
and another one that is round and located up in the sky with other planets. Evidence 
that children held this dual earth model and were not merely giving confused or 
inconsistent responses to questions came from children's drawings in which both 
'earths' were represented, and from the use of two distinct terms (i.e., the term 'earth' 
was typically reserved for the round planet up in the sky, while the term 'ground' was 
used to refer to the place where people live) (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). 
In addition to the dual earth model, a significant proportion of children were classified 
as holding a hollow sphere model. These children indicated that they had resolved the 
flat earth/sphere conflict by forming a well-defined model of the earth as either a) a 
hollow sphere with people living on flat ground deep inside it, or b) as consisting of 
two hemispheres, with people living on the lower hemisphere and the sky forming the 
upper hemisphere in the shape of a dome. Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) offer the 
following protocol and associated drawing as representative of children who were 
found to have constructed this creative synthetic model: 
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Venica, Grade 3 (hollow sphere): 
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round? 
C: Because you are on the ground and you make that picture like a shape and you 
made it a square shape and if you'll look up it'll look like a rectangle or 
something like that and if you go out of earth and go into space you'll see a 
circle or round. 
E: So what is the real shape of the earth? 
C: Round. 
E: Why does it look flat? 
C: Because you are inside the earth. 
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line, where would you 
end up? 
C: Somewhere in the desert. 
E: What if you kept walking? 
C: You can go to states and cities. 
E: What if you kept on walking? 
C: (No response.) 
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth? 
C: No. You would have to be in a spaceship if you're going to go to the end of 
the earth. 
E: Is there an edge to the earth? 
C: No. Only if you go up. 
Later: 
E: Can people fall off the end/edge of the earth? 
C: No. 
E: Why wouldn't they fall off? 
C: Because they are inside the earth. 
E: What do you mean inside? 
C: They don't fall, they have sidewalks, things down like on the bottom. 
E: Is the earth round like a ball or round like a thick pancake? 
C: Round like a ball. 
E: When you say that they live inside the earth, do you mean they live inside the 
ball? 
C: Inside the ball. In the middle of it. 
(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, pp.563-4) 
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Figure 5.2 Drawing of the earth, moon, the stars, and the sky by 
Venica, Grade 3 (hollow sphere). Reproduced from 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, p.558). 
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Finally, children who were classified as holding a flattened sphere model of the earth 
were found to have integrated information that the earth is round with their experience 
of its flatness, by forming a model of the earth as a thick pancake. According to this 
model, the earth is rounded at the sides and flat on the top and bottom where people 
live, supported by gravity (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). 
The above sample of findings, resulting from Vosniadou and Brewer's detailed 
analyses of children's mental models of the earth, can be taken to support the view 
that children construct coherent explanatory theories of natural world phenomena. 
Contrary to diSessa's claim that children's intuitive knowledge is fragmented and 
unconnected, Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) found that the great majority of children 
interviewed had recourse to a well-defined model of the earth, which they applied 
consistently. Specifically, by assuming that the children in their study were using a 
small number of clearly defined models of the earth, V osniadou and Brewer were able 
to account for over 80% of the variation in children's individual responses. In 
addition, Vosniadou and Brewer point to the high frequency of synthetic models 
uncovered as a powerful indicator that children are not content with fragmentary 
knowledge about the earth's shape but instead will take active steps to integrate the 
information they receive into a coherent representation (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). 
Similar findings of coherence in studies of children's models of the day/night cycle 
(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994), and their ideas about speciation (Samarapungavan & 
Wiers, 1997), add further weight to Vosniadou & Brewer's claims for theory 
construction in childhood. 
More generally, Vosniadou and Brewer's findings that a large number of children 
formed alternative models of the earth, offers a potential explanation for the perceived 
fragmentation and inconsistencies in children's intuitive knowledge discussed by 
researchers such as diSessa (1988). As Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) make clear, 
some of the models uncovered, such as the hollow sphere model, were so novel from 
the standpoint of the culturally accepted scientific model, that children initially 
appeared to be confused and inconsistent in their responses. Vosniadou and Brewer 
caution that without detailed characterizations of the actual models employed in a 
particular domain, researchers may mistakenly attribute inconsistencies and self-
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contradictions to children that are unwarranted when their conceptual frameworks are 
fully appreciated and taken into account (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). 
Assessing children's theories: Criteria of theory goodness 
If it can be accepted that children construct coherent explanatory theories of natural 
world phenomena, it is plausible to consider whether children's knowledge structures 
also meet criteria employed to evaluate the adequacy of theories in science. As part 
of their investigation of children's models of the day/night cycle, Vosniadou and 
Brewer (1994) explicitly examined three such criteria: empirical accuracy, logical 
consistency (both internal and external), and simplicity. Firstly, concerning the 
criterion of empirical accuracy, they found good evidence to support the claim that 
children honour the need for empirically consistent models in constructing their 
representations of the day/night cycle. Specifically, Vosniadou and Brewer argued 
that the majority of children's models were consistent with the following range of 
observations available to young children: 
• There is a sequence of day and night. 
• The sun is in the sky during the day, but not at night. 
• The moon and stars are in the sky during the night but not during the day. 
• Objects appear and disappear. 
(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994, p.130) 
The second criterion used by Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) to evaluate children's 
day/night cycle models, focused on the degree to which these models were internally 
and externally consistent. Once again, the detailed representations of children's 
models built up from verbal protocols and elicited drawings, offer considerable 
evidence that even young children are sensitive to the criterion of logical consistency. 
In particular, Vosniadou and Brewer found that the· majority of the children 
interviewed gave consistent responses to questions about a range of different 
phenomena associated with the day/night cycle such as the disappearance of the sun at 
night and the disappearance of the stars during the day (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). 
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Moreover, by investigating children's models of the earth together with their models 
of the day/night cycle and their models of the sun, these researchers were able to 
determine the degree to which children's accounts of related phenomena demonstrated 
external consistency with one another. Specifically, their findings indicated that for 
the majority of children interviewed, their models of the earth and the sun constrain 
the particular models they develop of the day/night cycle, and do so in appropriate 
ways. For example, children who held a flat earth model in which the earth is rooted 
in the ground, did not go on to explain the day/night cycle by invoking the mechanism 
of a mobile earth rotating on its axis or revolving around the sun. Instead, they opted 
for a logically consistent mechanism such as a movable sun that goes behind a 
mountain or far out into space at night and returns during the day. Similarly, children 
who were found to hold a stationary sun model did not subsequently explain the 
day/night cycle in terms of the movement of the sun. Rather, these children relied on 
logically consistent mechanisms such as the occlusion of the sun by clouds or the earth 
revolving around a stationary sun (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). 
Finally, in addition to empirical accuracy and logical consistency criteria, Vosniadou 
and Brewer (1994) also examined the extent to which children demonstrate an 
awareness of simplicity in their explanations of astronomical phenomena.2 They found 
that the majority of children not only employed mechanisms that were logically 
consistent, but in many cases used a single mechanism to explain multiple phenomena 
For example, many children were shown to use the same mechanism to account for 
both the disappearance of the sun and the disappearance of the moon in their protocols. 
More generally, Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) argue that children's models, such as 
that depicted in Figure 5.3, are often much simpler than the accepted scientific model, 
supporting the idea that children employ a simplicity measure in their theory 
construction efforts. 
2 In the context of their study, Vosniadou and Brewer defined 'simplicity' as" ... the use of the same 
mechanism to account for different, although related phenomena" (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994, p.176). 
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Figure 5.3 Example of a mental model of the day/night cycle 
constructed by children in Vosniadou and Brewer's study 
that is simpler than the scientific model. In this model, the 
sun and moon are fixed at opposite sides of the earth, 
which rotates in an up/down or east/west direction. 
Reproduced from Vosniadou and Brewer (1994, p.169). 
Collectively, the investigations of children's mental models of astronomical 
phenomena conducted by Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, 1994) offer indirect support 
for the possibility of parallels between children and scientists in the context of theory 
evaluation. By demonstrating that children's intuitive knowledge displays many of the 
features deemed to be hallmarks of good theories in science, this research suggests that 
children are capable of constructing and reasoning from knowledge structures that 
conform to these criteria.3 A further study conducted by Ala Samarapungavan 
(Samarapungavan, 1992), which does give explicit attention to theory evaluation, 
suggests that children can also use these criteria to evaluate the adequacy of their 
knowledge. The following section reviews Samarapungavan's important results. 
3 This claim is made more compelling by the nature of the domain investigated. That is, while 
children's explanatory models of the earth and the day/night cycle are likely to be constrained by some 
core physical principles, it is not plausible to suggest that the particular models uncovered by 
Vosniadou and Brewer, with their demonstrated empirical adequacy, logical consistency, and 
simplicity characteristics, are part of our innate endowment (as is often argued in the case offolk 
psychology for example). Vosniadou and Brewer make a similar point regarding the support their 
findings lend to a strong constructivist position on knowledge development more generally (Vosniadou 
& Brewer, 1994). 
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5.1.2 Evaluating explanations: Criteria for theory choice 
In an attempt to determine whether it is useful to cast children as intuitive scientists, 
Samarapungavan (1992) investigated the reasoning strategies employed by elementary 
school children on a range of theory choice tasks. In particular, she was concerned to 
establish whether children have access to and can utilize the same kinds of 
metaconceptual criteria that underpin theory evaluation in science. Working from 
accounts of theory selection in contemporary philosophy of science (e.g., Kuhn, 1977; 
Laudan, 1977; Popper, 1959; Thagard, 1978; Toulmin, 1972), Samarapungavan 
identified the following four criteria for further investigation with children: 
• Range of explanation: Firstly, if children reason like scientists then they 
should demonstrate a preference for theories that can account for a 
greater range of the data to be explained. 
• Non-ad hocness: Secondly, children should prefer theories that explain 
the data without having to rely on additional auxiliary or ad hoc 
hypotheses. 
• Empirical consistency: Thirdly, if children's judgments mirror scientists' 
judgments on theory choice tasks, then they should select theories that 
are consistent with the empirical evidence over theories that are 
inconsistent with it. 
• Logical consistency: Finally, Samarpungavan proposes that children 
should also demonstrate a sensitivity to the logical consistency of 
theories. That is, if a theory is shown to have internal inconsistencies 
then this fact should enter into, and constrain, children's choices on 
theory selection tasks (Samarapungavan, 1992). 
Having identified these four criteria as pivotal to scientific theory evaluation, 
Samarapungavan (1992) devised a series of experimental tasks to test children's 
ability to use these criteria as a basis for theory selection. In each task, she presented 
elementary school children with a group of observations relating to a particular 
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phenomenon. The children were then given two alternative explanations for the 
observations that differed on the basis of one of the four criteria listed above and were 
asked to choose the 'correct' explanation from the two alternatives. Children were 
also asked to justify their theory choices. Finally, in order to examine the influence of 
children's prior beliefs on their ability to apply the criteria under examination, 
Samarapungavan systematically manipulated the content of the tasks so that they were 
consistent, inconsistent, or neutral with respect to children's prior knowledge. 
Therefore, each of the four criteria was tested with three sets of materials: two sets 
from the domain of astronomy where pre-testing determined children's adherence to 
either a geocentric or heliocentric framework, and one set from the domain of 
chemistry which was conceived to be knowledge neutral (Samarapungavan, 1992). 
To give an example of the experimental materials used, consider the following set-up 
that was used to test children's ability to apply the 'range of explanation' criterion and 
the 'non-ad hocness' criterion (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4 Experimental materials used to test children's application 
of the range of explanation criterion and the non-ad hocness criterion. 
Reproduced from Samarapungavan (1992, p.l2). 
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In this chemistry task, a collection of jars was mounted on boxes that were labelled 
either 'hot' or 'cold'. Each jar was filled with a blue, red, or colourless liquid (acids 
and bases). A pH indicator was immersed into each jar, and its change in colour 
noted. In Figure 5.4, 'B' represents a change to the colour blue, while 'R' represents a 
change to the colour red (Samarapungavan, 1992). 
In tests of children's use of the 'range of explanation' criterion, children observed 
these changes and then were given two alternative theories (T1 and T2), that 
supposedly corresponded to what two children their own age (Ann and Joe) thought 
about the observations: 
T1 - I think the stuff in the jars is paint. The stick is coated with the 
colour of the liquid. So when you put the stick in the blue paint it turns 
blue and when you put the stick in the red paint it is painted red. 
T2 - I think that the stick changes color to show if a thing is hot or cold. 
So when the liquid in the jar is heated by the hot box, the stick turns red. 
The stick even turned blue in the liquid that had no colour because the jar 
was cold. (Samarapungavan, 1992, p.11) 
T1 attempted to explain the observations by proposing that the liquids were dyes, but 
was unable to account for fact that the indicator stick in the colourless liquid turned 
blue. In contrast, T2 was able to account for all the observations by proposing that the 
stick 'measured' the temperature of the liquids, turning blue in cold liquids and red in 
hot ones (Samarapungavan, 1992). 
In tests of children's use of the 'non-ad hocness' criterion, T1 introduced an ad hoc 
explanation in an attempt to account for the outstanding observation that the indicator 
stick also changed colour in the clear liquid: 
T1 - I still think the stick changes colour because it is covered by the 
paint in the jar. So when you put it in the red paint it turns red and in the 
blue paint it turns blue. Only sometimes, if the sticks are old they get 
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spoiled and they begin to get blue spots like the one in the jar with the 
clear liquid. (Samarapungavan, 1992, p.14) 
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The results of Samarapungavan's (1992) study offer convincing evidence that even 
young children can use a range of metaconceptual criteria to evaluate competing 
accounts of phenomena Specifically, Samarapungavan found that elementary school 
children could use all four criteria investigated as a basis for theory selection when the 
theories in question did not conflict with their existing knowledge. 4 Even the youngest 
children interviewed (first graders) demonstrated a systematic preference for theories 
that explained more, and were consistent both internally and with the evidence. In 
addition, the theory choices of older children (fifth graders) also showed a systematic 
preference for theories that did not rely on ad hoc hypotheses to account for the 
observations presented. Further, in many cases children were able to justify their 
choices by explicit reference to the criterion being examined.5 To give an example of 
a criterion-based justification on the 'range of explanation' task described above, 
Samarapungavan recounts the following justification given by a child after her 
selection ofT2 (the theory of broader range): 
... I think Ann is right because she also showed why the stick is blue in 
that box [points to clear jar] and Joe didn't. (Samarapungavan, 1992, 
p.13) 
Based on these findings, Samarapungavan argues that children can evaluate ideas by 
applying a range of metaconceptual criteria, and do so in ways that resemble theory 
evaluation strategies employed by scientists. She concludes that contrary to claims 
made by critics of the child-as-scientist analogy (e.g., Kuhn, 1989), " ... even young 
children share some of the cognitive underpinnings of scientific rationality that 
scientists do" (Samarapungavan, 1992, p.1). 
4 Overall, the frequency of correct choices was very high: pooled across grade, 1267 out of a total 
1620 theory choices or 78.2% were for the correct theory. For each criterion, the percentage of correct 
choices pooled across grade and task were as follows: range of explanation (81 %), non-ad hocness 
(65%), empirical consistency (94%), logical consistency (82%) (Samarapungavan, 1992). 
5 This was particularly true of the 'range of explanation' and 'empirical consistency' conditions, where 
criterion-based justifications for correct theory choices were 86% and 96% respectively 
(Samarapungavan, 1992). 
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To summarize, Samarapungavan's (1992) findings of scientific rationality on theory 
choice tasks, when taken together with the results ofVosniadou and Brewer's (1992, 
1994) investigations of children's theories of astronomy, indicate the possibility of 
significant relations between children and scientists in the context of theory 
evaluation. Indirect evidence from studies of children's mental models of the earth 
and the day/night cycle, suggests that children construct coherent explanatory theories 
that conform closely to criteria used to assess the worth of scientific theories. Direct 
evidence that children can actually use these criteria to choose between competing 
theories, and often justify their choices by reference to these criteria, adds considerable 
weight to the claim for parallels between the strategies employed by children and 
scientists to evaluate the efficacy of ideas. 
In a recent review of the nature of explanation in children and scientists (Brewer, 
Chinn & Samarapungavan, 2000), Brewer and colleagues draw together these findings 
concerning children's theories of the natural world to provide an account of 
explanation and the criteria children use to evaluate the quality of explanations. Based 
on their research, they conclude that there is a considerable overlap in the evaluative 
criteria used by both groups to assess the adequacy of knowledge, and speculate on 
how to further understanding of these correspondences in theory application across 
scientific and everyday contexts. Based on the methodological reformulation of child-
scientist parallels advocated in this thesis, it is suggested that these findings are 
naturally interpreted within the computational model of theory evaluation endorsed by 
the abductive theory of scientific method, according to which multiple criteria like 
those identified by Brewer et al. are combined in inferences to the best explanation on 
the basis of explanatory coherence. 
5.2 Theory building, evaluation, and explanatory coherence 
In Chapter 3, as part of my presentation of the abductive theory of scientific method, I 
highlighted Haig's commitment to a multi-criterial perspective on theory evaluation, 
and more specifically to the process of evaluating theories in terms of their 
explanatory power or worth (Haig, 2002). Adopting Gilbert Harman's label of 
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'inference to the best explanation' (Harman, 1965), Haig argues that theory evaluation 
in science is best construed as a comparative exercise, whereby rival theories are pitted 
against each other on multiple dimensions to determine which theory provides the best 
explanation of the empirical phenomena under study. Seeking a more detailed account 
of how this process might operate in scientific practice, Haig (2002) discusses an 
influential formulation of inference to the best explanation developed by the cognitive 
scientist Paul Thagard (Thagard, 1989, 1992) that centres on the notion of explanatory 
coherence. 
5.2.1 The theory of explanatory coherence (TEe) 
According to Thagard, the evaluation of competing theories or hypotheses is decided 
on the basis of three main criteria that collectively determine their relative explanatory 
coherence. The first factor involved in assessments of explanatory coherence concerns 
how much of the evidence a particular hypothesis explains, a criterion that Thagard 
terms the explanatory breadth or consilience of a hypothesis (see also Whewell, 
1967). The second factor important to explanatory coherence considerations is 
whether its explanations are economical and free of ad hoc assumptions. Thagard 
takes this factor to be concerned with issues of simplicity. The third factor identified 
by Thagard as contributing to explanatory coherence is the degree to which the 
hypothesis in question is similar to hypotheses that explain similar phenomena, a 
criterion that Thagard labels analogy.6 Thagard argues that when these three criteria 
are combined they serve to determine the explanatory coherence of a hypothesis 
relative to available alternatives. That is, a theory is judged to be more explanatorily 
coherent and therefore provides a better explanation of the phenomena than its rivals if 
it explains more, relies on fewer ad hoc hypotheses to achieve this explanatory 
success, and is consistent with currently accepted theories that explain similar 
phenomena (Thagard, 1992). In developing in detail his theory of explanatory 
coherence and its implementation in a computer program, which he applies to both 
6 An additional consideration is whether the hypothesis itself is explained, which Thagard subsumes 
under the criterion of explanatory breadth (Thagard, 1992). 
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scientific and everyday reasoning, Thagard endeavours to show how such judgments 
are made. 
With this aim in mind, Thagard (1992) compiles the following list of seven principles. 
Taken together, these principles serve to establish relations of explanatory coherence 
and allow a judgment of the acceptability of propositions that comprise an explanatory 
system, as well as an assessment of the explanatory coherence of the system as a 
whole, on the basis of local relations holding between pairs of propositions. In the 
following presentation of the principles, the symbol'S' stands for an explanatory 
system, which consists of propositions P, Q, and PI ... Pm (refer Thagard, 1992, 
pp.65-69; for an informal statement of the principles see Thagard, 2000, p.43): 
1. Symmetry 
(a) If P and Q cohere, then Q and P cohere. 
(b) If P and Q in cohere, then Q and P in cohere. 
The first principle, Symmetry, simply states that explanatory coherence between two 
propositions is a symmetrical relation. 
2. Explanation 
IfP1 . .. Pm explain Q, then: 
(a) For each Pi inP1 . .. Pm, Pi and Q cohere. 
(b) For each Pi and Pj in P1 ... Pm, Pi and Pj cohere. 
(c) In (a) and (b) the degree of coherence is inversely proportional to the 
number of propositions P 1 ... Pm. 
Principle 2, Explanation, determines the majority of the explanatory relations that give 
rise to explanatory coherence and in doing so, subsumes the criteria of explanatory 
breadth and simplicity discussed above. In particular, it specifies that (a) if a 
hypothesis explains a piece of evidence (or another hypothesis) then it coheres with 
that evidence (or hypothesis); (b) if two hypotheses jointly explain something i.e., they 
are "co-hypotheses", then they cohere with each other; and (c) the greater the number 
of hypotheses required for an explanation, the lower the degree of coherence of the 
hypotheses with each other and with what is being explained. 
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3. Analogy 
If PI explains QI, P2 explains Q2, PI is analogous to P2, and QI is analogous 
to Q2, then PI and P2 cohere, and QI and Q2 cohere. 
133 
The third Principle, Analogy, embodies the other major criterion identified by Thagard 
as central to establishing explanatory coherence. This principle states that if similar 
propositions explain similar pieces of evidence, then they cohere with each other. 
4. Data Priority 
Propositions that describe the results of observation have a degree of 
acceptability on their own. 
This principle recognizes that the results of observation and experiment, while not 
indubitable, have some independent acceptability. In science, this independent 
warrant can be seen to derive from the application of data collection and analysis 
techniques that are designed to promote data reliability (Haig, 2002), By including 
this principle as part of his theory of explanatory coherence, Thagard therefore 
endorses a form of "discriminating coherentism" (Thagard, 2000, p.44), where data is 
given a certain priority in assessments of explanatory coherence, but can be overridden 
by coherence considerations if required. 
5. Contradiction 
If P contradicts Q, then P and Q in cohere. 
Principle 5, Contradiction, covers the negative relations that· hold between 
contradictory hypotheses and states that if two propositions contradict each other, then 
they will "incohere" or actively resist cohering. 
6. Competition 
If P and Q both explain a proposition Pi, and if P and Q are not 
explanatorily connected, then P and Q incohere. Here P and Q are 
explanatorily connected if any of the following conditions holds: 
(a) P is part of the explanation of Q, 
(b) Q is part of the explanation ofP, 
(c) P and Q are together part of the explanation of some proposition Pi 
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While Principle 5 relates specifically to contradictory hypotheses, Principle 6 covers 
all other cases where hypotheses are deemed incompatible because they compete to 
explain the same evidence and no explanatory relations hold between them. 
7. Acceptability 
(a) The acceptability of a proposition P in a system S depends on its 
coherence with the propositions in S 
(b) If many results of relevant experimental observations are unexplained, 
then the acceptability of a proposition P that explains only a few of them 
is reduced. 
The final principle included in Thagard's (1992) statement of TEC proposes that 
propositions are accepted or rejected based on their degree of coherence with other 
propositions, as established by Principles 1-6. In doing so, this principle embodies the 
fundamental assumption driving assessments of explanatory coherence, namely that 
the decision to accept or reject a theory as a whole is made on the basis of local pair-
wise coherence relations (Thagard, 1992). 
5.2.2 Computing explanatory coherence: An introduction to ECHO 
While the principles of explanatory coherence listed above offer a far more precise 
formulation of the notion of inference to the best explanation than was previously 
available, Thagard argues that the theory by itself is still too general to show exactly 
how it is possible to compute the acceptability of competing hypotheses or theories on 
the basis of explanatory coherence. To overcome this limitation, Thagard has 
developed a computer program called ECHO 7 that successfully implements the 
principles of explanatory coherence using connectionist techniques (Thagard, 1989, 
1992). 
7 ECHO stands for Explanatory Coherence by Harmany Optimization (Thagard, 1992). The term 
'Harmany' is a tribute to Gilbert Harman and his early ideas regarding inference to the best 
explanation. 
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Briefly, in ECHO propositions corresponding to hypotheses and evidence are 
represented by nodes or neuron-like units, with links between them representing 
relations of coherence and incoherence. In accordance with Principle 1 (which states 
that propositions cohere and incohere equally), these links are symmetrical. 
Coherence relations (determined by Principles 2 and 3), are represented by excitatory 
connections and incoherence relations (specified by Principles 5 and 6), by inhibitory 
connections. Hence, if two propositions cohere because of explanatory relations 
holding between them, then the units representing these propositions are connected by 
an excitatory link. Conversely, if two propositions incohere because of relations of 
competition or contradiction, then the units representing these propositions are 
connected by an inhibitory link. ECHO implements Principle 4, concerning data 
priority, by establishing links from the units representing the data propositions to a 
special evidence unit with a constant activation of l. Figure 5.5 depicts a simple 
connectionist network that demonstrates these properties. 
When this network is run, activation flows from the special evidence unit to the 
evidence units (EI and E2), and then to the units representing the explanatory 
hypotheses (HI and H2). Because of the inhibitory link between HI and H2, these 
units have to compete for the activation spreading from the evidence units and the 
activation of one will tend to suppress the other. In order to compute the acceptability 
of the competing explanatory hypotheses, ECHO uses a standard connectionist 
algorithm (see the Appendix at the end of this chapter for details), which repeatedly 
adjusts the activation of all the units in parallel over a specified number of cycles. In 
each cycle of activation adjustment, the activation of each unit is updated based on the 
activation of the units to which it is connected by excitatory and inhibitory links. This 
process is repeated until all the units have reached static or unchanging activation 
levels, indicating that the network has settled into a stable state. At this point, some 
units will remain activated, with a final activation above a threshold of 0, while other 
units will be deactivated (final activation < 0). These final activation levels serve to 
determine the acceptability of the propositions represented. Specifically, propositions 
represented by units that have positive activations are accepted, and those represented 
by units that have negative activations are rejected. The result of running the network 
depicted in Figure 5.5 is that HI, which demonstrates greater explanatory breadth, is 
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accepted (remains activated), and the competing explanatory hypothesis, H2, IS 
rejected (deactivated). 
Figure 5.5 A simple ECHO network. Solid lines represent excitatory 
links and dashed lines represent inhibitory links. Evidence 
units are linked to a special unit with a constant activation 
of 1. 
By demonstrating how the acceptability of competing hypotheses can be effectively 
computed on the basis of explanatory coherence considerations (specified by TEC's 
seven principles), ECHO can be seen to provide a concrete connectionist solution to 
the problem of theory evaluation. Thagard (1992) points out that repeated runs of the 
program have confirmed ECHO can successfully integrate the criteria of explanatory 
breadth, simplicity, and analogy emphasized by TEC, with activation accruing to units 
representing explanatory hypotheses that 1) explain more than their competitors, 2) are 
simpler, and 3) are analogous to other explanatOlY hypotheses. More substantively, 
Thagard has successfully applied ECHO to numerous cases from the history of 
science, including Lavoisier's argument for the oxygen theory and Darwin's argument 
for evolution by natural selection (Thagard, 1989, 1992, 1999; Eliasmith & Thagard, 
1997; Nowak & Thagard, 1992). Collectively, these simulations lend strong support 
to the view that ECHO offers researchers a plausible model of theory evaluation that 
captures the strategies actually employed by scientists when faced with competing 
theoretical alternatives. With this comprehensive account of theory evaluation in 
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hand, therefore, we can return to the developmental findings of children's judgments 
on theory choice tasks and the question of parallels with scientists' judgments. 
Specifically, given Thagard's model, is it plausible to argue that children evaluate 
ideas on the basis of explanatory coherence considerations? 
5.2.3 Do children apply principles of explanatory coherence? 
In order to determine whether children evaluate their knowledge in line with the 
principles of explanatory coherence, we can identify the following four requirements 
that would need to be met (see also Thagard, 1992, Chapter 10): 
1. Children possess coherent explanatory theories 
2. They can appropriately differentiate and co-ordinate hypotheses and 
evidence 
3. They are sensitive to the specific criteria that enter into judgments of 
explanatory coherence 
4. They can use these criteria as a basis for theory evaluation. 
1. Coherent theories From the evidence reviewed in this chapter, it can be 
argued that the first requirement is satisfied. In Vosniadou and Brewer's (1992, 1994) 
investigations of children's models of the earth and the day/night cycle, even young 
children were found to possess coherent explanatory models of the phenomena in 
question, which served to frame and inform their responses in detailed interviews. 
Similarly, Samarapungavan and Wiers' (1997) study of children's ideas about the 
origin of the species produced convincing evidence that children construct coherent 
explanatory frameworks that constrain the solutions they generate to a variety of 
biological problems. More generally, these investigations add to the substantial body 
of literature that ascribes theory-like qualities to intuitive knowledge (e.g., Brewer & 
Samarapungavan, 1991; Carey, 1985; Karrniloff-Smith, 1988; Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder, 1974; McKloskey & Kargon, 1988; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996; Smith, Carey 
& Wiser, 1985; Wellman, 1990; Wiser, 1988). Collectively then, this research 
supports the view that children possess systematic theoretical structures of the sort 
required for judgments of explanatory coherence. 
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2. Ability to differentiate hypotheses and evidence A second requirement that 
must be met before we can conclude that children apply principles of explanatory 
coherence, concerns their ability to differentiate hypotheses and evidence. While 
Thagard's model of theory evaluation specifically requires this ability, the question of 
whether children can appropriately distinguish theories from evidential support for or 
against those theories has been at the forefront of arguments regarding the 
development of scientific reasoning skills in children (and lay adults) more generally. 
F or example, in the Introduction to this thesis, I highlighted claims by Deanna Kuhn 
(Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel & O'Loughlin, 1988), that children and lay adults do not 
reason like scientists because they are unable to differentiate and co-ordinate 
hypotheses and evidence effectively. In contrast, Samarapungavan's (1992) 
investigation of children's perfonnance on theory choice tasks reviewed in this chapter 
has led her to reject Kuhn's claim that children are deficient reasoners when it comes 
to coordinating theory with evidence. Specifically, her findings demonstrate that even 
first graders are competent in using both disconfirmatory and confirmatory evidence to 
choose between alternative theories, and can often justify their choices by explicit 
reference to key aspects of the theory-evidence relationship. In particular, 
Samarapungavan found that when justifying their choice of the empirically consistent 
theory, " ... as many as 82% of the children investigated mentioned the evidence that 
undermined the rival theory as well as the evidence that supported the one they had 
selected" (Samarapungavan, 1992, pp.20-21).8 
Consistent with S amarapungavan' s findings, Sodian, Zaitchik and Carey (1991) have 
proposed that even young elementary school children can appropriately differentiate 
hypothetical beliefs from evidence. Specifically, these researchers presented first and 
second graders with two competing hypotheses and asked them to select an empirical 
test that would allow them to decide between the hypotheses. They found that the 
maj ority of the children correctly selected a conclusive test and were able to 
8 Further, she proposes that Kuhn's (1989) fmdings may be more an outcome of the specific tasks 
employed to assess reasoning ability, than the inability of children and lay adults per se to differentiate 
and co-ordinate theories and evidence. In particular, Samarapungavan points out that Kuhn's subjects 
were required to evaluate the cumulative co-variation between possible causes and effects across several 
test tasks, a complex form of theory-evidence relationship that goes beyond an ability to differentiate 
and co-ordinate theories and evidence (Samarapungavan, 1992). 
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distinguish it from an inconclusive one. Moreover, in a further task that presented 
children with a genuine scientific problem, children were found to spontaneously 
generate strategies for gathering evidence to decide between alternative hypotheses 
(Sodian, Zaitchik & Carey, 1991). 
3. Sensitivity to criteria relevant to explanatory coherence judgments What 
about the third requirement listed above, namely that children should demonstrate an 
appreciation of the factors relevant to assessments of explanatory coherence? In 
addition to demonstrating that children possess robust explanatory models of natural 
world phenomena, Vosniadou and Brewer also uncovered an appreciation of some of 
the factors identified by Thagard (1992) as relevant to assessments of theory quality. 
In particular, Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) found children's models of astronomical 
phenomena were internally consistent and demonstrated a commitment to principles of 
simplicity. Relatedly, Samarapungavan and Wiers (1997), draw on Thagard's 
proposals to argue that children's ideas about speciation comprise " ... an internally 
consistent interrelated set of core beliefs" (Samarapungavan & Wiers, 1997, p.167). 
They conclude that their findings support those of other researchers such as Vosniadou 
and Brewer, indicating that children's conceptual systems demonstrate properties of 
explanatory coherence (Samarapungavan & Wiers, 1997). 
4. Use explanatory coherence criteria as a basis for theory evaluation On the 
basis of the evidence reviewed, it would appear that the first three requirements for 
determining whether children can reason on the basis of explanatory coherence 
considerations are satisfied. Detailed reconstructions of children's explanatory 
frameworks across a number of domains indicate children have recourse to coherent 
theories that demonstrate essential properties of explanatory coherence and which can 
be appropriately employed by them in their everyday problem solving. In addition to 
these findings, it is suggested that Samarapungavan's (1992) study,provides direct 
evidence for requirement 4, by showing that children can also use criteria relevant to 
explanatory coherence judgments as a basis for theory selection. 
In particular, Samarapungavan's finding that children selected theories that explained 
a greater range of observations can be seen to conform directly to Thagard's criteria of 
explanatory breadth embodied in TEC, and can be analysed as a coherence problem 
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using the ECHO network displayed in Figure 5.6. On ECHO computations of 
explanatory coherence, the more a theory explains, the greater its coherence and 
therefore the more likely it will be preferred over its competitor. In this network, 
which depicts the 'range of explanation' condition on the chemistry task given to 
children, T2 can be seen to demonstrate greater explanatory coherence than the 
competing theory TI, by explaining more of the evidence. 
Figure 5.6 
T1 
liquids are 
dyes 
E1 
Stick turned 
blue in clear 
liquid 
E2 
Stick turned 
blue in blue 
liquid 
T2 
I ndicator stick 
measures liquid 
temperature 
E3 
Stick turned 
red in red 
liquid 
An ECHO network depicting the 'range of explanation' 
condition on the chemistry task. 
Similarly, Samarapungavan's finding that older children showed a systematic 
preference for theories that did not rely on ad hoc hypotheses can also be modelled 
using ECHO (Figure 5.7). Specifically, the notion of simplicity embodied in 
Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence is one of non-ad hocness, according to 
which the degree of coherence of a hypothesis with the evidence and with its co-
hypotheses is inversely proportional to the number of co-hypotheses required. 
Implementing this criterion in ECHO, results in a preference for theories that make 
fewer ad hoc assumptions. In this network, which depicts the 'non-ad hocness' 
condition on the chemistry task, TI introduces an auxiliary hypothesis, AI, to deal 
Evaluating Ideas: The Role of Coherence in Scientific and Evelyday Thought 141 
with the outstanding observation that the indicator stick immersed in the colourless 
liquid turns blue. T2 is more likely to be preferred over TI on the basis of its greater 
explanatory coherence, because it provides a simpler explanation of the evidence that 
does not rely on any auxiliary hypotheses. Therefore, in both cases children's 
judgments relating to these criteria are consistent with predictions made by Thagard's 
model of theory evaluation. 9 
A1 
Old sticks 
develop blue 
dots 
Figure 5.7 
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temperature 
E3 
Stick turned 
red in red 
liquid 
An ECHO network depicting the 'non-ad hocness' 
condition on the chemistry task. 
9 What about the criterion of analogy, which Thagard argues can contribute to explanatory power in 
comparative assessments of competing theories? Samarapungavan (1992) does not directly investigate 
this criterion and therefore provides no insights concerning its possible use by children in theory choice 
contexts. However, indirect evidence that children may have some appreciation of this factor is 
provided by studies of analogical reasoning in children (e.g., Goswami & Brown, 1990a, 1 990b) that 
show the ability to reason by analogy is present very early on and provides a building block for 
subsequent learning. Moreover, Thagard (2000) has argued that the commonsense assumption for the 
existence of other minds at the heart of our folk psychological theorizing can be construed as an 
explanatory coherence problem with analogy (to our own minds) playing a central role. Finally, it is 
important to note that Thagard's (1992) analysis of the role of explanatory coherence in scientific 
revolutions, found that analogy was only minimally important to scientists' arguments (i.e., of the 
seven revolutions examined, analogy played a small role in only one, namely Darwin's argument for 
evolution by natural selection). 
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In addition, findings of children's preference for theories that were empirically and 
logically consistent (the two additional criteria investigated by Samarapungavan, 
1992), would also be predicted by Thagard's model. Firstly, concerning the issue of 
empirical consistency, this is addressed in TEC by Principle 4, data priority, which 
allocates the results of observation or experiment a degree of independent 
acceptability. As Thagard makes clear, the inclusion of this principle means that TEC 
is not a "pure coherence theory" (Thagard, 2000, p.43), but instead acknowledges that 
empirical consistency features in judgments of the explanatory worth of competing 
theories. Moreover, the way in which this principle is implemented in ECHO, with 
activation spreading in a non-symmetrical fashion from the evidence units to the 
hypotheses units via excitatory and inhibitory links, reveals how 'consistency with 
evidence' acts as a crucial determinant of acceptability. 10 
Secondly, regarding children's preference for theories that were free of internal 
contradictions or inconsistencies, the local relations of coherence and incoherence 
between propositions that are established by TEC's principles of Explanation and 
Contradiction/Competition, determine that ECHO will demonstrate a natural 
preference for theories that are internally consistent over those that contain 
contradictory propositions. More specifically, .contradictions contribute to judgments 
of explanatory coherence when the competing theory is either internally contradictory 
or explains "negative evidence" (Thagard, 1992). In discussing this point, Thagard 
uses the example of ECHO's preference for the oxygen theory over the phlogiston 
theory, which demonstrated internal contradictions by assuming that phlogiston could 
have both positive and negative weight. 
Finally, Samarapungavan's findings that the plausibility of the theories presented 
(determined by their consistency/inconsistency with children's prior knowledge) had 
an impact on children's evaluative strategies, can also be interpreted within Thagard's 
model of theory evaluation, where the presence of higher-level explanations can affect 
explanatory coherence judgments. In particular, principle 2( a) of TEC determines that 
a hypothesis is more coherent if it is itself explained. Correspondingly, in ECHO a 
10 Related to this point, Raig has recently suggested that the criterion of explanatory breadth in TEe 
can be understood as a non-predictive measure of empirical adequacy CRaig, 2002). 
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hypothesis that is explained by a higher-level hypothesis gains activation from this 
explanatory relation. Conversely, a hypothesis that is inconsistent with a higher-level 
hypothesis would tend to be disadvantaged by the inhibitory link that is established on 
the basis of incoherence relations. Likewise, Samarapungavan (1992) found that 
children were more likely to choose the 'correct' theory in terms of the criteria being 
examined when it did not contradict their existing explanatory frameworks. 
In summary, on the basis of Samarapungavan's direct study of children's theory 
selection strategies, it is plausible to argue that requirement four is also met. 
Samarapungavan's findings show that children can appropriately evaluate competing 
theories, using criteria that Thagard's explanatory coherence model identifies as 
pivotal for scientific theory evaluation. 
5.3 The pervasiveness of coherence-based inference 
In this chapter I have developed the proposal that the abductive framework offers a 
source of fruitful ideas about children's knowledge construction strategies by 
investigating the possibility of significant relations between children and scientists in 
the context of theory evaluation. With this aim in mind, I began by reviewing a body 
of research detailing children's theories of the natural world that points to substantial 
correspondences between the criteria used by scientists and children to evaluate 
knowledge. Following this review, I proposed that the abductive framework, with its 
endorsement of a precise computational model of theory evaluation, could illuminate 
these correspondences by showing how the criteria identified by developmental 
researchers enter into judgments of explanatory hypotheses on the basis of explanatory 
coherence. 
In particular, this model of theory evaluation indicates that children can employ 
explanatory coherence considerations as a basis for choosing between competing 
theories. Children demonstrate a preference for theories that explain more facts, 
require fewer ad hoc hypotheses to achieve this end, and are consistent both internally 
and with the evidence, indicating the likelihood that children can adopt a multi-
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criterial perspective on theory evaluation in a similar manner to scientists. While 
further research is needed to determine whether children can spontaneously integrate 
these criteria into more complex judgments of explanatory coherence, a recent 
proposal by Thagard (2000) that coherence-based reasoning is pervasive in human 
thought and action, lends support to the view that children readily apply complex 
coherence considerations in their everyday reasoning. 11 Specifically, Thagard (2000) 
builds on existing connectionist applications of coherence to the problems of 
explanatory inference (Thagard, 1989, 1992), analogical reasoning (Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1989a, 1995), and decision-making (Thagard & Millgram, 1995; Millgram & 
Thagard, 1996), to argue that ideas about coherence are central to solving the general 
puzzle of how we make sense of the world. According to Thagard, "making sense" is 
best conceived as a coherence problem that involves " ... fitting something puzzling 
into a coherent pattern of mental representations that include concepts, beliefs, goals, 
and actions" (Thagard, 2000, xi). In this view, many of the inferences we make in 
scientific and everyday contexts, do not take the form of stepwise linear reasoning 
epitomized by the canons of formal logic. Rather, Thagard argues they involve 
holistic judgments, in which large sets of elements are simultaneously assessed in 
order to determine how they fit together into a satisfying whole (Thagard, 2000). 
Given the proposed centrality of coherence mechanisms in both scientific and 
everyday thought, then, it would seem plausible that further investigations may well 
reveal children's capacity for integrating coherence criteria into complex judgments of 
explanatory coherence, in a way that parallels ECHO implementations of multi-
criterial theory evaluation in science. 
11 It is also worth noting here that in an open peer commentary on Thagard's theory of explanatory 
coherence (Thagard, 1989), Carl Bereiter (Bereiter & Scardama1ia, 1989) has reported that elementary 
school children can use explanatory coherence reasoning effectively in instructional contexts, and 
remarks on the speed at which the students caught on to the 'logic' of ECHO, viewing it as natural and 
reasonable. 
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5.4 Appendix 
Equation used to update activation in ECHO network (refer Thagard, 1992, 
p.l0l; see also Thagard and Verbeurgt, 1998): 
On each cycle the activation of a unit j, aj, is updated according to the following 
equation: 
a/t + 1) = aJ<t)(l - d) + netimax - ait)) if nefJ > 0, ne~{a/t) - min) otherwise 
Here d is a decay parameter (say .05) that decrements each unit at every cycle, min is 
minimum activation (-1), max is maximum action (1). Based on the weight wij 
between each unit i and j, we can calculate ne~·, the net input to a unit, by: 
Weights can be positive (typically .04) representing excitatory links, or negative 
(typically -.06), representing inhibitory links. 
Chapter 6 
Speculating on the Cognitive Origins of Science 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I argued that a methodological perspective on the child-as-
scientist debate could inform investigations of the process of knowledge acquisition in 
childhood by highlighting some significant parallels between the abductive inferential 
strategies employed by children and scientists. Having identified these parallels, this 
chapter turns to speculate on the cognitive origins of science and, in particular, the 
claim by proponents of the theory theory to have solved the evolutionary puzzle of 
our cognitive capacity for science. 
Accordingly, in Section 6.1 I begin by detailing the evolutionary story underpinning 
the theory theory. Section 6.2 then surveys a range of criticisms levelled at Gopnik 
and Meltzoffs (1997) claim to have identified science's cognitive foundations in 
early childhood learning. Having discounted the theory theory's evolutionary 
speculations, attention turns to an alternative proposal put forward by Mithen (2002) 
that the key components of scientific reasoning emerged in a gradual fashion over the 
course of human evolution. Finally, Section 6.3 briefly considers some recent 
indications of continuities between scientific and pre-scientific reasoning practices 
(Carruthers, 2002b) that hold particular relevance for the methodological parallels 
developed in this thesis, and concludes that these continuities offer a promising 
avenue for future investigations of the cognitive origins of science. 
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6.1 The theory theory's solution to an evolutionary puzzle 
While the last two chapters have developed a methodological perspective on the 
child-as-scientist debate as an alternative to the theory theory, the focus of this chapter 
shifts to speculations about the cognitive origins of science. What makes scientific 
inquiry possible? Are the foundations of science to be found in childhood learning? 
To what extent are there continuities across the reasoning strategies employed in pre-
scientific cultures and those taken to be central to scientific inquiry? Although 
attempts to answer these questions will be necessarily speculative, the issue of 
science's cognitive basis can be seen to have relevance for investigations of child-
scientist parallels in at least two fundamental respects. 
Firstly, part of my rationale for adopting a science-as-method view and reformulating 
child-scientist parallels along methodological lines (refer Chapter 2), appealed to the 
evolutionary naturalist insights of Hooker (1987, 1989). At a fundamental level, this 
endorsement of an evolutionary approach to epistemological issues entails a 
commitment to viewing ourselves, including our minds, as the products of evolution. 
Adopting an epistemology that is conceptually integrated with scientific knowledge of 
our evolved status, in tum leads one to expect fundamental continuities in knowledge 
seeking strategies across species, and in the case of humans, across scientific and 
everyday cognition. Moreover, this expectation forms the basis of any claim by 
proponents of the child-as-scientist analogy for substantive parallels between 
childhood cognition and theory change in science. Therefore, incorporating some 
preliminary speculations about the cognitive foundations of science into my analysis 
of child-scientist parallels is both consistent with the broad epistemological 
perspective informing this thesis, and relevant to assumptions of continuities In 
inferential practices that lie at the heart of the child-as-scientist debate. 
Secondly, in addition to recognizing the significance of our evolutionary history when 
attempting to develop child-scientist parallels, a further reason for considering the 
origins of our scientific abilities relates to claims embodied in the theory theory itself 
In Chapter 1, I indicated that an evolutionary explanation for the existence of 
substantive parallels between cognitive development and scientific change forms a 
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core component of Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) theory theory. In particular, their 
argument for the presence of common theory formation capacities rests on a specific 
evolutionary story regarding the adaptive function of theory building devices in early 
childhood learning contexts. Moreover, Gopnik and Meltzoff claim that this account 
of child-scientist parallels solves an "interesting evolutionary puzzle" regarding our 
cognitive capacity for science: 
Where did the particularly powerful and flexible cognitive devices of 
science come from? After all, we have only been doing science in an 
organized way for the last 500 years or so; presumably they didn't evolve 
so that we could do that. We suggest that many of these cognitive 
devices are involved in the staggering amount of learning that goes on in 
infancy and childhood. Indeed, we might tell the evolutionary story that 
these devices evolved to allow human children, in particular, to learn. 
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.18) 
According to this view, the "cognitive devices" underpinning scientific inquiry are 
seen to constitute a basic design feature of human minds that evolved to facilitate 
essentialleaming about the causal structure of the world. The puzzle of the origin of 
our ability to engage in scientific endeavour is therefore solved by adopting a 
developmental approach, and focusing on the natural links between scientific change 
and knowledge acquisition in childhood. 
Have Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) provided a solution to the puzzle of our capacity to 
undertake science? With this question in mind, the following section reviews the 
evolutionary speculations that form part of Gopnik and Meltzoff's proposals in more 
depth by attempting to trace the emergence of a specific evolutionary component to 
the theory theory across a series of successive formulations. 
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6.1.1 Science is a 'by-product' of childhood 
An initial indication that there might be an evolutionary reason for the existence of 
child-scientist parallels appears in an early defence of the theory theory by Alison 
Gopnik and Henry Wellman (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). In this paper, the authors 
conclude their argument with the provocative suggestion that "[s]cience ... might be 
a sort of spandrel, parasitic on cognitive development itself' (Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992, p.168). While not elaborating on this speculation in any detail, they introduce 
the possibility that the processes of scientific inquiry are epiphenomenal 
consequences of more fundarnentallearning processes seen in childhood. By doing 
so, the authors also indicate that further examination of the capacities for reasoning 
about the causal structure of the world underlying scientific inquiry may reveal a 
surprisingly close relationship with the inferential strategies involved in cognitive 
development. 
The possibility that science as a relatively recent cultural invention is a 'by-product' 
of the commonsense learning that occurs in infancy and early childhood is further 
developed in a subsequent chapter by the authors (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). In 
particular, this evolutionary speculation can be seen to be tied to their increasing 
interest in a cognitive characterization of science, both as a means of clarifying the 
theory theory, and as a way of distinguishing it from competing accounts: 
. . . scientific theory change and conceptual change in childhood are both 
the product of human minds trying to understand the world around them. 
Scientific change must centrally involve some human cognitive capacity. 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1994, p.258) 
Having established the possibility of a shared cognitive basis between scientific and 
childhood thought, Gopnik and Wellman (1994) subsequently begin to specify the 
precise nature of this proposed connection. Contrary to the assumed direction of 
insights from science to childhood learning, the authors argue that the opposite may in 
fact be true: 
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. . . the similarities are better captured by thinking of scientists as big 
children, rather than thinking of children as little scientists. The progress 
of science, we believe, reflects certain fundamental processes of 
conceptual change that are first seen in very young children. (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994, p.259) 
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The motivation for this 'reflexive' move by the authors is clearly not tied to pragmatic 
concerns regarding the accessibility of children as research subjects, or the 
(comparative) ease of studying childhood cognitive development in contrast to 
historical cases of scientific change. 1 Rather, Gopnik and Meltzoffs suggestion is 
that the cognitive capacities seen in childhood are epistemologically prior to those 
operating in science. Moreover, they speculate that any explanation of this 
relationship is likely to involve an ultimate account of these capacities, in terms of the 
function they served in facilitating childhood learning in our hunter-gatherer past 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). 
In addition to highlighting a possible evolutionary foundation for the theory theory, 
Gopnik and Wellman (1994) also speculate about the form of this evolutionary 
endowment by contrasting the theory theory with a modularity account of children's 
developing understanding of the mind. On the modularity view (e.g., Leslie, 1987), 
the young child's emerging folk psychology is seen to comprise an evolved module or 
series of modules dedicated to belief-desire reasoning, which come 'on-line' at 
specific points in development. In contrast to this speculation, Gopnik and Wellman 
suggest that the picture of development emerging from empirical investigations 
speaks against such a modular view: 
It is much more difficult to see how evolution would have selected for a 
series of representational systems, each maturing separately only to be 
replaced by another. (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994, p.284) 
1 Such 'pragmatic' motivations have been identified in both Kuhn's and Piaget's investigations of the 
relations between childhood and science (see Levine, 2000, for a discussion). 
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Instead, the authors argue for the evolution of a domain-general theorizing capacity, 
which, in combination with some domain-specific initial knowledge or "starting-state 
theories", is seen to be capable of producing the dynamic picture witnessed in 
development: 
What seems more plausible is that evolution selected for a cognitive 
capacity to revise concepts on the basis of evidence, that is, a theory-
making ability. (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994, p.284) 
6.1.2 Evolved mechanisms and scientific progress 
The idea that evolution has endowed us with a general and flexible theorizing 
capability is further elaborated in Gopnik's (1996b) formulation of the theory theory. 
In this target paper, and in her reply to commentators, Gopnik emphasizes the bi-
directional nature of the analogy, and sets about developing the claim that the 
epistemological success of science can be explained via its cognitive links to 
childhood learning. In particular, she argues that the most critical feature of science 
requiring explanation is its ability to "get things right", and suggests the success of 
science may be largely due to the exploitation of powerful learning mechanisms 
which evolved to facilitate knowledge acquisition in early childhood. 
In order to support this claim, Gopnik develops the following argument. Firstly, in 
keeping with Gopnik and Wellman (1994), she advocates a cognitive perspective on 
science, according to which the focus of inquiry is on the cognitive abilities employed 
by scientists in their knowledge seeking endeavours: 
. . . scientists must be using some cognitive abilities to produce new 
scientific theories and to recognize their truth when they are produced by 
others. Scientists have the same brains as other human beings, and they 
use those brains, however assisted by culture, to develop knowledge 
about the world. Ultimately, the sociology of science must consist of a 
set of individual decisions by individual humans to produce or accept 
theories. (Gopnik, 1996b, p.487) 
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Secondly, in conjunction with this perspective, Gopnik endorses what she takes to be 
the basic idea underpinning cognitive science that evolution has endowed us with a 
variety of devices for obtaining an accurate representation of the world. Thirdly, she 
suggests that scientific inquiry capitalizes on these devices in its pursuit of the truth: 
A cognitive scientist would say that evolution constructed truth-finding 
cognitive processes. Science employs a particularly powerful and 
flexible set of these cognitive abilities. Science uses a set of 
representations and rules that are particularly well-suited to uncovering 
the truth about the world. Science gets it right because it uses 
psychological devices that were designed by evolution precisely to get 
things right. (Gopnik, 1996b, p.489) 
By emphasizing the continuity of scientific and everyday cognition, and the 
dependence of human cognitive abilities on our evolutionary circumstances, Gopnik 
. acknowledges her debt. to the naturalistic epistemological tradition of Quine and 
others (e.g., Quine & Ullian, 19702). However, Gopnik also makes it clear that she is 
advocating a developmental version of the naturalistic thesis that indicates the 
possibility of a unique link between science and cognitive development. In particular, 
she argues that cognitive science claims for "truth finding" devices that are exploited 
by science, raise obvious questions about the origin of these devices. Her solution to 
this evolutionary puzzle is that they are present in the essential early learning of 
infancy and childhood, and that an account of their origins would reflect this 
developmental context. 
In making these claims, Gopnik highlights three characteristic features of humans 
when compared to other species: our behavioural plasticity, adaptive flexibility, and 
the relative lack of specialized cognitive abilities at birth, as reflected in a long period 
of immaturity (Gopnik, 1996b). Gopnik suggests that given these distinctive features 
of humans, the provisioning of a general theory building ability in the young of our 
species would make sound evolutionary sense: 
2 For Quine's classic presentation of the naturalistic epistemology thesis, see his essay Epistemology 
naturalized in Quine (1969, pp.69-90). 
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Equipping human children with particularly powerful and flexible 
cognitive devices, devices that are good at constructing accurate 
representations of new and unexpected worlds, might be an important 
part of this evolutionary strategy. We might indeed think of childhood as 
a period when many of the requirements for survival are suspended, so 
that children can concentrate on acquiring a veridical picture of the 
particular physical and social world in which they find themselves. Once 
they know where they are, as it were, they can figure out what to do. 
(Gopnik, 1996b, p.490) 
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On this view, then, attention to the evolutionary origins of theory building is taken to 
support Gopnik's claim that the analogy "cuts both ways", and that childhood 
cognition has explanatory import for understanding science. In particular, it is argued 
that science co-opts the natural learning mechanisms that evolved to facilitate learning 
in young children, and puts them to work in a "culturally-organized way". This 
suggests that any adequate account of scientific progress will need to take account of 
these evolved mechanisms and their origins in early commonsense learning. As 
Gopnik remarks: 
To explain scientific theory change we may need to talk about culture 
and society, but we will miss something important if we fail to see the 
link to natural learning mechanisms. (Gopnik, 1996b, p.493) 
Finally, in Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) defence of the theory theory, these 
evolutionary speculations are packaged together and explicitly presented as a core 
component of the theory theory account of child-scientist parallels. The authors claim 
firstly that the basic cognitive apparatus of science - the ability to generate and revise 
theories - is part of our evolutionary endowment. Secondly, they suggest that these 
theorizing capacities evolved specifically to facilitate knowledge acquisition in 
infancy and early childhood. Thirdly, they argue that science targets and exploits 
these innate capacities and, as a result, is largely successful in its attempts to construct 
an accurate representation of reality. 
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Taken together, these three claims can be seen to comprise a particular evolutionary 
story about the origins of theory building which serves as a foundation for Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs more general proposal that " ... cognitive development in childhood may 
be much like scientific theory change" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p.29). As they 
point out, the task facing theory theory researchers is not to demonstrate that young 
children "do science", but to argue for significant deep-structural parallels between 
the cognitive processes supporting scientific endeavour and those engaged in the bulk 
of cognitive development. Moreover, in making their case for the theory theory, these 
speculations about the origins of human theory building are seen to solve the puzzle 
of our human capacity for science. 
6.2 What makes scientific inquiry possible? 
6.2.1 Have Gopnik and Meltzoff solved the evolutionary puzzle? 
In the preceding section, I have attempted to trace the emergence of a distinct 
evolutionary component to the theory theory, beginning with the brief statement 
found in Gopnik and Wellman (1992), and culminating in the evolutionary story 
presented by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997). However, while these authors clearly rely 
on evolutionary considerations as one form of evidence for the theory theory, a 
number of commentators have questioned their claim to have identified the cognitive 
basis of science. These critiques can be seen to fall into three broad categories: 
assessments of Gopnik and Meltzoffs evolutionary account as a 'just-so' story (Fine, 
1996; Stich & Nichols, 1998); criticisms of the authors' commitment to "truth-tropic 
cognition" and the idea that evolution has selected for truth-finding cognitive 
processes (Downes, 1999); and claims that the theory theory is unable to account for 
the emergence of science in human history, or "the 1492 problem" (Giere, 1996; 
Faucher et al., 2002). I briefly consider each in turn. 
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Theory building as an evolutionary adaptation: A 'just-so' story? An initial 
criticism of the proposal that theory building constitutes an evolutionary adaptation, 
concerns the lack of appropriate evidence. For example, Fine (1996) takes Gopnik's 
(1996b) account of the innate basis of scientific reasoning to be a "thin tale", which 
fails to meet the evidentiary standards of evolutionary biology. More specifically, he 
points out that Gopnik's claims for innate theory-formation devices are unconstrained 
by any details of the environments in which these devices initially emerged and the 
selective pressures known or thought to have been operating within them. In the 
absence of any evidence for ". . . differential variation and selective fitness with 
respect to specific local environments" (Fine, 1996, p.535), Fine argues that Gopnik is 
unable to solve the very problem she claims to have solved, namely how science "gets 
things right". As indicated in Section 6.1.2, Gopnik identifies scientific progress as 
the feature of science that is most in need of explanation and argues the reason 
scientists manage to get at the truth is that they exploit theory revision mechanisms 
designed by natural selection to facilitate early learning. Yet, as Fine remarks, 
without providing details of the selection and development of a theory building trait in 
human children, Gopnik is at a loss to explain the presence of these mechanisms and, 
therefore, the success of science. 
Similarly, Stich and Nichols (1998) suggest that while Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) 
evolutionary speculations are broadly compatible with a range of facts to be 
explained, other 'just-so' stories could be constructed that would be equally consistent 
with the data. More specifically, they point out that the theory theory's 'solution' in 
its current form actually raises a further evolutionary puzzle about the function of the 
theory building mechanisms underpinning scientific inquiry. That is, Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs commitment to ''theories all the way down" is at odds with their claim that 
the adaptive virtue of a theory building capacity is to enable children to make sense of 
variable aspects of the environment, given that much of the early learning they discuss 
involves stable, highly invariant features of the world. In Stich and Nichols' view, 
this ''tension'' in Gopnik and Meltzoffs account reveals a lack of clarity about the 
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sorts of information processing problems the theory formation system was designed to 
solve and leaves the question of the origins of scientific cognition open to debate.3 
Cognition, fitness, and truth Further criticisms of Gopnik and Meltzoffs 
evolutionary story are found in Downes (1999), who argues that the theory theory 
rests on questionable assumptions about the nature and origin of human cognition. In 
particular, he suggests that Gopnik and Meltzoff s claims of child-scientist parallels 
are inextricably linked to their particular view of cognition as strongly veridical or 
"truth-tropic". As Downes remarks, Gopnik and Meltzofftake natural selection to be 
responsible for the emergence of truth-gaining cognitive processes in humans, and 
propose that science utilizes a particularly powerful set of these evolved cognitive 
capacities in its "pursuit of the truth". This picture of truth-tropic cognition and 
science is then linked to children's cognitive development by arguing that the reason 
children's and scientists' cognitive processes look similar is because of their 
evolutionary history - they evolved to allow human children to achieve truthful 
representations of the world. 
According to Downes (1999), however, these presuppositions about the veridicality of 
human cognition and its evolutionary origins are problematic for understanding 
scientific development in at least two respects. Firstly, he questions whether 
cognition and truth-tropic cognition are in fact the same thing, and cautions against 
conflating naturalistic hypotheses about actual mental processing with normative ones 
about optimal or ideally rational reasoning. In the case of science, he argues that an 
uncritical commitment to the idea that good science is 'truth-attaining' runs the risk of 
conflating the success of science "construed as the collection of practices, combined 
3 One possible story, suggested by Stich and Nichols (1998), is that scientific reasoning may be a 'by-
product' of later childhood learning rather than infant cognition as Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) 
maintain. More generally, it is not clear on Gopnik and Meltzoff s account why a capacity for theory 
building is functionally tied to the sorts of information-processing problems experienced in childhood 
at all. Despite their claims that comparative studies indicate the plausibility of powerful early learning 
mechanisms in humans, it is conceivable that a capacity for forming and revising theories emerged 
because of its role in solving any of a number of adaptive problems requiring imaginative thinking that 
are encountered in adulthood e. g., problems of parenting, hunting animals, gathering plant foods, 
selecting a good mate, etc. Therefore, even if young children demonstrate a facility for forming and 
revising theories, this does not necessarily indicate the evolutionary function of theory building is to 
enable children "to get things right". On this point, see Carruthers' (2002a) recent proposal that the 
forms of pretend play witnessed in early childhood have not evolved to service children's needs, but 
have been selected for because of their role in enhancing adult creativity. 
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throughout history" with individual scientists' cognitive practices as truth-tropic. 
Secondly, Downes suggests that Gopnik and Meltzoffs claim for the evolution of 
veridical cognitive mechanisms rests on a questionable relation between 'fitness' and 
'truth'. Drawing on the work of philosophers advocating a pragmatic approach to 
epistemology (e.g., Stich, 1990), Downes cites examples in which fitness and truth are 
not aligned to support his proposal that "truth is separable from cognitive success", 
and that despite Gopnik and Meltzoffs claims, "truth-tropic cognition is not likely to 
be selected for" (Downes, 1999, p.575). 
"The 1492 problem" A final argument against the theory theory's proposed 
solution to the evolutionary puzzle concerns its inability to account for science's 
historical development. For example, Giere (1996) questions why modern science 
took so long to make its appearance in human history if the cognitive capacities 
sufficient for undertaking scientific inquiry emerged in the Pleistocene. More 
particularly, he argues that scientific activity as we understand it was absent in 1492, 
but given the short time span between now and then we cannot attribute its subsequent 
appearance to evolved cognitive capacities. Therefore, Giere concludes that 
something else must have been responsible for the development of science, something 
that is missing from Gopnik's (1996b) 'solution'. Giere then proceeds to identify 
some of the elements he thinks are implicated in the scientific revolution, including 
the development of instrumentation, symbolic notations, printed materials, and 
experimental methods, and all of which are indispensable "for understanding the 
workings of modern science" (Giere, 1996, p.538). 
In reply, Gopnik (1996b) suggests that the apparent gulf between pre-scientific and 
scientific cognition, and hence the difficulty of explaining the emergence of science, 
is resolved if the focus shifts from adult reasoning to the commonsense theorizing 
activities of young children. Having redirected attention to early childhood reasoning, 
she argues that in 1492, due to increased leisure and a range of technological and 
social advances, a raft of new evidence relevant to solving fundamental problems 
about the causal structure of the world was generated. This availability of evidence in 
turn led the innate theory formation devices of childhood to be 'reactivated' in the 
evolutionary novel context of adult science (Gopnik, 1996b). 
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However, as Faucher et al. (2002) have recently pointed out, this attempt to save the 
theory theory's solution fails because it is unable to explain why science did not make 
its appearance much earlier in China. In particular, they argue that well before 1492, 
the social and technological factors cited by Gopnik as crucial to the production of 
new evidence, were present in Chinese society. Given that "science as we know it did 
not emerge in China" (Faucher et aI., 2002, p.340), Faucher et aI. suggest that other 
critical factors must have been responsible for its subsequent appearance in the West. 
Having rejected the theory theory's solution to the evolutionary puzzle, they go on to 
identify a range of additional components needed to solve the 1492 problem that focus 
on the social and cultural transmission of norms, theories, and theory revision 
mechanisms. Moreover, Faucher et al. argue that these factors are important for 
attempts to understand scientific cognition. 
In summary, the above criticisms can be seen to raise a number of questions about the 
utility of Gopnik and Meltzoffs evolutionary story for understanding the cognitive 
basis of science. The 'just-so' nature of their account, its reliance on presuppositions 
of truth-tropic cognitive processes and their evolution by natural selection, together 
with its inability to explain the emergence of science in human history, all undermine 
Gopnik and Meltzoffs claim to have identified the locus of scientific reasoning in 
early childhood cognition. If we reject the theory theory's solution, however, then we 
are left with the evolutionary puzzle of our ability to engage in science. In this 
respect, a recent collection of papers targeting the cognitive foundations of scientific 
inquiry (Carruthers, Stich & Siegal, 2002), can be seen to offer a useful platform for 
some initial speculations. Accordingly, in what follows, I first review evidence for 
the proposal that science demonstrates a piecemeal evolutionary history, before going 
on to sketch some ideas regarding continuities between scientific and pre-scientific 
cognition that centre on the capacity for abductive inference. 
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6.2.2 The emergence of scientific abilities in human evolution 
In Chapter 2, I suggested that adopting a view of science-as-method indicates the 
likelihood of continuities in knowledge seeking strategies not only across science and 
our everyday cognition, but also across species more generally. In a similar vein, 
Robin Dunbar (Dunbar, 1996) has argued that when we shift from viewing science as 
a body of theory to recognizing it as a process or method of inquiry, scientific activity 
is revealed as " ... a highly formalized version of something very basic to life, namely 
the business of leaming about regularities in the world" (Dunbar, 1996, p.58). More 
particularly, he cites a range of evidence drawn from anthropology, psychology, and 
behavioural biology, to propose that two fundamental components of scientific 
activity - classification and causal inference - are commonplace in everyday human 
reasoning, and are also " ... key feature[s] in the lives of most birds and mammals" 
(Dunbar, 1996, p.58). He concludes that science is not specific to modem Western 
culture or even peculiar to human beings, but rather is " ... a 'natural' approach to the 
physical world ... characteristic of all higher organisms" (Dunbar, 1996, p.77). 
One implication of Dunbar's 'continuity' claims for attempts to trace the cognitive 
origins of science is that certain fundamental aspects of scientific reasoning are likely 
to demonstrate a long evolutionary history. Recently, Steven Mithen (Mithen, 2002) 
has developed this suggestion further, arguing that our cognitive capacity for science 
has a biological basis that emerged gradually via a series of independent evolutions 
over a period of at least five million years. In order to support this proposal, Mithen 
begins by identifying what he takes to be the critical properties of science, and argues 
that the following components are essential to contemporary scientific practice: 
i) In-depth observation of the natural world 
ii) The ability to generate and test hypotheses 
iii) A focus on causation 
iv) The use of tools (such as external notational devices) to extend 
referential reach and facilitate problem solving 
v) The accumulation of knowledge and understanding over time 
vi) The use of metaphor and analogy. 
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Having established a working definition of science, Mithen turns to the fossil and 
archaeological records in an attempt to uncover evidence relating to the emergence of 
these components of scientific thought over the course of human evolutionary history. 
For expository purposes, he divides this 'history' into four roughly consecutive 
categories, beginning with the Early hominines (4.5 - c.l. 8 mya), then moving to 
consider various species of Early humans (1.6 my a - 300,000 years ago), the 
Neanderthals (250,000 - 28,000 years ago), and finally Homo sapiens (beginning 
130,000 years ago), which are further subdivided into hunter-gatherers of the late 
Pleistocene and early Holocene farmers. 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of Mithen's (2002) account of the emergence of key 
elements of scientific inquiry in human evolution, drawn from his discussion of the 
anatomy and activities of these four groups of human ancestors and relatives. 
Concerning the first category of early hominines (australopithecines and early species 
of Homo), Mithen suggests that members of this group are likely to have 
demonstrated two fundamental components of scientific thought: a capacity for in-
depth observation of the natural world, and a facility for generating and testing 
hypotheses. Evidence for the early emergence of these basic scientific abilities is 
argued to be found in the manufacture of stone tools during this period, which Mithen 
suggests would have required a form of hypothesis testing. In addition, he highlights 
the foraging activities of early hominines and suggests that after 2 my a these activities 
appear to have included systematic searching for animal carcasses, which would 
indicate the presence of rudimentary predictive capabilities. In making these claims, 
Mithen points out that the scientific skills he attributes to early hominines may not 
differ markedly from those found in the great apes, thereby aligning himself with 
Dunbar's (1996) general position that 'basic science' is characteristic of many animal 
speCIes. However, contrary to Dunbar's claims that causal inference is a key 
component of these basic scientific abilities, Mithen stops short of attributing causal 
reasoning to early hominines, suggesting instead that such a facility makes a later 
appearance in early humans. 
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Table 6.1 The emergence of key elements of science in human 
evolution, compiled from Mithen (2002). The complete 
cognitive foundations for scientific activity are argued to 
be in place in hunter-gatherers of the late Pleistocene, with 
economic and social conditions conducive to the 
development of new bodies of knowledge subsequently 
appearing in early farming communities. 
Early hominines . Early humans Neanderthals Homo sapiens (i) Homo sapiens (ii) 
KEY ELEMENTS (late Pleistocene (early Holocene 
OFSCIENCE hunter-gatherers) farmers) 
Detailed observation 
of natural world • • • • 
Hypothesis 
generation & testing • • • • 
Concern with 
• • 
causation confined to theory of mind • 
theory of mind only? 
Use of tools to extend 
cognition ? • 
Accumulation of 
knowledge • 
Use of metaphorl 
analogy • 
Favourable social & 
economic conditions 
In this second category of human ancestors, which includes a variety of species (e.g., 
H. ergaster, H. erectus, H. heidelbergensis), Mithen (2002) indicates the likelihood of 
further developments in observational and hypothesis-testing abilities, together with 
the emergence of a capacity for causal inference. In support of these speculations, 
Mithen points to evidence of increased sociality, the development of more complex 
technology, (e.g., emergence of the bifacial technique), and big game hunting 
(necessarily a co-operative venture), as signs of a significant shift in the mind-reading 
abilities of early humans compared to those of the early hominines. Moreover, he 
remarks that such mind-reading skills are intimately tied to an appreciation of basic 
causal principles and speculates that a concern with causation may have initially 
emerged in the context of folk psychological reasoning, and only later been extended 
to natural world phenomena. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Turning to the cognitive foundations of science present in the Neanderthals (H 
neanderthalensis), Mithen (2002) argues that evidence of hunting, sophisticated tool 
making techniques (including the Levallois method), and social behaviour (supported 
by a language facility), can be seen to reinforce claims for the early emergence of 
basic scientific abilities in human evolution. In addition, he cautiously speculates that 
one known set of Neanderthal artifacts may constitute an early example of a recording 
device, thereby indicating that tools were being used by the Neanderthals to extend 
cognition/perception. However, Mithen also argues that the 'cognitive profile' of 
Neanderthals emerging from the archaeological record is remarkably static over time, 
to the extent that " ... Neanderthals living at 50,000 years ago appear to have no 
greater store of knowledge or understanding of the world than those living at 250,000 
years ago" (Mithen, 2002, p.32). In Mithen's view, this lack of "directional change" 
in knowledge, together with the absence of any compelling evidence for art, 
symbolism, or ritual, suggests that additional key elements of scientific thought are 
likely to be absent from this group. 
In contrast to the static profile of the Neanderthals, Mithen (2002) argues that the 
appearance of the first anatomically modem humans (H sapiens sapiens) marks the 
beginning of the period in which all the remaining cognitive foundations of science 
can be seen to emerge. In particular, he points to dramatic developments at c.50,000 
years ago in tool technology, the use of organic substances, body adornment and art, 
as evidence for a fundamental shift in intellectual abilities relevant to the eventual 
development of science. 4 First, he suggests that the archaeological record for this 
period offers compelling evidence that tools were being used to extend cognition and 
thereby facilitate problem solving, the most obvious example being incised bones and 
stones, which are thought to have functioned as rudimentary recording devices or 
'external memory aids'. Second, Mithen highlights examples of images from Upper 
Palaeolithic art that combine features of humans and animals, and argues that they 
indicate the capacity for analogical reasoning and the use of metaphor. Third, he 
4 Mithen's specific proposal, developed in detail elsewhere (Mithen, 1996b), is that these 
developments reflect a major cognitive transition from a "specialized mentality" to a new form of 
"cognitively fluid mentality", which is a necessary precursor to creative thought and can be seen to 
underlie the emergence of art, religion, and science. 
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points to the development of hunting and gathering tools and strategies designed to 
match prevailing environmental conditions, as well as the convergence on a 
microlithic hunting technology in many parts of the world, as evidence for substantial 
accumulation of knowledge over time. 
Finally, Mithen (2002) concludes that although all the key elements of scientific 
thought were in place in late Pleistocene hunter-gatherer societies, the development of 
science as a distinct domain of inquiry was ultimately dependent on a specific set of 
social and economic conditions which emerged much later in human history. With 
this in mind, he turns to the early farming settlements in the Near East to consider the 
role of the invention of agriculture, citing the emergence of a burgeoning craft culture, 
and the development of substantial bodies of new knowledge in building, agriculture, 
and textiles, as evidence of the contribution of a farming economy to the eventual 
appearance of science. 
In contrast to the evolutionary story presented by proponents of the theory theory, 
Mithen's (2002) account of the cognitive origins of science can be seen to offer a far 
more comprehensive solution to the puzzle of what makes science possible that 
succeeds in overcoming the limitations of Gopnik and Meltzoff s 'just-so' account. 
While the theory theory suggests that our core scientific abilities emerged as a by-
product of childhood learning, Mithen rejects attempts to pinpoint a particular time, or 
even a particular species, as holding the key to our capacity for science. Rather, his 
proposal is that scientific reasoning constitutes an emergent phenomenon, embodying 
multiple elements that were subject to different selection pressures and evolved 
independently of one another over the course of human evolution. As he states, "[t]he 
human mind is a product of a long evolutionary history" (Mithen, 2002, pAO). 
Recognizing this fact indicates that it is only by undertaking a detailed investigation 
of this history in its entirety, examining the fossil and archaeological evidence for 
clues to the thought and behaviour patterns of our ancestors and relatives, that we will 
be in a position to gain some purchase on the cognitive origins of science (Mithen, 
2002). 
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6.3 Abduction, tracking, and science 
In this chapter, I have examined Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) proposal that our 
capacity for science rests on theory formation capabilities that evolved to facilitate 
early childhood learning. I began by tracing the development of this evolutionary 
story across a series of successive formulations of the theory theory, highlighting both 
the development of cognitive connections between science and childhood, and the 
claim that science's success is ultimately dependent on these ties with childhood 
cognition. Following this presentation, I identified a number of criticisms that have 
been directed at this account, and argued that its 'just-so' status, dependence on the 
veridicality of human cognition, and inability to account for science's historical 
development, all serve to undermine Gopnik and Meltzoffs proposed solution to the 
evolutionary puzzle of our capacity for science. 
Having discounted the theory theory's story, I subsequently outlined an alternative 
account of the cognitive origins of science put forward by Mithen (2002), and backed 
by archaeological evidence, which suggests that our core scientific reasoning abilities 
are the emergent outcome of a piecemeal evolutionary history. Sketching the outline 
of this history from the earliest traces of humanity to the appearance of the first 
farming communities, I concluded that Mithen's research programme represents an 
informative approach to the issue of what makes science possible and, in contrast to 
the theory theory's just-so story, offers a useful framework for future investigations of 
the cognitive basis of science. 
Finally, given the focus of the current work on abductive methods of science, this 
chapter would not be complete without some preliminary speculations about the 
possible origins of abduction in human thought. In this respect, a recent account of 
the "roots of scientific reasoning" that examines the degree of continuity across 
reasoning strategies in human hunter-gatherers and scientists offered by Peter 
Carruthers (Carruthers, 2002b), is suggestive. Moreover, Carruthers' claims can be 
seen to be directly relevant to the continuity claims defended in this thesis, because 
they focus on the species of abductive inference involved in the generation and 
evaluation of theories that comprise the cornerstones of Haig's (2002) abductive 
theory of scientific method. 
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Briefly, Carruthers (2002b) reviews a selection of anthropological data relating to the 
extended processes of reasoning involved in tracking animals employed by 
contemporary hunter-gatherers, and argues for the existence of fundamental 
continuities between these inferential practices and the knowledge seeking strategies 
of scientists. He begins by identifying the critical elements of scientific reasoning 
with the processes of existential abduction and inference to the best explanation that 
were detailed in Chapter 3. Then, working predominantly from a detailed account of 
tracking and its links to science compiled by Liebenberg (1990),5 Carruthers 
demonstrates that the sophisticated speculative tracking engaged in by hunters in pre-
scientific cultures relies on just these forms of abductive inference. In particular, he 
highlights the need for hunters tracking an animal to construct rudimentary 
explanatory hypotheses about the likely behaviour of the animal, by reasoning back 
from traces of footprints, disturbed vegetation, etc. to the causal mechanisms 
underlying these signs. Moreover, he remarks that once generated, these hypotheses 
will typically be subjected to a process of intense comparative evaluation, in which 
hunters draw on a range of empirical and super-empirical criteria in order to establish 
which of the available hypotheses provides the best explanation of the spoor evidence. 
Having endorsed a continuity position on the relations between science and 
commonsense, Carruthers (2002b) proceeds to outline his preferred version of the 
emergence of these scientific abilities in human development, and speculates that the 
appearance of "sophisticated cross-modular abductive reasoning" in school age 
5 In his book "The art of tracking: the origin of science", Liebenberg (1990) relates the reasoning 
involved in tracking practiced by contemporary hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari to a hypothetico-
deductive (rather than abductive) model of science, which he then contrasts with an inductive account. 
A key feature of his argument is that the inferential requirements of sophisticated speculative tracking 
(as opposed to simple tracking) require the hunter to go beyond enumerative induction to generate a 
creative hypothesis that coherently explains a range of tracks and signs in terms of underlying causes. 
However, given that it is this creative generation of a hypothesis or theory and its subsequent 
evaluation in terms of its ability to provide the best explanation of the spoor evidence that Liebenberg 
wishes to emphasize in his parallels with scientific practice, I would suggest that the abductive account 
of scientific method endorsed in this thesis provides a more fitting source model for his claims. In this 
respect, it is also notable that Carruthers interprets Liebenberg's fmdings of hunter-gatherer tracking 
within an abductive methods framework. 
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children may be reliant on language as a critical precursor. 6 Finally, Carruthers 
concludes with some speculations about the origins of abductive inference in human 
evolution. In line with Liebenberg's (1990) proposals that the cognitive origins of 
science reside in the ability to interpret tracks and signs, which in tum may have 
evolved because of their important role in hunting, Carruthers suggests that one 
plausible scenario is to tie the adaptive function of abduction to these subsistence 
activities. In which case, as Carruthers points out, sexual selection forces would have 
been important in establishing some of the key inferential foundations of science 
(Carruthers, 2002b). 
In summary, while not professing to offer an evolutionary explanation of our capacity 
for abduction, Carruthers can be seen to offer some interesting speculations about the 
roots of scientific inference that are relevant to issues at the heart of the child-as-
scientist debate. Firstly, his argument for comparable scientific abilities across 
scientific and pre-scientific cultures endorses the fundamental assumption of 
continuities between science and commonsense on which the child-as-scientist 
analogy depends. Secondly, by focusing on the role of abductive methods in science, 
Carruthers' continuity account provides some measure of support for the specific 
parallels between scientific and everyday reasoning that are developed and defended 
in this thesis. Finally, by highlighting the role of existential abduction and inference 
to the best explanation in contemporary hunter-gatherer tracking, the work of both 
Carruthers (2002b) and Liebenberg (1990) can be seen to provide a potentially 
informative platform for future investigations of the origins of abductive science. 
Working from this platform, researchers can explore the initial speculation put 
forward by Liebenberg (1990) that "selection for an ability to interpret tracks and 
signs may have played a significant role in the evolution of the scientific intellect" 
(Liebenberg, 1990, pA). 
6 Given abduction is not dependent on language, a more plausible account of its development may, as 
indicated in Chapter 4, draw on the relationship between representational redescription and creative 
theory construction identified by Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) model. Interestingly, this model of the 
emergence of cognitive flexibility in ontogenetic development has also proven useful for researchers 
grappling with the problem of how such flexibility may have emerged in human minds over the course 
of evolutionary history (e.g., see Mithen, 1996a, 1 996b; Browne, 1996). 
Chapter 7 
An Abductive-Methods Perspective on the 
Child-as-Scientist Debate 
I began this thesis by asking how we can best characterize the development of 
knowledge in childhood. I suggested that, increasingly, researchers' attempts to 
answer this question are guided by analogy to the development of knowledge in 
science. As Keil, Levin, Richman and Gutheil (1999) remark, "[i]t has become 
increasingly tempting in recent years to consider children as intuitive theorists or little 
scientists" (Keil et ai., 1999, p.285). This comment reflects the fact that an extensive 
body of research now exists that subscribes to the idea that children parallel scientists 
in their attempts to explain and predict phenomena as they acquire knowledge of the 
world. Foremost among proponents of this view are Alison Gopnik and Andrew 
Meltzoff (1997), whose formulation of the theory theory takes the cognitive processes 
subs erving theory change in science and childhood cognitive development to be 
essentially the same. The aim of this thesis has been to critically examine the theory 
theory and to draft an alternative version of the analogy in which the construction of 
meaningful relations between children and scientists is achieved by adopting an 
abductive-methods perspective on the debate. In this concluding chapter, therefore, I 
first provide a summary of the main arguments, I then reinforce proposals for the 
utility of a methodological perspective on child-scientist paral~els by undertaking a 
detailed comparative evaluation the theory theory and the abductive-methods account, 
and finally close with some speculations regarding future directions. 
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7.1 Looking back 
In order to undertake a critical analysis of the utility of child-scientist parallels, my 
preparatory work in the Introduction comprised a brief review of the recent history of 
the child-as-scientist analogy in cognitive developmental research. Beginning with 
Henry Wellman's application of the scientific analogy to the content and structure of 
children's everyday knowledge, I highlighted a number of ways in which mappings 
have been constructed between children and scientists, and sketched some of the 
criticisms that have been levelled at the analogy by both psychologists and 
philosophers of science. Having situated the theory theory within its historical 
context, I then sought to lay the methodological foundations for the model 
development process to follow by investigating the role of analogy in science. I first 
identified the features that constitute a productive scientific analogy in general terms, 
and then outlined a specific theory of analogical reasoning developed by Holyoak and 
Thagard (1995), which characterizes the mapping process in terms of the 
simultaneous satisfaction of multiple competing constraints. I suggested that this 
multiconstraint theory serves to provide some broad directives for my proposed 
reformulation of child-scientist parallels and, in addition, offers a useful template for 
undertaking a comparative evaluation of the theory theory and my alternative 
methods-centred account. 
With these methodological provisions for constructing a productive scientific analogy 
in place, Chapter 1 undertook a detailed examination of Gopnik and Meltzoff s (1997) 
formulation of the theory theory. I began by outlining the main tenets of the 
theoretical framework and then focused on the four principal strategies adopted by the 
authors in a bid to develop the theory theory beyond its current heuristic status. 
Following this presentation, I turned to consider some of the criticisms that have been 
directed towards Gopnik and Meltzoffs characterization of child-scientist parallels, 
concerning both their claims for identity between scientific and childhood cognition, 
and their extension of the theory theory down to infancy. These criticisms prefigured 
my proposal that the major limitation of the theory theory account lies in its continued 
reliance on an inappropriate source model. Specifically, I argued that Gopnik and 
Meltzoff s account of child -scientist parallels places undue weight on Kuhnian ideas 
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about revolutionary conceptual change and, as a result, is unable to illuminate the 
mechanisms responsible for cognitive development in childhood. 
Following this critique of the theory theory, Chapter 2 initiated the development of an 
alternative formulation of child-scientist parallels, by looking to select a more 
appropriate source model for the analogy. Drawing on the evolutionary naturalist 
insights of Hooker (1987, 1989), I first outlined the general case for a methods-
centred view of science. Then I showed how the expressed purpose of Gopnik and 
Meltzoff's (1997) theory theory, namely to utilize theory-evidence relations in order 
to explain conceptual and linguistic developments, specifically requires a methods-
oriented approach. Having identified the potential utility of a methodological source 
model for the analogy, I turned to consider possibilities offered by the two major 
orthodox theories of scientific method. Evaluating each theory in terms of its 
prescriptions for knowledge generation, I argued that neither an inductive account 
with its unfulfilled promise of a 'truth-producing algorithm', nor the received 
hypothetico-deductive view with its emphasis on the sufficiency of empirical testing, 
has the capacity to provide an adequate account of scientific inquiry. This being the 
case, I advocated a move beyond orthodox accounts to more recent developments in 
scientific methodology, in an effort to secure an appropriate source model for my 
reformulation of child-scientist parallels. 
In Chapter 3, I detailed my chosen source model, a comprehensive abductive theory 
of scientific method put forward by Haig (2002), By way of introducing the 
abductive theory, I first identified a renewed philosophical interest in the empirical 
base of science and the role of experimental practice in producing facts worthy of 
scientific investigation. Following this review of the new experimentalist movement, 
I highlighted a related body of work by Bogen and Woodward (1988, 1992) that 
clarifies the nature of empirical facts. These authors demonstrate that it is 
phenomena, rather than observable data, which are the appropriate focus of scientific 
explanation and prediction. Due attention to phenomena detection in science in turn 
suggests the need for a corresponding focus on the explanation of phenomena and the 
codification of the inferential moves from descriptive claims about empirical 
phenomena to explanatory theory. In line with this need, I pointed to a growing 
recognition of abduction as an important species of scientific inference and the 
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concomitant development of computationally rigorous and operationally specific 
guidelines for explanatory reasoning. Against this backdrop of contemporary 
research, I presented Haig's abductive framework, emphasizing its focus on both the 
detection of empirical phenomena and their subsequent theoretical explanation via an 
abductive reasoning process that incorporates generation, development, and appraisal 
dimensions. I concluded that the abductive theory of scientific method offers an 
informative general perspective on scientific inquiry. Moreover, by doing so, it 
recommends itself as an appropriate source model with which to reformulate the 
child-as-scientist analogy. 
In order to map relations from the abductive-methods source model to the target of 
children's knowledge development effectively, Chapter 4 began by redefining the role 
of the child-as-scientist analogy within cognitive developmental research. I argued 
that Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) attempt to promote the theory theory as a successor 
to Piaget's constructivist framework does not facilitate the development of system 
mappings between children and scientists. I then considered as a more promising 
framework theory for developmental inquiry an alternative interactionist account of 
development put forward by Elman et al. (1996). Within this framework, I defined a 
narrower role for the child-as-scientist analogy by reviewing micro genetic analyses of 
children's problem solving strategies undertaken by Karmiloff-Smith (1984, 1988, 
1992) that provide persuasive evidence for the existence of creative theory 
construction in childhood. I concluded that Karmiloff-Smith's specific findings of 
data-to-theory moves in children's problem solving which accord with, and are further 
illuminated by, the abductive account of scientific method, indicate the utility of this 
reformulation of the analogy for investigating cognitive change. 
Having established the initial plausibility of my abductive-methods perspective on the 
child-as-scientist debate, Chapter 5 extended the application of the model beyond a 
concern with theory generation to examine the processes by which children evaluate 
the quality of everyday explanations. With this aim in mind, I reviewed a range of 
evidence for the claim that school age children are sensitive to criteria for evaluating 
theory goodness that are commonly identified with theory evaluation practices in 
science. I then linked these findings to the computational model of theory evaluation 
advanced by Thagard (1989, 1992), which combines these criteria in inferences to the 
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best explanation understood in terms of explanatory coherence. Drawing on 
Samarapungavan's (1992) investigation of children's scientific reasoning strategies, I 
argued that it is plausible to suggest children can appropriately use explanatory 
coherence considerations as a basis for theory selection. I concluded that an 
abductive-methods approach to theory evaluation, which incorporates a precise means 
of formulating the notion of inference to the best explanation, is capable of 
illuminating significant parallels between the evaluative strategies deployed in 
scientific and everyday thought. 
Finally, having demonstrated the utility of a methodological reformulation of the 
child-as-scientist analogy, Chapter 6 turned to speculate on the origins of our theory 
building abilities in light of Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) invocation of an 
evo.lutionary warrant for the theory theory. I began by tracing the emergence of an 
adaptationist explanation of child-scientist parallels through a series of progressive 
formulations of the theory theory by Gopnik and her colleagues. Following my 
reconstruction of the theory theory's evolutionary story, I considered a number of 
criticisms that jointly serve to undermine the theory theory's claim to have identified 
the cognitive basis of science. Then, having rejected Gopnik and Meltzoff's 
evolutionary speculations, I reviewed an alternative account of the emergence of 
scientific cognition in human evolution by Mithen (2002) and concluded that it offers 
an informative framework for investigating our human capacity for science. Finally, I 
briefly considered some speculations regarding a possible connection between 
scientific reasoning and tracking by Liebenberg (1990) and Carruthers (2002b) that 
hold particular relevance for the methodological parallels drawn in this thesis, and 
suggested that these accounts may offer a useful entry point for future investigations 
of the origins of abductive science. 
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7.2 Comparing analogies: The theory theory versus the abductive-
methods account 
172 
In her 1996 formulation of the child-as-scientist analogy, Gopnik (1996b) states that 
in order to move the analogy forward, we need to be more explicit about the proposed 
parallels between the development of knowledge in science and the development of 
knowledge in childhood. Likewise, Gopnik and Meltzoffs expressed aim is to 
present the theory theory in as much detail, and with as much precision as possible, 
thereby forcing researchers to reconsider its status as merely a "vague metaphor" 
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Yet despite recognizing the need for clarity, Chapter l's 
review of recent commentaries on the theory theory highlighted persisting 
ambiguities, including the strength ofthe relations being argued for (e.g., Giere, 1996; 
Stich & Nichols, 1998), and the actual location of the proposed parallels between 
scientific development and children's cognitive development (Downes, 1999; Bishop 
& Downes, 2002). 
As part of my own preparatory work undertaken in the Introduction, I suggested that 
attempts to achieve a clearer account of child-scientist parallels would benefit from 
the store of recent cognitive science research on the nature of analogical reasoning. In 
particular, I reviewed the multiconstraint theory of analogy put forward by Holyoak 
and Thagard (1995), and presented a template for undertaking a comparative 
examination of the theory theory and my alternative abductive-methods account 
drawn from their comprehensive treatment of analogical thinking. Now being in a 
position to apply this template, we can draw on the multi constraint theory's taxonomy 
of attribute, relational, and system mappings to construct representations of the two 
analogies, and use the multiple constraints of semantic similarity, structural 
consistency, and relevance-to-purpose to evaluate the relative coherence of each 
account. 
7.2.1 The theory theory 
Table 7.1 offers a representation of Gopnik and Meltzoff s (1997) theory theory using 
Holyoak and Thagard's tripartite distinction between attribute, relational, and system 
mappings (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; see also Shelley, 1999a, 1999b). 
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Table 7.1 A representation of the theory theory using the 
multi constraint theory's taxonomy of attribute, relational, 
and system mappings. 
SOURCE: SCIENCE TARGET: CHILDHOOD 
Attribute scientists children 
scientists'-theories children's-mental-models 
scientists'-cognitive-development children's-cognitive-development 
scientific-theories children's-mental-models 
theoretical-terms children's-early-words 
theory-change conceptual-change 
semantic-change semantic-change 
scientific-development children's-cognitive-development 
Relational (comprise (theories, coherent-structure) comprise-1) comprise (mental-models, coherent-structure) comprise-2) 
(have (theories, interpretative-function) have-1) (have (mental-models, interpretative-function) have-2) 
(have (theories, predictive-function) have-3) (have (mental-models, predictive-function) have-4 
(change (theories) change-1) (change (mental-models) change-2) 
System (cause (evidence, change-1) cause-1) (cause (evidence, change-2) cause-2) 
(entails (change-1, semantic-change) entails-1) (entails (change-2, semantic-change) entails-2) 
(explains (cause-1, scientific-development) explains-1) (explains (cause-2, cognitive-development) explains-2) 
This taxonomy serves to emphasize the depth of the parallels being argued for, and 
hence is particularly useful for comparing competing analogies. More specifically, 
each row in the table depicts a particular mapping between the source (science) and 
the target (childhood). The mappings identified in the top third of the table are 
attribute mappings, where attributes of the source and the target are placed in 
correspondence with each other on the basis of their perceptual and/or semantic 
similarity. The middle third of the table depicts more complex relational mappings, 
in which it is the relation between attributes that is mapped from the source analog to 
the target. Finally, the bottom third of the table contains system mappings - the most 
complex and abstract form of mappings identified by the multiconstraint theory. 
System mappings constitute mappings of higher order relations based on causal 
concepts, including 'cause', 'explain', 'entail', 'facilitate', etc. and involve whole sets 
of interconnected relations being mapped from source to target. 
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The first thing we notice about this representation of the theory theory is that a large 
number of the proposed correspondences are located at the initial level of attribute 
mappings. So for example, scientists in the source domain maps to children in the 
target domain, and scientists' theories maps to children's mental models. Moreover, 
two distinct groupings of attribute mappings can be identified: those that map 
knowledge structures and processes of scientists as individual cognitive agents to 
children's knowledge structures and processes, and those that map attributes of 
science and scientific change to the pattern of knowledge development in childhood. 
At the next level down, the more complex relational mappings identified are 
concerned with the content of scientific knowledge and, by analogy, children's 
knowledge. In particular, these relational mappings identify relations between 
theories and their characteristic structural, functional, and dynamic properties that are 
then mapped to children's mental models. So for example, scientific theories 
comprise coherent structures (comprise-i), which have interpretative and predictive 
functions (have-i and have-3), and undergo change (change-i). Similarly, children's 
mental models are argued to be coherent (comprise-2), to provide children with 
interpretations and predictions about phenomena (have-2 and have-4), and be 
defeasible (change-2). Finally, the system mappings identified represent the higher 
order relations invoked by the theory theory to support claims of deep similarities 
between the processes of knowledge development in science and childhood. As 
Shelley (1999b) remarks, " ... system mappings indicate not just that two conceptions 
are similar, but why they are similar (1999b, p.149, italics in original). In the case of 
the theory theory, the causal-explanatory concepts mapped from source to target can 
be seen to draw on a broadly Kuhnian analysis of scientific development. The 
relations being mapped suggest that the accumulation of counter-evidence is primarily 
responsible for theory change (cause-i) and this interplay between theories and 
evidence, which also entails semantic changes (entails-i), accounts for scientific 
development (explains-i). Similarly, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) argue that evidence 
causes children's mental models to change (cause-2), which entails associated 
linguistic developments (entails-2), and provides an explanation for the majority of 
cognitive development in childhood (explains-2). 
Working from this multiconstraint representation of the theory theory, then, provides 
an initial indication of the complexity of the parallels constructed by Gopnik and 
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Meltzoff (1997). At a general level, it indicates that many of the mappings involve 
shared lists of attributes rather than the more complex causal relations that obtain in 
system mappings. More specifically, this representation reveals that proposals for 
substantive cognitive parallels between scientists and children, which are central to 
Gopnik and Meltzoff's (1997) defence, fail to demonstrate any degree of analogical 
depth. In particular, the attribute mappings constructed between scientists' (as 
opposed to 'science') and children's knowledge acquisition processes, are not 
supported by any system mappings that identify the relevant set of causal relations to 
be transferred from source to target. Rather, the system mappings given in Table 7.1 
draw their warrant from Kuhn's analysis of the social/institutional mechanisms 
involved in revolutionary scientific change (e.g., Kuhn, 1962). The resulting absence 
of system mappings licensed by a cognitive-oriented theory of scientific inquiry 
means that the theory theory's construal of child-scientist parallels lacks analogical 
complexity. 
According to a multiconstraint analysis, the goodness or coherence of an analogy is 
determined by applying the standards of similarity, structure, and purpose. More 
specifically, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) argue that a productive scientific analogy 
promotes system mappings between source and target by simultaneously satisfying 
the following constraints: 
i) Semantic Similarity - the degree of perceptual and/or semantic similarity 
between mapped elements of the source and the target; 
ii) Structural Consistency - the degree to which the analogy constitutes an 
isomorphism; 
iii) Relevance-to-Purpose - the degree to which the analogy provides a solution to 
the problem that prompted the construction of the analogy in the first place 
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). 
How does the theory theory fare when judged against this set of evaluative criteria? 
Taking the constraint of similarity first, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) can be seen to 
rely on natural correspondences between components of the source and the target that 
exploit perceptual and semantic similarities holding between scientists and children. 
So for example, scientists' conceptual structures and children's conceptual structures 
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are paired on the basis of object similarity, as are scientist's cognitive processes and 
children's cognitive processes. In addition, the source and target are seen to be 
semantically similar: in both cases, theoretical structures are implicated in knowledge 
acquisition, which in tum is seen to involve a process of theory change. Moreover, 
Table 7.1 shows that Gopnik and Meltzoffs (1997) relational and system mappings 
involve identical predicates, thereby indicating that the analogy between the 
development of knowledge in science and the development of knowledge in 
childhood is a strong and reasonable one. 
Countering this conclusion, however, are the criticisms of the theory theory reviewed 
in earlier chapters, many of which can be seen to relate to the constraint of similarity. 
In particular, researchers such as Bishop and Downes (2002), Downes (1999), 
Gellatly (1997), and Russell (1992), all question in various ways the validity of the 
proposal that revolutionary theory change in science and cognitive development in 
childhood are similar or even comparable processes given that they rely on 
fundamentally different sets of causal relations for their operation. In Chapter 1, I 
argued that Gopnik and Meltzoff s (1997) attempt to counter these concerns by giving 
science a cognitive characterization and attempting to promote parallels between 
scientists and children as individual cognitive agents. Based on the representation of 
the theory theory given in Table 7.1, however, this criticism appears to be upheld. 
That is, while claiming to have identified substantive cognitive correspondences 
between children and scientists, the majority of the mappings constructed by Gopnik 
and Meltzoff (1997) can be seen to involve non-cognitive comparisons between 
abstract features of science and scientific change and children's knowledge 
development. Moreover, the theory theory's system mappings that indicate the 
reasons why the source and target are similar, attach identical predicates to an 
institutional process of knowledge change on the one hand, and an individual's 
knowledge acquisition on the other, thereby violating constraints of similarity at the 
level of causal relations. 
In addition to a failure to satisfy similarity constraints at the level of system mappings, 
the theory theory has also been criticized on grounds of structural inconsistencies. In 
particular, work by Bishop and Downes (2002) and Downes (1999) suggests that the 
theory theory is "multiply ambiguous", promoting a range of possible relations 
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between the source analog and the target that compete with one another and create 
tensions within the analogy. According to the multi constraint theory, the constraint of 
structural consistency is satisfied in an analogy when two conditions are met: 1) each 
predicate in the source analog is aligned with a unique predicate in the target; and 2) 
when two predicates are mapped, their corresponding arguments are also mapped 
from source to target. Table 7.1 reflects the concerns raised by Bishop and Downes, 
by depicting attribute mappings that violate the first of these conditions. Specifically, 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) can be seen to align children's cognitive development 
with both scientists' cognitive development and scientific development, and children's 
mental models with scientists' theories and scientific theories, thereby violating the 
one-to-one mapping constraint that impacts on the theory theory's overall structural 
integrity (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; see also Gentner, 1983). 
Finally, my own criticisms of the theory theory can be seen to relate to the third 
constraint on analogical reasoning identified by the multiconstraint theory, which 
concerns the purpose of the analogy. Discussing this constraint, Holyoak and 
Thagard (1995) argue that it is important to examine the elements of the source analog 
that are relevant to the user's goal of solving a problem in the target domain. For 
example, in explanation-driven uses of analogy, the relevant elements are the set of 
causal relationships operating in the source that can point to potential causes of the 
target behaviour under study (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). In Chapters 1 and 2, I 
suggested that Gopnik and Meltzoff s (1997) goal in using the analogy is to develop a 
replacement framework theory for cognitive development that provides an 
explanatory account of the cognitive mechanisms subserving conceptual and linguistic 
developments in children. From the representation given in Table 7.1, however, the 
theory theory version of the analogy fails to meet this goal, due to its continued 
reliance, depicted in its system mappings, on a Kuhnian account of scientific 
development. As I have repeatedly argued, the set of causal relationships operating in 
this account offers no insights into individual scientists' cognition and, accordingly, is 
unable to contribute to productive reasoning about the mechanisms underpinning 
children's knowledge acquisition processes. 
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7.2.2 The abductive-methods account 
Contrasting with the representation of the theory theory given in Table 7.1, Table 7.2 
details the particular pattern of attribute, relational, and system mappings 
underpinning the abductive-methods version of the child-as-scientist analogy. 
Table 7.2 A representation of the abductive-methods account using 
the multi constraint theory's taxonomy of attribute, 
relational, and system mappings. 
SOURCE TARGET 
Attribute scientists children 
scientists'-theories children's-mental-models 
scientists'-methods children's-methods 
Relational (comprise (theories, coherent-structure) comprise-1) (comprise (mental-models, coherent-structure) comprise-2) 
(have (theories, explanatory-function) have-1) (have (mental-models, explanatory-function) have-2) 
(construct (scientists, theories) construct-1) (construct (children, models) construct-2) 
(employ (scientists, existential-abduction employ-1) (employ (children, existential-abduction) employ-2) 
(apply (scientists, EC-criteria) apply-1) (apply (children, EC-criteria) apply-2) 
System (in-order-that (construct-1, explain) in-order-that-1) (in-order-that (construct-2, explain) in-order-that-2) 
(enables (employ-1, theory-generation) enables-1) (enables (employ-2, model-generation) enables-2) 
(facilitates (apply-1, theory-evaluation) facilitates-1) (facilitates (apply-2, model-evaluation) facilitates-2) 
(explains (enables-1, construct-1) explains-1) (explains (enables-2, construct-2) explains-2) 
(explains (facilitates-1, construct-1) explains-3) (explains (facilitates-2, construct-2) explains-4) 
The first point of difference concerns the relative distribution of mappings across the 
three categories, with the majority of correspondences between the source and the 
target on the abductive-methods account being located at the levels of relational and 
system mappings. Further, the mappings identified are more tightly focused on 
scientists' cognitive constructions and their methods of inquiry, with the attribute 
mappings between scientists' theories and children's mental models, and between 
scientists' methods and children's methods being supported by deeper relational 
mappings that identify the specific inferential strategies involved. In particular, the 
relational mappings shown can be seen to go beyond the proposal that both scientists 
and children construct theories to include additional correspondences indicating that 
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scientists employ existential abduction (employ-i) and that they apply explanatory 
coherence criteria (apply-i). Similarly, children are argued to rely on the same 
abductive principles in their problem solving attempts, employing existential 
abduction (employ-2) and applying criteria relevant to explanatory coherence 
considerations (apply-2). 
Finally, the system mappings promoted by the abductive-methods account offer 
additional support for the attribute and relational mappings identified between 
scientists and children, by giving the reasons for the lower level relations between the 
source and the target. These include the motivations to engage in theory building 
activities; that is, scientists and, by analogy, children are seen to construct their 
representational structures in order to gain explanatory understanding (in-order-that). 
Further, the capacity for abductive reasoning is directly related to the ability to 
effectively generate and evaluate claims about theoretical entities. Scientists' 
employment of existential abduction enables them to generate explanatory theories 
(enables-i), and their application of explanatory coherence criteria facilitates the 
effective evaluation of their theories (facilitates-i), which together contribute to an 
explanation of the theory formation process (explains-i and explains-3). Similarly, 
children's ability to use existential abduction and apply explanatory coherence criteria 
allow them to generate and evaluate explanatory models (enables-2 andfacilitates-2), 
which combine to offer the beginnings of an explanation of how children develop 
knowledge of the world (explains-2 and explains-4). 
Compared with the multiconstraint representation of the theory theory, the abductive-
methods account depicted in Table 7.2 demonstrates a greater level of mapping 
complexity in its comparisons of scientists and children. To begin with, the majority 
of the mappings depicted are relational and system mappings as opposed to more 
superficial mappings between basic attributes of the source and target. In addition, 
the abductive-methods account resolves the tension between theory theory 
comparisons based on the scientist as individual cognitive agent and those based on an 
abstract account of scientific change, by focusing exclusively on methodological 
parallels between scientists and children informed by an abductive theory of scientific 
method. As a result, the methods-centred mappings constructed between scientists 
and children at both attribute and relational levels are supported and further deepened 
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by complex system mappings that apply causal-explanatory concepts drawn from the 
abductive theory to make sense of the theory construction efforts of children. 
The proposal that the abductive-methods version of child-scientist parallels 
demonstrates a greater degree of mapping complexity than the theory theory gains 
further credence when judged against the standards of the multiconstraint theory. 
Firstly, regarding the constraint of similarity, this alternative abductive-methods 
account can be seen to overcome many of the concerns raised by theory theory critics 
relating to violations of this constraint. Like the theory theory, the abductive-methods 
account is initially guided by natural correspondences between components of the 
source and the target that draw on perceptual and semantic similarities holding 
between scientists and children. However, unlike the theory theory, this alternative 
account is able to capitalize on these correspondences by adopting a methodological 
source model that searches for a deeper basis to these similarities. In addition, this 
source model allows the abductive-methods account to avoid many of the 
fundamental dissimilarities between source and target facing theory theory proponents 
who are attempting to match the process of knowledge development in children to an 
abstract, disembodied account of scientific theory change. Furthemiore, the use of 
identical predicates by the abductive-methods account, indicating that the source and 
target are semantically very similar, is supported by the range of evidence reviewed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 that points to compelling similarities between the inferential 
strategies actually employed by scientists and children in their knowledge seeking 
endeavours. 
Secondly, by selecting a methodological source model that gives precedence to the 
view of scientists as cognitive agents, the abductive-methods account avoids the 
structural inconsistencies identified in the theory theory analogy. In Gopnik and 
Meltzoffs (1997) account, tendencies to violate one-to-one mappings can be seen to 
stem from the inability of a Kuhnian source model to support the effective 
construction of cognitive mappings between scientists and children. As a result, 
children's representational structures and their knowledge acquisition processes are 
not only mapped to scientific theories and scientific development, but also to 
scientists' theories and scientists' cognitive development, thereby weakening the 
structural integrity of the analogy. In contrast, the abductive-methods account, with 
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its focus on the methods and inferential strategies employed by individual scientists, 
eliminates the need for such two-to-one mappings. Specifically, Table 7.2 shows that 
each element in the source is mapped to exactly one element in the target, thereby 
ensuring that the abductive-methods analogy is structurally consistent. 
Finally, this alternative abductive-methods version of the child-as-scientist analogy 
fulfills the purpose for which it was designed, by supporting my proposal of 
substantive methodological correspondences between scientific and everyday 
cognition. In Chapter 4, I made it clear that I did not endorse Gopnik and Meltzoffs 
(1997) goal of constructing a replacement explanatory framework for cognitive 
developmental research. Rather, I argued for a revised role for the analogy, in which 
the focus of investigation is limited to identifYing correspondences between the 
explanatory reasoning strategies employed by scientists and children in their attempts 
to construct accurate representations of the world. Therefore, in one important sense, 
the purpose of the abductive-methods analogy is far narrower and more constrained 
than that of the theory theory, dealing exclusively with abductive principles of 
inference and attempting to transfer knowledge about the operation of these principles 
in a scientific context to the everyday context of children's reasoning. However, in 
another sense this alternative formulation can be seen to have a much broader goal in 
mind than the goal articulated by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997). Rather than seeking to 
identifY a 'special' relationship between children and scientists, the abductive-
methods account attempts to identify robust commonalities in method that extend 
across science and commonsense inquiry. From the representation given in Table 7.2, 
this goal is achieved by the construction of systematic correspondences between 
patterns of higher order relations that provide an integrated abductive-methods 
interpretation of creative reasoning in scientific and everyday contexts. 
To summarize, by employing a multi constraint analysis of the theory theory and the 
alternative methods-centred account, we gain a rich and informative way of 
representing and evaluating these two analogies. Using Holyoak and Thagard's 
(1995) taxonomy of attribute, relational, and system mappings to depict each 
formulation of child-scientist parallels serves to highlight the complexity ofthe causal 
connections made by the abductive-methods account relative to the theory theory. 
Moreover, this indication of greater complexity and coherence is reinforced by the 
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degree to which the abductive-methods analogy satisfies the constraints of similarity, 
structure, and purpose. Specifically, based on its ability to construct mappings of 
similar higher-order relations that evidence a high degree of structural consistency and 
contribute to its purpose, we can conclude the abductive-methods analogy offers a 
means of developing relations of greater abstractness, generality, and complexity 
between scientific and everyday cognition. These relations promise to advance the 
child-as-scientist debate beyond current theory theory concerns in a number of 
potentially fruitful ways. 
7.3 Future directions: Consolidating an abductive perspective on 
human reasoning 
I have argued that Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) look to the analogy with science to 
answer the question of how knowledge develops. In particular, they aim to extend the 
analogy beyond its widespread application to the content of everyday conceptual 
knowledge, to investigate the processes by which children form and revise this 
knowledge over the course of development. According to Gopnik and Meltzoff, 
children are not just in possession of conceptual frameworks that look a lot like 
theories, they are theoreticians, closely resembling scientists in their attempts to 
explain and predict the phenomena encountered in their everyday interactions with the 
world. Having undertaken an extended analysis of the theory theory and its 
implications for cognitive developmental research, I have argued that the theory 
theory fails in its bid to offer a coherent and productive account of this knowledge 
development process. Despite the authors' claims that the theory theory can explain 
many important psychological phenomena of cognitive development, I have shown 
that the theory theory's reliance on a Kuhnian source model of scientific change does 
not facilitate the construction of system mappings between scientists and children. In 
the absence of any system mappings supporting substantive cognitive parallels, the 
theory theory is unable to show how insights about the causal relations at work in the 
source, answer questions about the corresponding set of causal relations in the target. 
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In addition to analysing the theory theory, however, I have also attempted to 
formulate a more viable version of the child-as-scientist analogy, based on 
methodological parallels with the processes of inquiry identified in scientific practice. 
Focusing on the application of abductive inference strategies not only creates 
informative connections between the creative reasoning of scientists and children, but 
also points the way to the formation of a more general category or abductive schema 
that both includes these two examples within its scope and applies to investigations of 
human reasoning more widely. In their account of the role of analogy in creative 
thought, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) emphasize the connection between analogy and 
the formation of schemas, which they characterize as complex concepts " ... based on 
the relational structure common to the target and the source" (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1995, p.220). They propose a cyclical relationship whereby the construction of 
analogies facilitates the formation of new and more abstract schemas, which in tum 
promote the discovery of more remote analogies, and so on. Likewise, Nersessian 
(1999) stresses the importance of generic abstraction in analogical modelling, arguing 
that the process of abstracting what is common to specific instances in a problem 
context in order to form a general category based on patterns of higher order relations, 
plays a crucial role in scientific discovery and conceptual change. Relating these 
proposals to the child-as-scientist debate, the abductive-methods account of the 
analogy can be seen to draw on insights from scientific methodology, cognitive 
developmental research, and computational philosophy of science, to abstract what 
scientists' and children's reasoning strategies have in common in the context of 
creative theory construction. The result is the identification of a pattern of relations 
between species of abductive inference and their functional roles in generating and 
evaluating explanations of empirical phenomena that has potential applications 
beyond the specific instances examined in this thesis. Speculating on how such a 
schema could contribute to the consolidation of an abductive perspective on human 
reasoning more generally, the following lines of inquiry would appear particularly 
promising: 
A cognitive developmental perspective on abduction can complement current 
philosophical and AI approaches In Chapter 3, I pointed to a recent revival of interest 
in abductive inference by both philosophers of science and artificial intelligence 
researchers. Within philosophy of science, creative reasoning strategies, long 
An Abductive-Methods Perspective on the Child-as-Scientist Debate 184 
marginalized under a deductive logic model of scientific reasoning, have received 
increased attention in attempts to codify scientific discovery practices (e.g., Curd, 
1980; Magnani, Nersessian & Thagard, 1999), and have been accorded a central role 
in attempts to construct an adequate model of scientific inference more generally (e.g., 
Haig, 2002; Magnani, 2001; Thagard, 1988; Rozeboom, 1972, 1997). Within the 
arena of AI, the development and testing of abductive solutions to a range of problems 
including medical diagnosis, planning, and decision-making, has led researchers such 
as Josephson and Josephson (1994) to argue that abduction is ubiquitous in human 
reasoning, and that abductive inference models have potential for wide application 
across scientific and everyday contexts. 
Adding to the results of this "renaissance of research on explanatory reasoning" 
(Thagard, 2001), the current work has revealed substantive correspondences between 
scientists and young children in the abductive inferential strategies underpinning 
creative theory construction. In light of these correspondences, a cognitive 
developmental approach to the study of abduction could prove a useful source of 
insights that serves to complement the existing lines of investigation by philosophers 
and AI researchers. Specifically, detailed empirical investigations of the emergence 
of abductive inference in human development could contribute to an improved 
understanding of the necessary precursors to creative reasoning, which in tum could 
inform the design of computational systems that attempt to model human discovery 
processes. In addition, a focus on the earliest forms of abductive inference in young 
children may assist in answering questions of whether or not there are more basic or 
fundamental kinds of explanatory reasoning and, if so, how these forms relate to the 
species of abductive inference identified in scientific practice. Such answers could 
contribute to current attempts to develop taxonomies of abductive inference (e.g., 
Magnani, 2001; Thagard, 1988), as well as provide a starting point for tracing the 
developmental trajectory of explanatory reasoning capabilities more generally. 
Conversely, ongoing work carried out by cognitive developmentalists under the broad 
heading of causal and explanatory reasoning, could gain a deeper, more theoretically 
informed focus by being integrated with current philosophy of science and AI work in 
an interdisciplinary study of abduction. 
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Investigating the origins of abductive science may clarify Peirce's speculation 
that we possess an evolved facility for "guessing right" In Chapter 6 I suggested that 
a comprehensive solution to the puzzle of what makes science possible would, 
following Mithen's lead, need to look at evidence for the evolution of our scientific 
abilities contained in the fossil and archaeological records. Following my review of 
Mithen's account of the emergence of scientific reasoning in human evolution, I 
briefly sketched some speculations relating to the possible origins of abductive 
inference that draw on anthropological studies of pre-scientific cultures. In particular, 
the detailed fieldwork undertaken by Liebenberg (1990) suggests the presence of 
some fundamental continuities between the reasoning processes involved in the 
speculative tracking of contemporary hunter-gatherers and the abductive inferential 
practices at the heart of scientific practice, thereby linking our evolved human 
capacity for abduction to its role in successful hunting. 
These speculations about the possible origins of abduction in human thought would 
appear to mesh well with Peirce's own ideas about our capacity for abductive 
inference. In particular, Peirce believed that the human mind demonstrates a peculiar 
affinity with nature, to the extent that we demonstrate a facility for making correct 
abductions or 'guessing right'after only a limited number of attempts: 
Nature is a far vaster and less clearly arranged repertory of facts than a 
census report; and if men had not come to it with special aptitudes for 
guessing right, it may well be doubted whether in the ten or twenty 
thousand years that they may have existed their greatest mind would 
have attained the amount of knowledge which is actually possessed by 
the lowest idiot. (Peirce, 1932, vol.2, p.476) 
Moreover, he suggested that an explanation for the existence of this abductive facility 
is likely to be found in an evolutionary history of the human mind: 
There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that man's mind, having been 
developed under the influence of the laws of nature, for that reason 
naturally thinks somewhat after nature's pattern. (Peirce, 1958, vol. 7, 
p.30) 
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Future investigations of the possible links between abduction and tracking in human 
evolution that adopt Mithen's evidence-based approach to studying the cognitive 
origins of science, then, may be able to clarify Peirce's speculation that we possess an 
evolved facility for "guessing right". In particular, Mithen's own work (Mithen, 
1988) has provided direct evidence for the sorts of abductively driven speculative 
tracking discussed by Carruthers and Liebenberg, in the imagery of Upper Paleolithic 
cave art. Working from these sorts of records, and with a comprehensive account of 
abduction in hand, it remains the task of future researchers to determine whether the 
tentative connections to tracking can provide the foundations of an evolutionary 
explanation of abductive reasoning and, if so, identify when during the course of 
human evolution this facility may have emerged. 
Increased knowledge of the abductive inferential strategies underpinning 
creative theory construction has potential applications for science education 
Reviewing the literature on the child-as-scientist analogy reveals that it is not only 
developmental psychologists who have placed undue weight on Kuhn's ideas about 
revolutionary conceptual change. Science education researchers can also be seen to 
have relied heavily on the Kuhnian-informed analogy with science. In a seminal 
paper, Rosalind Driver and Jack Easley (Driver & Easley, 1978) proposed that 
students' everyday knowledge of natural phenomena is best understood as coherent 
bodies of intuitive ideas or "alternative frameworks", rather than misunderstandings 
or immature versions of adult scientific understandings. In addition, these researchers 
argued that children's cognitive development could be likened to a series of 
conceptual revolutions, paralleling Kuhn's (1962) description of paradigm shifts in 
science, and suggested that this Kuhnian-inspired model of radical theory change may 
have application for science education research and teaching practices (see also 
Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982). This work is generally regarded as an 
important instigator· of the constructivist movement in science education that has 
dominated contemporary approaches to research and teaching of science since the 
1980's (Kyle, Osbourne, Leach, Scott & Norris, 1998). 
However, while helpful in alerting science educators to the actual content and 
structure of children's ideas about natural phenomena, the 'conceptual change as 
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theory change' model has proved less successful in supplying crucial insights about 
the processes through which new ideas are generated and evaluated. This has led to 
increased debate about its pedagogical utility for science education. 1 Given the 
inability of the Kuhnian-inspired model to provide an account of the psychological 
mechanisms involved in creative theory construction, the alternative methods-centred 
account of child-scientist parallels formulated in this thesis could offer a useful 
starting point for researchers wanting to characterize the process of knowledge 
acquisition in science students. In partiCUlar, delineating close connections between 
species of abductive inference and their roles in generating and evaluating 
explanations of empirical phenomena in both scientists and children suggests that an 
abductive-methods framework could take researchers beyond the basic idea that 
children construct theories to offer some specific guidelines about the inferential 
strategies and methods involved. Incorporating these abductive inference guidelines 
into their models of cognitive change could in tum prove useful for researchers 
tackling the complex problem of how children learn science, and guide thinking about 
how we can best apply knowledge of children's inquiry methods in formal science 
instruction. 
In conclusion, the current work has attempted to offer an informative methodological 
perspective on the child-as-scientist debate that overcomes limitations inherent in 
current approaches. The result is an abductive-methods formulation that integrates 
insights from scientific methodology, cognitive development, and contemporary 
philosophy of science to identify substantive parallels between the processes by which 
children and scientists develop knowledge of the world. The widespread failure by 
philosophers and psychologists until recently to acknowledge the pervasiveness of 
abductive reasoning in scientific inquiry and everyday problem solving has been, in 
my view, to the detriment of our understanding of human creativity in both domains. 
However, by acknowledging that a codifiable form of creative inference exists, and 
that it is ubiquitous in scientific and everyday knowledge seeking, we can look to 
advance knowledge of our human methods of discovery and explanation. In this 
respect, the most important benefits of the child-as-scientist analogy may be to 
promote the cross-fertilization of ideas between scientific methodologists and 
1 See for example two recent special issues of Science & Education: "Children's Theories and 
Scientific Theories" (September, 1999) and "Thomas Kuhn and Science Education (January, 2000). 
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cognitive and developmental psychologists on the nature of creative reasoning. Only 
by detailed, interdisciplinary investigation of abductive inference practices in science 
and commonsense will we be in a position to say how knowledge development is 
possible, whether in our everyday exploits as children or in our intellectual pursuits as 
professional scientists. 
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